

ESSAYS ON INDOLOGY

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PREFACE

The present volume consists of four sections; i.e. Sanskrit Philology, Textual Criticism, Sanskrit Literature and Indian Philosophy. It incorporates in part the matter which was published in various research journals of India over the years. The two critiques on the Sanskrit Dutakavyas and the Conception of Time in the Post-Vedic Sanskrit Literature which had not been published hitherto except the discussion on Bhartrhari's Conception of Time (which was published in the Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, Volume XXXIX. 1958) are new additions. These as published here consist of fifty seven and fifty-six pages respectively and within the limitations of a short study can be considered to be fairly detailed. These can serve at least as the nucleus of a thorough and exhaustive study of these topics later. Their value on this point alone cannot be over-emphasised.

Apart from these two distinct additions there is quite a substantial addition to the already published matter too. Thus, for example, the study on Sanskrit Semantics as published in the Poona Orientalist, Volume XXIII, Nos. 3 & 4., 1958, has increased here in volume by about a half. From fourteen it has now grown to twenty-one pages. Similarly the study of the Concept of Fate in the Valmiki Ramayana which was published in the Poona Orientalist, Volume XXIII, Nos. 1 & 2, 1958, has been conjoined with another similar study in fifteen pages of the Concept of Daiva and Purusakara in the Vasistha Ramayana which had not been published so far but which was pertinent in view of the fact that the tradition ascribes to Valmiki, the authorship of the Vasistha Ramayana too.

Among the further new additions may be mentioned the study of the words Kirata and Kahala, the Sanskrit

Originals of a few Hindi and Panjabi Words, the Text of Dik and Kala Samuddesas of the Vakyapadiya and its Commentary, Poetry in the Vamana Purana and the An-yoktis of the Vasistha Ramayana. As a matter of fact, this volume of 236 pages contains not more than seventy-page-matter already published in various oriental research journals of India.¹ The rest is a new addition, the result of my latest researches.

Keeping in view the various topics dealt with, some sort of classification has been attempted here and the essays grouped under a common head. This classification is broad-based, though not strictly scientific.

I may mention that nobody could be more conscious of the shortcomings of this work than I. Any suggestions for its improvement, therefore, would be most welcome.

Inspite of all the precaution and care taken, some misprints have crept in, for which I request the scholars to make a reference to the Errata.

In the end it is my most pleasant duty to thank my father Pandit Charudeva Shastri for his very kind guidance and help in the preparation of this volume. I am also grateful to Messrs Mehar Chand Lachhman Dass for undertaking the publication of the work and seeing it through the press expeditiously.

Satyavrat

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1. Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal (Vol. XXIII. 1957 No. 2). The Bhāratiya Vidyā (Volume XV; No. 2, 1956). The Poona Orientalist (Vols. XXI. Nos. 1-4, 1956; XXIII. Nos. 1-2, 1958; XXIII. Nos. 3-4, 1958; XXIV. Nos. 3-4, 1959) and the Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute (Vol. XXXIX, 1958).

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Puri, Orissa

ERRATA

84	27	ksapāt	for	kṣpāt
89	Footnote	°vikrayī	"	°vikravī
57	3	lute	"	flute
101	26	abductor	"	abductor
103	36	her	"	him
105	25	used	"	u s e
114	19	kanakamukharī	"	kanakamukhuri
123	34	anuṣṭubh	"	anuṣṭubha
126	10	flirt	"	carouse
153	14	is forms	"	is in forms
170	3	dyad	"	dvad
170	6	nirapṣāḥ	"	nirapṣā
171	18	kālas	"	hālas
176	Footnote	pratyayāntaraviśeṣepi	"	pratyayāntaraviśeṣepi
183	"	kālāvibhāgāt	"	kālāvibhāgāt
184	5	things	"	kings
189	14	fine	"	five
190	14	Schools	"	School
197	Footnote	parāparavyatikara°	"	parāparavyatikarv°
198	10	kalā	"	kāla
204	Footnote	bhūmivāryanalānilāḥ	"	bhūmivāryanalānalāḥ
210	14	dyad	"	dvad
222	6	santāpam	"	snatāpam

Indian Culture in the light of Sanskrit Language.

— Satya Vrat Shastri

Prof. of Sanskrit
SANSKRIT LANGUAGE AND INDIAN CULTURE

University of Delhi

For the study of our ancient culture, we have at our disposal a vast literature consisting of the Epics, the Purāṇas, the Arthaśāstra and other allied treatises. The memoirs of Buddhist pilgrims, the memoranda of foreign visitors, the inscriptions, the coins, and the works of the court-poets are an additional source. All this is useful evidence, but never beyond question. Recorded history cannot claim to represent objective reality. The subjective element may vitiate the whole thing. There are not a few facts in history which are differently described by contemporary authorities and by actual observers. In the fight between Mahmud Khilji of Malwa and Rana Kumbha Karna of Mewar, each claimed a victory for himself. Mahmud raised a pillar of victory at Mandu near Dhar and the Rana commemorated it by a pillar at Chittor. Badauni describes the outcome of the battle at Haldighat as a victory for Akbar, but the writings on the walls of the temples of Udaipur speak of a victory for Pratap. Similarly the result of a battle at Mudki (Ferozepore) between the English and the Sikhs is differently told. The truth, therefore, lies obscured and buried under a thick crust of prejudice. The impressions of foreign visitors regarding the ways and manners of the ancient Indians may also be biased. A visitor may not have duly appreciated what he saw, may have partly or wholly misunderstood the life and thought of the people or wilfully misrepresented it. He may have an innate aversion for certain things and may have, therefore, overlooked them. Or, he may have a strong liking for certain other things and may have, therefore, overdone the picture. Even an intelligent, vigilant and dispassionate observer may give us a version of things and

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happenings which may not be perfectly true. But facts gleaned from linguistics are unchallengable. They stand out with an unobscurable perspicuity. The process of gleaning them is highly interesting. We, therefore, attempt to present a view of the Aryan Culture as the study of the Sanskrit language affords us.

It is well known that the ancient Aryans dubbed non-Indians, men of other races, as impure. They gave them the name 'mlechha'. Let us see if this was a mere conceit or well-grounded, legitimate pride. Unless we assume that the Aryans of yore lived close to water, making full and free use of it like aquatic birds, we cannot satisfactorily explain words like *snātaka*. In good old days, a young boy was entrusted to the care of a 'guru' with whom he lived a life of self-restraint for a number of years. During this period he developed his mind and body under the direction of his teacher, applying himself without distraction, to the various lores, sacred and secular. He always sought opportunities of service to the 'guru' to pay off, at least partly, the deep debt of gratitude he owed to him for the knowledge imparted so disinterestedly, ungrudgingly and devotedly. On the termination of his career as a student, he was given a sacred bath accompanied with mantras and then permitted to go back home. He was then designated *vidyā-snātaka*, *vrata-snātaka* or *vidyā-vrata-snātaka*, according as he had completed his course of studies, or his vow of celibacy or both. This designation attached to him all his life, before and after he had settled as a householder. This one act of bathing at a particular time and with a particular ceremony gave him a name for life, and his multifarious activities during his long stay at the Gurukula could not. What an association with water!

When they installed a prince on the royal throne, the ancient Aryans made him perform sacred ablutions with the water of the sacred rivers, poured out of golden vases, to the accompaniment of chanting of Vedic mantras. To this process they gave the name *abhiṣeka* which literally means 'a bath'.

The English have 'coronation' for the king-making ceremony. Literally the word means 'putting a crown on'. The ancients too put a king-designate on the throne, adorned his head with a crown and invested him, likewise, with powers to administer the state. Then why this disparity in usage? It must have something to do with their mode of living. May we not say that it signifies that water predominated over other things so much so that it gave name and form to their ceremonies? Physical purity must have been an outstanding feature of the life of an Aryan.

In Sanskrit we have *niṣṇāta* and *nadiṣṇa*, words for proficient, skilled, etc. Now these are derived from $\sqrt{snā}$, to bathe, with the initial consonant cerebralized in the given sense. The underlying meaning is, doubtless, 'thoroughly bathed' which is conveyed by *niṣṇāta* and *nadiṣṇa*. The expression *niṣṇāta*, therefore, means 'proficient in the Śāstra'. Now there is nothing to correspond to it in English. It would do violence to the English idiom to say 'bathed' or 'thoroughly bathed' in knowledge or literature. We do hear of drinking and drinking deep at the fountain-head of knowledge. This may have a bearing on the prevalence of drinking amongst the English. Even to this day, they are a people more in love with drinking than with bathing. The expressions such as *pārāga* (lit. one who has crossed over to the other side) and *pārīṇa* are evidence of the fact that the Aryans lived by the side of water. Here the śāstra, examination and query are all streams metaphorically. Words such as *anukūla*, *pratīpa* which mean 'agreeable to', 'opposed to', mean literally no more than 'along the bank', 'opposite to the bank of water'. The people deriving their idioms and metaphors from water were surely fond of it and, therefore, rightly proud of their physical purity.

The Sanskrit word for a teacher is *upādhyāya*. The word has been derived as 'upetyādhyāte' smāt 'by approaching whom knowledge is acquired'. This, therefore, is quite significant inasmuch as it shows that it were the students

who approached teachers for study and there was nothing analogous to the present day tuition system where teachers go about knocking at the doors of their wards to teach them in return for a mere pittance. There was again no question of the students disobeying their teachers or disrespecting them. Many ancient texts proclaim that the relations between the teachers and the taught were the most cordial. Well, the same thing the bi-syllabic word *chātra* has to say. The word *chātra* has been explained as *chādayati doṣān guroh*, 'one who covers the faults of the teacher'. The conception of a student in ancient times was that of an umbrella over the head of the teacher protecting him from the onslaughts of detractors. When such was the conception of a student, where could arise then the necessity of students taking up positions against their teachers ?

We now proceed to show the moral aspect of the Aryans' life. Morally, too, they were equally advanced. The name *avadya* which they gave to sin is significant. It literally means 'unspeakable'. The Aryans not only abhorred the commission of sin but also a reference to it. They did not afford to contaminate their tongue by speaking of sin. They believed, as the ancient writings tell us, that even a talk of sin was enough to condemn a man to hell. History tells us that theft was not known in ancient India. This is exactly what a single word *taskara* has to say. *Taskara* is a Sanskrit word for 'thief'. It connotes one who does 'that', viz. something which must not be named, it being so reprehensible. Expressions such as *sāptapadīna*, 'friendship formed by speaking seven words or walking seven steps together' point to their genuine sincerity and amiability. Surely it redounds to the credit of the Aryans of old that they could make friends so soon, while we moderns, with our much vaunted culture and civilization, do not, in spite of repeated contacts. Miserliness is condemned with one voice both by the revealed literature and the written law-books. Even to-day the sight of a miser in the morning is considered

inauspicious by the Hindus. Now the very word *kṛpaṇa* (miser) reveals all this. Literally it means 'pitiable'. That this is its primary sense is amply shown by usage. The Manusmṛti (IV. 185) reads *kṛpaṇa* in this sense in the passage 'duhitā kṛpaṇam param'. The Gītā also has it in the same sense : 'kṛpaṇāḥ phalahetavaḥ'. Another equivalent of *kṛpaṇa* is *kadarya* which, when broken up, means a 'contemptible owner', 'kutsito' ryah'. That a miser was given this name is enough condemnation. He was cried down as an unhappy man who, though rich enough, could not spend to make his life comfortable.

Other synonyms of *kṛpaṇa* are *nakham-paca* and *mitam-paca* which, when broken up, mean cooking limited or nail-much of food. These words have their origin in the quantity of food cooked in the miser's household for his own consumption. This is well against the social ethics of the ancient Indians. Food is not only meant for oneself; it is to be shared with many, the guests, the Brāhmaṇas, the servants, the birds or the insects. If a person eats his food alone, he eats sin alone. (Kevalāṅgho bhavati kevalādī). *Arāti*, a word for enemy, is also a pointer in the same direction. *Arāti* signifies a person who gives nothing in charity. *Rati* is a gift. A person, who did not contribute a part of his incomings to improve the society as a whole, was looked upon as an enemy. What condemnation of miserliness could be more contemptuous and caustic !

In Islam usury is strictly prohibited. Ancient Indians, too, looked down upon it. The word for interest in Sanskrit is *kusīda* which is itself more eloquent than any indictment of it. It means *kutsitam sīdanty atra* where people come to occupy a contemptible state. It is this that leads to the debasement of the people. The word *kausīdya* formed from *kusīda* means indolence, laziness. This is typical of the profession of usury where the money-lender has nothing else to do than to earn his living by exploiting the needy. He being a parasite makes no effort for earning his livelihood.

He passes his time in a leisurely way. So the word *kausīdya* meaning originally the profession of usury has come to mean, ironically enough, laziness or indolence.

The ancient Aryans believed in bird-omens, auspicious or inauspicious marks, etc., as other ancient peoples did. The word for omen is *śakuna* which is also a word for a bird. It, therefore, needs not much of imagination to see that they believed in the cries and movements of birds as communications of the future. As for the belief in marks, words like *jāyāghna* (in *jāyāghnas tilakālakaḥ*) formed by Pāṇ III. 2.52,53 may be instanced. That they believed in the power of spells to win one's heart, is indicated by the phrase *hr̥dyo mantrāḥ* where *hr̥dya* is derived by the rule *bandhane carṣau* (Pāṇ. IV. 4. 96).

We may here deal with a few other aspects of Aryan culture. The ancient Aryans had a very simple dress, consisting of two clothes, the upper, *uttariya* and the lower, *upasaṃvyāna* garments. The word for dress is always used in the dual even for a royal personage. Cp. 'Manorame na vyavasiṣṭa vastre' said of king Daśaratha (Bhaṭṭi III. 26). At the marriage ceremony, the bridegroom was presented with an *udgamanīya* which was nothing but a pair of washed clothes. Now the fact that the Aryans did not use much of cloth or were not heavily clad, as the moderns are, is revealed by the word *kuvinda*, a weaver. Formed by the Vārtika 'gavādiṣu vindeḥ samjñāyām' the word means one who gets a scanty living. Now, if the Aryans used a plenty of clothings, the weaver could not be called *kuvinda* with any justification. It would be also interesting to know if the ancients had the shaving saloons as in the west. We say no. *Janāṅgama* is one of the words for a barber. It means one who approaches people (to do a shave). If the people approached the barber for the purpose, as they do now, the word would lose all propriety. The *śāstras* interdict shaving by night. This is what *divākīrti*, another name for barber, says. A barber was so called for he was a subject of talk by day only and never

by night. The plain meaning is that he was not thought of at night, for his services were not required at the time.

That the ancient Indians were people of æsthetic taste, can be known from the well-known word *pravīṇa* which means originally 'prakṛṣṭo vīṇāyām' 'one who is an expert in playing on the lyre'. The word developed a secondary meaning of clever, or expert later. An expert in lyre is the real expert, so the ancients thought.

Let us consider what constituted the staple food of the Aryans. At present wheat is the normal food of the Indians of the North and rice of those of the South. In ages gone by rice was the staple food of the Indians even of the North. This is evidenced by the fact that lexicographers read *anna* and *andhas* amongst the words for food. *Bhakta* and *andhas* are not synonymous at all with *anna* (food). Then why are they listed along with *anna*, *bhojya*, etc.? The conclusion is irresistibly forced on us that rice was the principal article of food of the Aryans. If it were otherwise, *bhakta* and *andhas*, the particular forms of food, would not be read along with words for food in general. Pāṇini's term *bahuvrīhi* for the attributive compound is also illuminating. It means 'one in possession of plenty of rice'. It is remarkable since Pāṇini belonged to the North-West, being a native of *Śalātura*. Rice must be the food even of the Northerners in the days of Pāṇini.

Besides rice, the other food with which the Aryans were most familiar was the sesamum seeds, the *tilas*. The forehead mark is called *tilakaḥ*, '*tila-pratikṛtiḥ tilakaḥ*'. This is the meaning of *tilaka*. It is on account of its similarity with *tila* that it is so called. A mole is also called *tila*. This, too, is on the analogy of *tila*, the sesamum seed. It is human psychology that whenever we come upon a thing similar to those already known, we name it after the thing with which we are most familiar. This is further evidenced by the word *taila* which means 'oil'. Primarily it means oil extracted out of the *tilas*. Secondarily it comes to signify oil in general.

We can say *sarṣapatailam*, *inguditailam*. The word *tila* in the words noted above is certainly not without significance.

Let us now see what attitude the Aryans had towards worldly possessions. It is generally held that they very early turned their back upon the world and its possessions, being deeply impressed with their transitoriness. This is far from the truth. Linguistic evidence refutes such a view. The Sanskrit word *dhanya* is eloquent. It is a word for 'blessed'. It is derived from *dhana* with the suffix *ya* in the sense of 'one who grows rich'. (Vide Pāṇini, *Dhanagaṇaṃ labdhā*—IV, 4.84) Later it developed a secondary sense, 'blessed', and was extended to other persons equally happy or devoted to the practice of virtue or the acquisition of knowledge. This development must be traced back to the time when the Aryans looked upon a rich man as a happy man. If it were not so, the application of the word to happy or blessed persons would be void of sense.

The same information is yielded by words *śreṣṭhin* and *sādhu*. *Śreṣṭhin* means *śreṣṭham asyāsti*. Here we have the *matvarthīya ini* suffix in the sense of praise or acclamation, *praśamsā*. 'One who is blessed with the best' is then the meaning of *śreṣṭhin*. Now, what is the best? Why is it not named? Well, it is so well known. It is money. Similarly, *sādhu* means originally good, righteous. It later develops a secondary meaning. In Hindi it is still in vogue in the form of *sāhu*. The word, *sādhu* is a pointer to the times when moneyed people were regarded good, good for economic activity so essential for the healthy living of society. But here it must be understood that whereas merchants and the traders were the good people, the *sādhus*, the persons hoarding wealth for the sake of it were heavily at a discount. The Indians in ancient times had very early foreseen the dangers of concentration of wealth in a few hands. When any hoards of coins come to be deposited in the safe-vaults of a handful of capitalists, there arises a danger to society. The leaders of society look at this develop-

ment with suspicion and alarm. In Sanskrit the god of wealth is given the name of *kubera* which, when dissolved, means *kutsitaṃ beram asya*. The word *bera* means 'body'. One whose body is contemptible is *Kubera*. In the Hindu pantheon the Lord of wealth is regarded as a leper. Again, one of the names of *Kubera* is *Naravāhana* which means one who has a man as his conveyance. A man riding a man! Well, this is what a capitalist does. He can amass huge wealth only by depriving others of their rightful share. A man himself, he crushes other men. The *Mahābhārata* (I. 140. 77) says :—

nācchitvā paramarmāṇi, nākṛtvā karma dāruṇam |

nāhatvā matsyaghātīva prāpnoti mahatīm śrīyam ||

"Not without striking at others' vitals, not without doing terrible deeds, not without killing like a fisherman can one obtain huge wealth." The same idea is conveyed by the single word *naravāhana*

Now a word about metaphysics. The *Sāṅkhya* philosophers postulate that the soul is unrelated (*asaṅgo vai pūruṣaḥ*). The same view is accepted in the *Song Celestial*. This, however, can be known without a study of the *Sāṅkhya Sūtras* or the *Gītā*. The word *duḥkha* alone is informative enough. This tiny little word is a compound made up of 'duḥ', 'bad', 'defective', and 'kha', the sense-organ. It therefore literally means a state in which the senses are undermined, overwhelmed or defective. This is exactly how suffering reacts on the senses. This in plain English means that the ancient Aryans who spoke Sanskrit, believed in the *Sāṅkhya* doctrine that all suffering (*duḥkha*) was confined to the senses, leaving the soul quite unaffected.

Throughout our literature, we are called upon to divert our minds from the objects of the senses, the *viśayas*. The objects hold men in their grip and it is emphasised times without number that we should strive hard to keep off them, which is undoubtedly the most difficult task. That the attraction of the objects of the senses is irresistible can be known not only from the scriptures but also from the word

viṣaya itself. *Viṣaya* is a compound of *vi* and *saya* from the √*ṣiñ* 'to bind.' *viśeṣena sinvanti iti viṣayāḥ*. *Viṣayas* are so called because they bind one tightly. The ancient Indians could not have given a better word to the objects of the senses.

SANSKRIT SEMANTICS

Semantics is always an interesting study. To know how words undergo changes in meanings and what processes, psychological, historical or political effect them, is the most rewarding to a sincere researcher. Words have their own stories to tell and they tell them in a charming way. Simply one has to attune one's ears to the tales secretly whispered into them. The tales may not be quite intelligible, a thick crust of our ignorance may have made them quite unfamiliar to us or the running sands of Time may have rendered them obsolete and difficult to understand. Yet the words speak and we have to listen to them.

Semantics is a very recent science. Work on it has been undertaken seriously in the west. In India too some very good works have appeared on it.¹ But Sanskrit semantics still remains a neglected field. Stray attempts have been made here and there to explain the changes in the meanings of a few words on the basis of a comparative study of Greek and Latin. But no systematic attempt has been made to give the various stages in the semantical process which may be properly supported by authentic evidence. More often than not, this process is shrouded in mystery. It is not generally possible to explain all the changes in the meanings of Sanskrit words, because Sanskrit had the longest lease of life in India with the result that Sanskrit words had the chance to move farther and farther away from their moorings till they arrived at a stage when it becomes rather difficult to connect them with their original

1. Babu Ram Saxena, *Artha-vijñāna*; Kapildev Dwivedi, *Artha-vijñāna aur Vyākaranādarsana*; Hardev Bahri, *Hindi Semantics*; Oharudeva Shastri, *Paryāyavacanavivekaḥ*, Proceedings and Transactions of the All India Oriental Conference, Session, XVI Lucknow, 1955.

meanings. Generally the intermediary links are missing. The literature often does not help to restore them. For one thing, we may not have the literary records of all the periods of Indian history. For the other, the intermediary process in the change of meaning of a particular word may not be discovered there. Conjecture then has to be offered. But conjecture must remain a conjecture after all. It cannot be a substitute for evidence. Another conjecture may cut rightly across it. In spite of all these difficulties an attempt has to be made to trace out the development of meanings of Sanskrit words which certainly is not so easy, for the Sanskrit words have in many cases, as we have said above, wandered off from one stage to another till at last they have arrived at a point when they appear to be completely cut off from their original moorings. As in modern Indian languages, so in Sanskrit many words have undergone changes in meanings due to one cause or another. Of these causes *Lakṣaṇā* may be said to have exercised a strong influence. Sometimes a primary sense gives rise to a secondary one which in course of time completely supplants the former sense. This is what has happened in the case of such well-known words as *pravīṇa*, *kuśala* and *udāra*. The word *pravīṇa* primarily means one who is skilled in playing on the lute. Now, playing on the lute requires proficiency in the art as also practice, 'abhyāsa'. From this, 'pravīṇa' has developed the secondary sense of 'proficient', which has altogether eclipsed the original meaning. Similarly with 'kuśala'. The word means primarily one who cuts the kuśa grass, *kuśāṃl lātīti*. Now the cutting of the kuśa blades requires caution. One has to be careful and circumspect lest one should injure one's fingers. *Te hi kuśa vyutpannair adātum śakyāḥ*. Hence the secondary meaning of the word *kuśala* is 'expert', 'skilful'. The same is the case with *udāra*. This word primarily means *udgata ārāt*, one (a horse or a bullock) who needs not the whip (*āra*), viz., one who understands the implicit intention of the driver and

acts accordingly. Thence it comes to mean one who knows the minds of the supplicants as they approach him and gives them gifts without promptings and pleadings from them; hence liberal. Here, too, the primary sense is altogether lost. All these are instances of what is known as *nirūḍha-lakṣaṇā*. Let us look at some other more interesting but less discussed words and the changes in their meanings due to the power of Indication.

Let us take the word *viśārada*. It means skilled, proficient. How has it developed this sense? Can we dissolve the compound as *viśiṣṭā śārada yasya saḥ*. Well, the answer is no. Śārada is the name of the goddess of learning and the goddess cannot be *viśiṣṭā* or otherwise. One cannot be distinguished from oneself. Moreover, in the *Āmarakoṣa*¹ the words *śārada* and *viśārada* are read side by side. So we cannot dissolve the compound as above. Rather, we should dissolve it as has been done by Kṣīrasvāmin as: *vigataṁ śāradatvam abhinavatvam asyeti viśāradaḥ*, one who is no longer a novice, having attained maturity. Hence the secondary sense is that of an expert. Now, *śārada* means a novice. The derivative meaning is *śaradi bhavaḥ śāradaḥ*, belonging to the *śarad*, autumn season, autumnal. This is the primary sense of the word. In course of time it develops the secondary sense of 'new'. With the advent of the autumn things begin to wear a new look. The sky shines blue, washed as it were of the dark clouds, and the muddy rivers and the rivulets begin to flow with their clear, blue waters. The gloom cast by the rainy season disappears and everything looks new, as it were. The *lakṣaṇika* meaning of the word *śārada* then is 'new'. In this very sense the word has been used by Pāṇini in the Sūtra *śārade' nartave*.² The word *śārada* here means new, fresh. The example given is *rajjū-śāradam (udakam)*. This has been explained by Jayāditya as *sadyo rajjūddhṛtam udakam anupahataṁ rajjūśāradam uc-yate*.³ This meaning of the word is given in the *Āmarakoṣa*.

1. III. 3.95. 2. VI. 2. 9. 3. Kāśikā on Pāṇ. VI. 2. 9.

From this secondary sense of 'new' (*pratyagra*), the development of another secondary (or more correctly tertiary) sense of 'novice' is only a step further. One who is new to a thing cannot be proficient in it. *Viśārada* then is what is opposite of *śārada*, 'not novice', mature.

Another interesting word in this chain is *kṛpaṇa*. Primarily it means *kṛpyate kṛpāviṣayī kriyate iti kṛpaṇaḥ*, one who is pitied. In this sense we come across many uses in literature¹. Later, the word develops the sense of a miser. Society in ancient times, as even now, looked down upon the miser. His sight was and still is considered inauspicious in the morning. He was thus a pitiable creature. What has happened in this case is that what was formerly an adjective has become a noun. There are many instances of that.

Upagūhana is another word. Primarily it means 'to conceal'. Secondarily it has the sense of an embrace. Embrace is represented here as concealing another person in one's self. When two loving souls meet, they clasp each other. Their effort usually is to embrace each other so closely that they may put each other in their own selves. Let there be one and not two. The word *upagūhana* produces powerful emotions in the mind. It is doubtful if there be a better word for embrace in any other language.

The word *avarodha* for *antaḥpura* or harem is suggestive of the times when women were confined to the four walls of the royal palace and had no freedom to move out and mix with the people freely. The primary meaning of the word *avarodha* is confinement. Later it developed the sense of a harem, for it is there that confinement is at its worst. So the word for confinement has come to mean a harem on account of social reasons. Since what is confined becomes hidden, unrecognized, *avaruddha* comes to mean

1. "Kṛpaṇāḥ phalahetavaḥ"—Gītā (2.49). "Duhitā kṛpaṇam param"—Manu, 4. 185.

incognito : *avaruddho* carat Partho varṣāni tridaśāni ca (Mbh)¹.

The word *vadānya* primarily means one who speaks, vadati (dīyatām) iti vadānyaḥ. The word 'give' was considered to be the most welcome in ancient times when charity was highly applauded. 'Dāna' was considered to be leading to untold merit and there was no dearth of persons in whose homes this word 'give' was always to be heard. The word 'give' was the real word and one who spoke that was called *vadānya*. As only a generous person could say 'give', so the word *vadānya* came to mean liberal.

The word *yāpya* is formed from \sqrt{ya} 'to go' in the causal sense with the suffix *yat*. Literally it means 'one to be sent out'. We have the primary sense in the Gautama Dharma-Sūtra (II.4.23). The figurative meaning of this word, however, is 'to be discarded', 'to be ex-communicated'; hence *nindya*, reproachable, condemnable. In Amara's verse *śibikā yāpya-yānaṃ syāt* the word *yāpya* has been explained by Kṣīra as '*yāpyasya aśaktasya yānaṃ*'², the carriage for one who is unable to walk, who is *yāpya* 'to be carried'. Here the word *yāpya* means weak, feeble, one who is to be carried to some place and cannot walk himself. It is interesting to note that here the primary sense of the word is also visible. In the Āyurveda the word *yāpya* means a disease which cannot be perfectly cured but continues to be treated, and the patient can in no way be immunised. Such diseases are leprosy, phthisis, piles and so on. This meaning of the word *yāpya* may suggest the process through which it has come to mean *nindya*. A person who is suffering from any fell disease (Roga, 'rujati iti rogaḥ' which corrodes him) and cannot be cured becomes an object of people's reproach. They begin to say how unfortunate this disease-ridden man is. He thus becomes contemptible in their eyes. Similarly, any other person who becomes an object of *nindā* on account

1. Apte's Sanskrit-English Dictionary under *avaruddha*. 2. Kṣīra on Amara, III. 1. 61.

of his silliness, misbehaviour or any other thing is also called *yāpya*. As for example, *yāpyo vaiyākaraṇaḥ*. This is the case of an *aupamika prayoga*, usage based on similarity.

Bhakti primarily means service, loyalty, attachment, devotion. It implies subordination, servility, being the second to some one served. In the sphere of language it comes to mean *upacāra*, secondary usage ; as in *bahubhakti-vādīni Brāhmaṇāni*. Hence we have the nominal derivative, *bhākta*, which simply means *gauṇa*, attributive, secondary.

The word *śuśrūṣā* means *śrotum icchā*, 'the desire to listen'. The secondary meaning of the word is service. One who is anxious to listen to the words of others is *śuśrūṣu*. Now, one listens only when one has a respectful attitude towards the person who speaks or when one is prepared to act at his bidding. In him there is the preparedness to act as the other person bids him to. And this is what service means. In the narrower sphere of studies, this fact stood out more clearly. There was oral teaching in ancient India, a student anxious to learn a lore had to listen to the words as they came from the lips of his teacher. And this he could do only if he served him. *Śuśrūṣā* (desire to listen) thus came to mean service. It is a case of the means being expressed by the word for the end, *tādarthyāt tācchabdyam*.

The word *saṃskāra* is used in different senses in different places in the Sanskrit literature, as for example, in Ragh. III. 18 where it means polishing, in Ragh. XV. 76 where it means grammatical purity, in Kumāra Sambhava VII. 74 where it means education and mental health and in Ragh. 1.20 where it means the impressions produced by the good or bad actions performed by an individual in a previous life. Such impressions are called *saṃskāras* because they remain clinging like the smell of a thing to the soul of the individual who performed the actions. It will be seen that the etymological sense of the word *saṃskāra* underlies all the senses given above. The word is formed from *saṃ+skṛ+ghañ(a)*. 'S' is inserted before *kr* by the rules "*Samparibhyāṃ*

karotau bhūṣaṇe, Samavāye ca" (Pāṇ. VI. 1. 137-8) after the prepositions *saṃ* and *pari* when it means to adorn or to assemble. The first three senses are directly derivable from the sense to 'adorn'; they are only different phases of adornment. The *saṃskāras* may in one sense be said to adorn a man inasmuch as all he does depends upon them, and which therefore are of prime importance. Or *saṃskāra* may mean a collection. And since no other collection is more important than that of good or bad deeds done by a man in previous births as affecting his present life, it may pre-eminently and of all other collections be said to be his *Samskāra*.

The word 'akṣata' means whole rice. It has been rendered so by translators wherever it occurs. Literally it means uninjured or unbruised. It is only when rice is husked, it is apt to be injured. So later the word comes to mean whole grains of husked and well-cleaned rice, and accordingly it is used in the plural only. Here is the case of an adjective becoming a proper noun, after the manner of *sāgarāmbharā*, first sea-girt (earth), then the earth.

The word *tiraskṛta* properly means what is hidden from view (*antarhita*) and therefore, not noticed as, in *tarutiraskṛta*, screened by a tree; hence secondarily, what is not noticed even though not hidden. The further development of the meaning is to 'supersede', 'to excel'. When one of the two things by its superior excellence or other merits prominently draws attention to itself diverting it from the other, the second thing is called *tiraskṛta* or excelled by the other. Similarly, when a person is left out of account, he feels humiliated, hence *tiraskṛta* comes to mean *avamānita*.

The word *anika* means an army. The gradual development of its meaning is traced by S. P. Pandit¹ thus : "*anika* is originally the face; and meaning then the edge of any sharp weapon it signifies like the Latin *Acies*, the sharp edge or edge-like appearance of an army in march, i. e. a row. In

1. Notes on Raghuvamśa, B. S. Series.

classical Sanskrit the word only bears one signification derived from the last, viz., that of multitude or army."

The word *āvarjana* in the sense of attracting comes from \sqrt{vrj} in the sense of averting, turning away. The primary sense of *āvarjana*, therefore, is turning this way, bending towards (ān). The word is found used in this sense in Raghu. VI. 15 and Kumārasam. II. 26. In *kalaśam āvarjayati* $\sqrt{āvri}$ means to tilt and pour out the contents. From this primary sense of physical bending or tilting has developed the secondary sense of attracting, captivating, which is nothing but mental (bending) inclination for a thing.

The word *upāṅśu* means secret. Literally it means *upagatā amśavo' tra*, 'a place which the rays of the sun have just approached but have not entered'; hence it means a retired or secret place.

The words *anukūla* and *pratikūla* literally mean 'following the bank or slope', 'opposite to the bank', respectively. The secondary meaning of the words, however, is 'agreeable to', 'opposed to', for along the bank or the stream movement (swimming, rowing, etc.) is easier than against the bank or upstream. On account of the natural flow of water one swims on with the least resistance. So it is agreeable to swim along the bank and not against it. Hence the secondary meaning of *anukūla*, etc., is 'agreeable'. Another word connected with the stream of water is *pratipa* which means opposite, opposed. Primarily it means *pratigatā apo' tra*, where the flow of water is in a contrary direction. Then it comes to mean opposite, contrary, unfavourable.

A very common word used for fasting is *laṅghana*. Literally it means 'to skip over' or 'to leap over' (the meal-time). In another sense the word is used for injury, e. g. in *atapalaṅghana*. How has the latter sense developed? It is so very simple. The act of fasting leads inevitably to some emaciation of the body. The desire has also to be controlled. So fasting is an injury both physical and mental. Hence the evolution of the sense of injury from the sense of fasting.

The word *lāvaṇya* is generally derived from the word *lavaṇa* and means *lavaṇasya bhāvaḥ*, 'saltiness' or the 'property of salt'. This is its primary sense, and 'beauty' the secondary. Dr. K. C. Chatterji has his own conjecture to make. He derives it from the word *rāmaṇyaka*, an adaptation of *rāmaṇīyaka*.

In the *Rāmāyaṇa* (3. 15. 5), the word *rāmaṇyaka*¹ is used twice. The learned doctor assumes that it is there in place of the regular *rāmaṇīyaka* due to metrical exigencies. He then proceeds to detail the process of evolution of the word *lāvaṇya* from this ungrammatical form adopted only for the sake of metre. According to him *rāmaṇyaka* first loses its *ka*, then *r* is changed into *l* and *m* into *v* by the process of dissimilation and the word *lāvaṇya* emerges. This view is most unconvincing. It proceeds from a very weak premis. It is extremely doubtful if a wrong form which is there merely because the writer could not otherwise compose in a given metre could be a current coin and could lead in course of time to the development of a correct form of common usage. The loss of 'ka' also remains unexplained. Moreover, the word *lāvaṇya* grievously suffers in sense, if the suggested derivation from *rāmaṇyaka* is accepted. *Lāvaṇya* does not stand for the ordinary beauty. It is more than *rūpa* (beauty of form) and *kānti* (grace) and even *mādhurya* (sweetness). Those who have seen salt in the quarries know how shining and how lustrous it is. Even huge columns of salt are transparent. So the beauty which is as shining and

1. *Rāmāyaṇe* (Āraṇya 25-5) dṛśyate—

Vanarāmaṇyakam yatra jalarāmaṇyakam tathā |

Sannikṣṭam ca yatra syāt samitpuspakuśodakam ||

Atracchando' nurodhena rāmaṇīyakaśabdena rāmaṇyakarūpam svikṛtam iti bhāti rāmaṇīyakaśabdāc ca yopadhād iti rāmaṇīyakaśabdasya niṣpattih tatas' ca rāmaṇīyasya bhāva iti tasyārtha iti sidhyati. *lāvaṇyaśabdasyāpi* sa svārthah prathamam tavad rāmaṇīyakam rāmaṇyakam sañjātam tato rāmaṇyam tato rālayorabheda iti nyāyena sannihitayor anunāsikayor ekasya viśamīkaraṇa-prakriyayā cānanunāsikīkaraṇena *lāvaṇyam* iti niṣpannam iti bhāti—
Mañjūśā. January, 1956.

lustrous as the rocky salt is called *lāvanya*. It is defined as *muktāphaleṣu chāyāyās taralatvam ivāntarā pratibhāti yadangeṣu tal lāvanyam ihocyate*. This means that *lāvanya* is comparable to the sheen of the pearls. This definition is a pointer to the fact that writers of technical works were conscious of the connection of *lāvanya* with *lavaṇa* (salt).

The word *dhvānta* is from $\sqrt{\text{dhvan}}$ 'śabde' 'to shout'. It means darkness. It seems a far cry from shouting (together) to darkness. The process of the evolution of one meaning from another is an interesting psychological study. It is very natural to hear people shouting to each other when they are not able to see each other in the pitch dark and so get separated from each other. As they all call out to each other, there is a confused noise all around. Now, as that shouting, *saṁśabdana*, takes place on account of the darkness, the word *dhvānta* itself has come to mean darkness. This conjecture gets welcome support from a passage in the Ṛgveda¹ where the words *dhvānta* and *tamaḥ* are used side by side, *dhvānta* being used as an adjective, meaning darkness in which there is shouting, hence thick darkness.

The word *anīṣam* is dissolved as *nāsti niṣā yasmin tat*, 'that (action) wherein there is no night'. Actually the word *niṣā* does not have the primary sense of the night here. As the night is for rest, the word has here the secondary sense of rest or the cessation of activity. So *anīṣam* means restlessly or, in other words, ceaselessly.

The primary meaning of the word *śakuna* is 'bird'. The development of the secondary sense of an omen from *śakuna* is very interesting. The ancient Indians believed in bird-omens. As they were in direct communion with the natural phenomena all around them, they had an intimate knowledge of the actions and movements of the plants and the birds and the effect, good or bad, they exercised on the

1. Dhvāntaṁ tama' vadadhvase hata Indro mahnū pūrvahūtav apatyata—Ṛg 10. 113. 7.

human life. The word *śakuna* is a pointer to the times when our ancestors had an implicit faith in the cries and the movements of the birds as communications of the future.

The word *oṣadhinātha* means the moon. How it has come to mean the moon has been ingeniously brought out by Mr. S. P. Pandit in the following words : "Properly speaking *oṣadhinām nāthaḥ* or the king of plants is the soma plant which being largely used in sacrifices, naturally came to be regarded as the highest plant, and be styled the king of plants. The key to the fact of *oṣadhinātha* meaning both the soma plant and the moon seems to lie in the word *indu*. This word is frequently found in the R̥gveda, but always in the sense of (1) a drop of the soma juice, and (2) the soma juice itself. It appears the word *indu* coming then to signify a globule, or a round little body very naturally became a name of the fuller moon. Now, according to a very common principle that has had such a prominent influence on the development of the Sanskrit vocabulary, viz. that whenever a vocable that signifies two things, has other synonyms, those other synonyms also become each expressive of the same two things, the word *soma* acquired the additional sense of moon. Then, as is very common in the growth of mythology, the conceptions, attributes, etc., connected with the original personified or rather deified concept of soma, viz. that of the plant, became attached to the new concept, viz. that of the moon. Thus the whole derivation may be put in the following pseudological form: The word *indu* means both a drop of the juice of the sacrificial plant, (or the juice itself) and the moon; a synonym of *indu* in the first sense is the word *soma*, therefore *soma* meant both the plant and the moon. Now, because *soma*, the plant was developed into a personification by certain attributes, therefore, *soma*, the moon, acquired also the same attributes. And thus it is that the moon also came to be described as the King or Lord of the plants".¹

1. S. P. Pandit's note on Raghu 2. 73 in his edition (B.S. Series).

The argument is plausible, not decisive. The very first link in the argument is weak. It is not clear how *indu* came to signify the moon. The authors of the *Wörterbuch* also confess to the ignorance of the process by which this new signification developed. It is imagined that it first came to mean a little round body, and then the full moon. It is, to say the least, unconvincing. Indeed the contrary would be more natural, more true. The little shining drops of soma (*indu*) came to be compared to the moon, they were conceived as moon-like, the little moons, the moon being the recognised standard of comparison. We are supported in this contention by a Brāhmaṇa passage : *candram candreṇa kṛṇāti yat somam hiranyena kṛṇāti*.¹ Here the soma is called *candra* (the moon) as gold is. Obviously *candra* meaning primarily the moon is only a secondary appellation of the *soma* and gold. As for transference of epithets, we admit it is a common phenomenon in mythology. But transference as such should be one which we cannot otherwise explain. For example, when Kṛṣṇa is called *Madhusūdana* or *Kaiṭabhāri* we cannot explain these epithets unless we assume transference of epithets originally belonging to *Viṣṇu* with whom the former came to be identified. For, we know that Lord Kṛṣṇa never slew the demons Madhu and Kaiṭabha; it was Viṣṇu who did it long before in the Satyayuga. The present is a doubtful case of transference. The moon is doubtless *oṣadhinātha*, because she protects the herbs by helping them with moisture. The epithet is easily explained without transference.

The primary sense of the word *nibhṛta* seems to be brimful (*nitarāṃ bhṛtam*). We have the use of the word in this sense (*cintayā nibhṛtaḥ*). With human beings it means well-satisfied (vide *Rāmāyaṇa*, *bhuktāśca bhogā nibhṛtāś ca bhṛtyāḥ* VI. 109.22). Now, what is brimful makes no sound (*sampūrṇaḥ kumbho na karoti śabdāṃ*); hence the meaning, silent, quiet. In this sense we have a number of uses in

1. *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, 3. 3. 3. 6.

literature.¹ Since all sound is a form of energy produced by motion (technically called vibration) the absence of sound presupposes the absence of motion.² Hence the meaning 'silent' develops into 'motionless.' From physical motionlessness and silence it is only a step to mental quietude. Nibhṛtātmā means śāntamanāḥ 'of an unruffled mind'. In case of the mind absence of motion could mean absence of vacillation, wavering, swerving, i. e. firmness, resoluteness; hence the meaning firmly attached, faithful. Later these two meanings, silent and motionless, combine to give us the meaning 'secret', for secrecy implies silence and motionlessness. "Nibhṛtam iti cintanīyam, śīghram iti sukaram" (Śākuntalam, Act 3). Now, secrecy implies concealment; hence the meaning hidden, out of sight.³ Again, from the primary sense of fullness may be traced the sense 'humble', for fullness contributes to heaviness and heaviness to inclination. A tree bends under the weight of the fullness of its fruit. A man full of virtues will naturally bend. Viśākha-datta, the playwright, uses the word in this sense.⁴

The word *vaṁśa* means a bamboo tree. It also means a family. The use of the word in the sense of 'family' seems to arise from the similarity that it (the family) has with the bamboo tree, '*vaṁśa iva vaṁśaḥ*.' A bamboo tree never grows alone. Initially one, in course of time it gets surrounded by others of its variety and there develops a full grove. It is the hope of every Hindu that his family should grow and multiply just as the bamboo tree grows and develops into a cluster. So this happy idea of the growth of the family

1. Koyam vo nibhṛtam tapovanam idam grāmīkaroty ājñayā. (Svapna-vāsavadatta, Act I). Nīṣkampavṛkṣam nibhṛtadvirephaṁ kānanam (Śākuntala). Kāraṇena khalu mayā naibhṛtyam avalambitam (Mālavikā Act III).

2. Vide Kṛtakarmā nibhṛtavat sa tūṇīm punar āviśat (Rāmāyaṇa VI. 108. 20). Nīṣkampacāmaraśikhā nibhṛtordhvakarṇāḥ (Śākuntala, 1. 8). Anibhṛtakaroṣv ākṣipatsu priyeṣu (Meghadūta, 68). Vāridhīn iva yugāntavāyavaḥ kṣobhayanty anibhṛtā gurūn api (Kīrāta, 13. 66).

3. Nabhasā nibhṛtendunā—(Raghu 8. 15).

4. Praṇāmanibhṛtā kulavadhūr iva—(Mudrārākṣasa, Act I).

is at the back of the use of the word *vaṃśa* for family.

The word *jugupsā* originally meaning desire to breed cows has had to pass through a rather tortuous path to yield the present sense of aversion. It is from \sqrt{gup} to breed cows, etc. The emphasis after some time shifted from cows to breeding. Now, as breeding requires protection, the stem comes to mean to protect. As protection means keeping a thing away from others, it comes to signify concealment. The process of change does not stop at that. It continues. Now only that thing is usually concealed which repels or turns a man away. It is in this way that the word has come to mean abomination.

Primarily the word *vaidya* means learned, *vidyām adhīte veda vā*, 'one who studies some lore or knows it.' Secondly it means a physician. The secondary meaning of the word has become so popular that it has overshadowed the primary sense. Of course, the word has been used in the sense of a learned man in the epics¹, but even there it is not very common. The development of the secondary sense being fairly early, we are forced to the conclusion that peoples' mind must have conceived *Āyurveda* to be the most important branch of study, the *Vidyā*. This was very natural. To the people suffering from a legion of ailments and diseases, only that *vidyā* is the true *vidyā* which gives relief to them. *Vidyā*, therefore, comes to mean *Āyurveda*, the science of medicine, and a man proficient in the *Vidyā*, the *Āyurveda*, is therefore a *vaidya*. The word *kavirāja* is also important in this connection. It also supports the above conjecture. This means a learned man or a 'prince among learned men.'

The root *īkṣ* with *upa* means to ignore. That this was not the sense in the times of *Yāska*² is clear from the sense of looking closely or examining thoroughly, in which he uses

1. Vide *Rāmāyaṇa*; II. 77. 21; II. 100. 42.

2. *Tad etenopekṣitavyam*—*Nirukta*, ed. Mukunda jha Bakshi, *Nir-naya Sagar Press. Bombay, 1930, p. 38.* Also 'Evam uccāvaceṣv artheṣu nipatanti, ta upekṣitavyāḥ' *ibid.* p. 32.

it. It has the sense of nearness. The word has psychological and physical background. A distant thing is not clearly visible. A thing near at hand can be seen clearly and minutely. So far so right. But when the thing comes too near the eye, it cannot be seen at all. If somebody were to read a book with its pages touching the eyelids, he won't be able to read at all and would soon begin to feel that he should better give up the attempt. So *upekṣā* comes to mean not seeing which is the same thing as ignoring.

The word *abhiyukta* means accused. It means connected with. The question is with what? Evidently with an offence. *Doṣeṇābhiyuktaḥ*. 'Abhiyukta' is one who is connected or charged with an offence. The word *doṣa* (offence) came to be dropped as the ellipsis could be easily supplied mentally, for the word was repeatedly used in the context of crimes. According to Viṇṇāneśvara *abhiyuj* also means to question, to inquire as in Yājñavalkya Smṛti (2. 28). *Abhiyukta* then primarily means questioned, interrogated; hence a suspect, or an accused person.

Another similar case is provided by the word *utsikta* which means overflowing, puffed up (with pride). The question here too is with what? The reply is with *darpa*, pride. That this is not a mere conjecture but a statement of fact is proved by the use of the expression *darpotsikta* in the following verse in the Yogavāsīṣṭha :

darpotsiktatayā kasyacit sa mahāmuneḥ ।
yadā mṛditavān āsīd āśramam śarmabhājanam.² ॥

On account of long association with *darpa* *utsikta* by itself comes to convey the sense of *darpotsikta* and *darpa* is dropped. Thus *utsikta* in the sense of puffed up, or haughty alone came to be used in Sanskrit literature, as for example, 'utsikto vinayād apeta-puruṣo bhāgyaiś calair vismitaḥ'.³

1. Not noted in Monier William's Sanskrit-English Dictionary.

2. vi (ii). 186. 11.

3. Bhāsa, Svapnavāsavadattam, I. 3. Bhāsanūṭakacakram, ed. C. R. Devadhar, Poona Oriental Book Agency, p. 2.

Just as in the case of *abhiyukta* the word *doṣa* came to be dropped as the ellipsis could be easily supplied mentally so in the case of *utsikta* too the ellipsis was supplied mentally and this word by a psychological turn or twist came to yield the sense of proud or arrogant. The tendency of dropping of one of the two syntactically connected words and using the remaining word in the sense of the whole is not uncommon in Sanskrit literature. Thus, for example, we have the word *uttara* for reply. Literally the word means after, or latter. The complete expression, however, is *uttaram vākyaṃ*.¹ In course of time, *vākya* comes to be dropped and *uttara* itself begins to yield the sense of it. But this tendency though common cannot be regarded a normal phenomenon of Sanskrit language. Were it so, *ādhmāta* (inflated) would alone stand for *darpadhmāta* (inflated with pride), which it never does.

The word *dravya* also offers an equally interesting study. The grammarians of the Pāṇinian School would derive it from *dru* (tree). '*Drur iva dravyam*', something like a tree. What is striking about a tree ? Its parts. They are so distinct; they are all visible to the naked eye. A tree is an aggregate of so many parts; hence it is defined as '*śākhādīmān padārthaḥ*.' Now, all concrete things are made up of parts after the manner of the tree, they are *avayavins*, though the parts are not always distinct. Thus being like the tree (*dru*), they are called *dravya*. This is the primary sense of the word. From this general sense follows the specified sense of a substance, a substratum of properties, as the Vaiśeṣikas have it. According to them abstract notions such as *guṇa*, *karma*, etc. are not *dravya* for they are not the substrata of property or properties (*guṇāśraya*). From this specified sense again develops yet another sense of fit or suitable person or object, a worthy person, one who is possessed of qualities (of head and heart) ; hence *bhavya*, blessed, promising. Pāṇini notes this meaning in his Sūtra '*dravyam*

1. See Rāmāyaṇa V. 39. 32; V. 59. 1; V. 68. 16.

ca bhavye' (5. 3, 104). That the word *dravya* in this sense is used in the neuter even when used in apposition with a noun of a different gender unerringly points to the fact that it is only an extended meaning of the term of the Vaiśeṣikas. A person is *dravya* for he is *guṇāśraya*, as a substance is : '*dravyam iva dravyam*'. The original meaning of the word *patra* was a leaf of a tree. In earlier times a leaf of a tree was used for writing purposes. This was the practice not only in India but in other countries too. In English also we say 'the leaf of a book'. Now, a thing which was written on the leaf also came to be known as *patra*. *Patra* in this way came to signify a letter, which was written on the *patra*. In course of time any thing which served as a writing material came to be called *patra*. Thus we have *tāmrapatra*, *suvarṇapatra*, etc., for copper and gold plates respectively.

The change in the meaning of the word *patra* reminds us of the Latin word *pinna* meaning feather from which has come the modern English word pen.

On the word *sākṣin* M.R. Kale¹ has written a beautiful note. In grammar this word is formed by Pāṇini's rule *sākṣād draṣṭari saṃjñāyām*' (V.2. 91) with the suffix *in* (ini) added to the word *sākṣāt* in the sense of a looker-on. He explains the semantical evolution of this word in this way : "In a transaction like a loan, etc., three persons directly see the act, viz., one who gives ; one who takes and a third party who witnesses the act. The word *saṃjñā* in the sūtra is used to show that the word *sākṣin* is restricted to the person merely looking on and does not refer to the lender or the borrower. *Sākṣin* merely means a witness. Now, the person who witnesses the performance has also to pronounce judgment on the propriety or otherwise of it. Hence the word *sākṣin* comes to acquire the meaning of an umpire, a judge. It is in this sense that the word is found used in the

1. Mālavikāgnimitra, Nirṇaya Sagar Press edition, Bombay, Notes, p. 41.

feminine in the *Mālavikāgnimitra* of Kālidāsa : "sākṣiṇīm tāvat pṛccha."¹

The word *kitava* literally means *kin tava* ? 'how much (of money) are you having with you' ? One who asks such a question is *kitava*. As a gambler asks this question of another gambler he is called *kitava*. Now, a gambler is usually given to fraud and chicanery. He is a wicked person. So the word *kitava* gives up its primary meaning of gambler and assumes the secondary meaning of a rogue, a rascal.² It is from *kitava* in this sense that we have the word *kaitava* meaning fraud. Now, as one has to pretend to be honest before one can hope to deceive others, the word *kaitava* comes to mean pretext.

Literally the word *suvarṇa* means 'of fine colour'. Now of all the metals it is the colour of gold which appeals most to the eye. It is gold which is really *suvarṇa* 'of fine colour'. The next stage in the development of meaning of the word *suvarṇa* is furnished by the meaning of ornament that the word *suvarṇa* comes to acquire. The ornaments are called *suvarṇa* because they are made of *suvarṇa*. (*vikṛter api prakṛtisamjñā*). Just as ornaments of gold are called *suvarṇa*, so is a coin of gold. In this sense the word has been used in the *Manusmṛti* and the *Mahābhārata* and such other works. *Suvarṇa* also means a weight of gold, 80 *rattikas* or about 175 grains troy.³

Nirvāṇa literally means extinguished. It is formed from the root *ṇā* with the past participle suffix *ta*. From this etymological sense the word comes to develop the sense of the state of perfect rest, equilibrium when all disturbances are removed. Such a state of mind comes into being when one has no other feeling than that of unmixed joy or hap-

1. page 80. of Text.

2. *Mālavikāgnimitra*, Ed. M.R. Kāle, Gopal Narayan and Co., Bombay, 1920, Notes p. 104.

3. Cf. *Dūtavākya* of Bhāsa 'yatra Keśavasya pratyutthāsyati sa mayā dvādaśsuvarṇabhāreṇa daṇḍyah', *Dūtavākya* Bhāsanūṭaka-cakram, ed. C. R. Devadhar, Poona Oriental Book Agency, p. 444.

piness. Now, this blissful experience one can have only when one has cast off the shackles of the body. It is in this way that the word *nirvāṇa* comes to mean salvation. The word *nirvāṇa* is found used with fire as well as with a *muni*. The use of it in the sense of complete happiness or deep satisfaction is attested by the *Abhijñānaśākuntalam* of Kālidāsa : 'aye labdham netranirvāṇam'.¹

The word *āmra* originally means a mango tree. In this sense it is masculine. It also means a mango fruit in which sense it is neuter. It appears that from the original sense of a tree of that name the word *āmra* came to signify the fruit that grows on that tree. The next stage in the development of the meaning of the word *āmra* is that it gives up the original sense of a mango tree and comes to acquire the sense of a sacred tree in general. In this sense we have the use of it in the following verse which enumerates the *pañcāmras*, the five sacred trees by planting which a man can never go to hell :

aśvattha ekaḥ picumarda eko
dvau campakau trīṇi ca kesarāṇi |
saptātha tālā nava nārikelāḥ
pañcāmraropī narakaṃ na yāti ||²

M. R. Kale very beautifully explains the semantical change in the word *asura* in the following words³ : "The word *asura* originally meant a god. It is formed from the word *asu* with the addition of the suffix *ra*. Etymologically it means one full of (*ra*) spiritual life (*asu*). The *asura* is used in the original sense of a god in the oldest parts of the R̥gveda. There it is an epithet of the chief deities such as Indra, Agni, Varuṇa, etc. But when there was a conflict between the ancient Persians and the old Aryans, the ancient

1. Ed. M. R. Kale, Gopal Narayan & Co, Bombay, 1920. p. 67.

2. Bhāṣāvṛtti of Puruṣottamadeva, ed. Srisha Chandra Chakravarti, The Virendra Research Society, Raj Shahi, Footnote 5, p. 69.

3. Raghuvamśa, Cantos I—X ed. M. R. Kale, Gopal Narayan & Co, 1922, Notes, p. 51. --

Persians called the deities of the Aryans, *devas*, devils. The Aryans by way of retaliation called the deities, *asuras*, of the Persians, demons. Thus the word *asura* which had so long signified a god, came to mean a demon with the Aryans; and their fertile genius easily led them to coin a word *sura* for a god from the very term *asura* which now meant 'not-a-god' by eliminating *a* from it as if it were a negative particle. Cf. the word *sita* derived from *asita* meaning black." The word *asita* was a simple word and not a compound of *a* and *sita*. Similarly *vidhavā* is the original word. It has its cognate forms in a number of European languages, for example, English—widow; Latin—viduo; Greek—vidva. *Vidhavā* is not a compound of *vi*+*dhava* as it is supposed to be, yet *dhava* came to be recorded as a word for 'husband' in the Lexicons and became current as such. This would explain the fact of the derivation of the word *sura* from *asura*.

The word *anukrośa* primarily means to cry after (*anu*=after, *krośa*=crying). From this primary sense the word comes to mean to cry in sympathy. Now crying in sympathy means that a person feels pity for another in distress. It is in this way that *anukrośa* comes to mean pity. It is particularly interesting to note that the English word 'sympathy' too means the same thing. 'Sym' means together while 'pathy' means pity.

The word *kṣana* means 'a moment' originally. Secondly it means leisure. How this word came to mean leisure we do not know. The intermediary link is missing. We can only put forward a conjecture and that is that from the sense of moment it might have come to acquire the sense of one's own moment. From this the sense of leisure was the natural extension, for leisure is precisely one's own moment. Now, when one has leisure one puts on a bright face and feels happy. That is really a festive occasion for him. So the word *kṣana* comes to mean a festive occasion. In this sense the word has been used frequently in literature, as for

example in 'tena hy ayam sugrītaḥ kṣaṇaḥ'¹; "Vidūṣakaḥ—grīhitaḥ kṣaṇo' smi"². The phrase grīhitaḥ kṣaṇaḥ means that I have found leisure or time to do the work. It is interesting to note that the Marathi derivative of the word, *saṇa*, is still used in this very sense.

The word *tapasvin* primarily means one who practises penance or meditation. Now such a person really is the one who has nothing to do with this world. Though in it, he is not of it. In the eyes of others, he is an involuntary sufferer who has to depend upon others for his maintenance. Hence the word comes to mean poor or helpless in which sense numerous uses of it can be found in literature.

The word *dakṣiṇa* literally means skilful, expert. It is formed from the root *dakṣ* which means to be active or skilled. The right hand is called *dakṣiṇa* because it is more active. Now, from this sense of active or skilled the further extended sense is 'one who is skilled or active in helping others.' Now, such a person can only be he who is generous, large-hearted. In this way the word *dakṣiṇa* comes to have the sense of large-hearted or liberal. Literature preserves not a few instances of it in this sense. One such may be quoted here from the Svapnavāśavadattam of Bhāsa : 'sadā-kṣiṇyasya janasya parijano' pi sadākṣiṇya eva bhavati'.³

1. Abhijñāna Śākuntalam, ed. M. R. Kale, Gopal Narayan & Co, Bombay, 1920, Act 2, p. 46.

2. Mālavikāgnimitra, ed. M. R. Kale, p. 36.

3. Act V, Bhāsanāṭakakram, edited by C. R. Devadhar, Poona Oriental Book Agency, p. 33.

ON THE WORDS KĀHALĀ AND KIRĀṬA

There has been a lot of discussion on the words *kāhalā* and *kirāṭa*. These words have touched off a controversy of late. The word *kāhalā* is found in the Yogavāsiṣṭha verse :

siddhavidyādharonmuktapuṣpavarṣasahasrabhṛt |
dhvananmṛdaṅgamurajakāhalāśaṅkhadundubhi¹ ॥

The word is used in Sanskrit literature in all the three genders. There is a lot of discussion as to what it exactly signifies. As in the Yogavāsiṣṭha verse quoted above the word *kāhalā* has been used with *mṛdaṅga*, *muraja*, *śaṅkha* and *dundubhi*—all musical instruments, it must also mean one such thing. But what exactly is it ? According to Baldev Prasad Mishra² it is somewhat like a drum, the view which is contested by Jagannath Prasad Shukla³ who believes that *kāhalī* was a bugle resembling very much the *dhus-tūra* flower. He records the fact that this bugle is sounded even now at the time of the procession of the Vaiṣṇava saints. The editor of the Nāgarī Pracārīṇī Patrikā in which Mr. Mishra's note appears, gives very useful information with regard to this word. He notes various dictionary meanings of the word. Thus according to Macdonnel, *kāhala* in the masculine gender means a large drum while *kāhalā* in the feminine gender means a kind of 'wind-instrument, Monier Williams gives the meaning of neuter *kāhala* as a kind of musical instrument. V. S. Apte in his "A Practical Sanskrit-English Dictionary" mentions the meaning of the word *kāhalā* as "a large army drum". Hemacandra in his

1. III. 59. 5.

2. Piṭhamarda aur Chāyānāṭaka, Nāgarī Pracārīṇī Patrikā, Vol. 51, No. IV. Saṃvat 2003.

3. Kāhalī, Nāgarī Pracārīṇī. Patrikā, Vol. III, No. 1, Saṃvat 2004.

comment on the Abhidhānacintāmaṇi¹ quotes the verse :

kāhalā tu kuhālā syāc caṇḍakolāhalā ca sām
 samveśapratibodhārtham dragaḍadrakaṭāv ubhau ||

which tells us that *kāhalā* is a kind of musical instrument also called *kuhalā* which produces a terrible noise. In 'Rāmāśramī' the commentary on the Amarakoṣa, the word *adi* in '*vaṃśādīkam*'² is said to mean *kāhalā*, etc. (*ādipadāt kāhalādivādyam*) from where the conclusion would be irresistible that *kāhalā* like the flute was a musical instrument to be blown with the mouth. In the Śabdakalpādruma the *dhustūra* flower is called *kāhalāpuṣpa*, the meaning of which is 'that the form of which resembles *kāhalā*.' As the *dhustūra* flower is very long *kāhalā* must also have been a long pipe-sort of a thing which was not necessarily an army bugle as V. S. Apte in his Dictionary says. The reference in the Yogavāsiṣṭha would not support this view although in the Harṣacarita and the Kādambarī of Bāṇa it has been used in the context of the army movements in connection with military expeditions. Dr. Vasudeva Sharan Agrawala thinks that *kāhalā* is a musical instrument like a pipe. In Hindi he calls it *turahi*.³ The editorial note on the word *kāhalā* in the Nāgarī Pracārīṇī Patrikā, already referred to above, mentions the interesting fact that a pipe-like musical instrument *kahalla* is still used in Kārṇāṭaka and serves the purpose of announcing the visit of officials. It is also used at the annual celebrations in honour of the village deity. Anandabodha Sarasvatī, the commentator of the Yogavāsiṣṭha, explains *kāhalā* as '*kārṇālasamjñako vādyaviśeṣaḥ*.' As the word *kārṇāla* has not been traced in the extant literature, the commentator's explanation of *kāhalā* does not enlighten us at all as to what type of musical instrument it signified. We have, therefore, to depend upon, as we have done above, other evidence to arrive at the exact signification of the

1. II. 108.

2. I. 7. 4.

3. Kādambarī-Ek Sāṃskṛtika Adhyayana, pp. 63, 77, 117, 126 ; Harṣa Carita-Ek Sāṃskṛtika Adhyayana, p. 140

word. From the various references to the word in Sanskrit literature this can at least be said that there is no difference in the senses of *kāhala*, *kāhalā* and *kāhalī*. All of these mean a kind of musical instrument, *turahi* in the words of Dr. Vasudeva Sharan Agrawala, which is sounded with the breath blown from the mouth. There is a difference in gender only as in the case of the word *taṭa* which is found in all the three genders in one and the same sense.

The other word which has provoked some discussion about its exact descent is *kirāṭa*, meaning a merchant. It is found in the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* in the verse, 'atyantakṛpṇaḥ kaścit kirāṭo dhanadhānyavān', (VI. (i) 83. 16). In the *Kṛtyakalpataru*¹ *kirāṭa* is said to be a merchant who deals in prohibited ware like oil or ghee, a sense which Monier Williams records, and this is not improbable. The meaning is clear. The word is used down to this day in the sense of a Bania (a merchant in general) in the West Panjab and the North-Western provinces of the pre-partition days. Yet scholars have sought to assign it a specified sense which neither tradition nor vogue countenances. Mr. Bhogi Lal J. Sandesara thinks that *Kirāṭa* does not mean a mere merchant but a highly deceitful one on the basis of the following verses from the *Rājatarāṅgi* :

candanāṅkālike śvetāṅśuke dhūpādhivāsini ।
viśvastaḥ syāt kirāṭe yo viprakṛṣṭe' sya nāpadaḥ ॥
lalāṭadrkpuṭaśrotradvandvahṛnnnyastacandnaḥ ।
saḍbinduvṛścika iva kṣṇāt prānāntakṛd vaṇik² ॥

Mr. Bhogilal is evidently mistaken. He has failed to understand the Text. The second stanza is a mere amplification of the first. He suggests that "*kirāṭa* has been derived from *kirāṭa* by cerebralization, the transference of meaning being made possible by metaphorical process. There is a marked similarity between the predatory habits of wild tribes like *Kirāṭa* and the cheating proclivities of the merchants

1. *Hārīta* quoted in *Gārhaṣṭhyakāṇḍa* of *Kṛtyakalpataru*, p. 227.

2. VIII. 182—183.

and hence the evolution of semantical change.¹ Dr. Raghavan traces the word *kirāṭa* in the satires of the Kashmirian Kṣemendra who mentions it as a sub-species of the predatory Kāyastha.² In the Yogavāsiṣṭha the word has been used in the sense of a Baniya in general. Following the line of evolution suggested by Mr. Bhogilal we may say that as every Baniya being deceitful and ruthless in his transactions had so much in common with a *kirāta*, he came to be called by the same name slightly modified, viz., *kirāṭa*.³

Here is clearly a case of expansion of meaning of the word *kirāta*, if the word *kirāṭa* is a *tadbhava* from it. But it is a big 'if'.

Mr. Ranjit Pandit in his 'River of Kings' (pages 350 and 362) translates Kirāṭa as Bhils, an aboriginal Indian tribe of the Vindhya hills and Rajputana. Evidently he too, is linking the word *kirāṭa* with *kirāta*. As in the Yogavāsiṣṭha a *kirāṭa* is said to be flourishing in the Vindhya forest (Vindhyātavīkakṣe) this meaning also can very well fit in the context.

1. "Śīlāṅkadeva in his commentary on Sūtrakṛtāṅgasūtra says that several castes are given a name after their characteristic blemish. A Brahmana is called Doḍa, a Baniya, a Kirāṭa and so on. Āgamodaya Samiti edition, p. 284"—A Note on the word Kirāṭa, Bhogilal J. Sandesara, Bhāratiya Vidyā, Vol. VIII., Nos. 3-4, 1947.

2. Kirāṭa, V. Raghavan, Bhāratiya Vidyā, Vol. VIII, 5-7, May-June-July, 1947, p. 176. Also see 'Kāyastha', V. Raghavan, New Indian Antiquary, Vol. VI., No. 7, October 1943, p. 150-62.

3. Probably the Yogavāsiṣṭha Commentator too had this derivation of Kirāṭa in mind as would appear from his comment on IV. 53.14 : "Kirāṭānām pratyantadeśavāsinām karmādhikārabahiṣkṛtānām."

SANSKRIT ORIGINALS OF A FEW HINDI AND PANJABI WORDS

There are many words in some of the Modern Indian languages whose origin is not easily traceable. The form from which they have travelled to their present state does not admit of easy discernment. Many times their shape in the process of evolution has changed beyond recognition. Their meaning too has undergone certain unavoidable changes. But inspite of all these difficulties there is something so mysterious in them that we cannot resist their call. Their sweet music enthrals us and we think there is no insurmountable difficulty in the way of acquainting ourselves with their past history. True, the remoter the past, the more difficult it is to trace the history. Fortunately for us, literature comes to our rescue and throws up certain evidences without which it may not have been possible to arrive at the earliest known form of the words. By carefully sifting the material with us we arrive at the source of the many current vocables of Hindi and Panjabi. This study, though rather difficult, is highly rewarding, for it helps to solve many a vexed problem of Linguistics.

The word for marriage party in Panjabi is '*Janet*'. It is derived from the Sanskrit word '*Janyatrā*' meaning a marriage party. This word is of very rare occurrence in Sanskrit and is not so far found in any other ancient work except the *Yogavāsiṣṭha*.¹ The development of the word '*Janet*' from '*Janyatrā*' is more reasonable than from the lengthy '*Janyayātrā*' with an involved process of phonetic change.

The two well-known words in Hindi which are generally used in juxtaposition with each other are '*kheti-bāṛi*'

1. 1. 5. 8.

which mean agriculture and breeding of cattle. Now, the word 'bārī' seems to be derived from the Sanskrit word 'Vārttā' one of whose meanings is recorded by Monier Williams as breeding of cattle. The English word 'breed' also is evidently connected with this word.

The Hindi word 'Caukhaṭ' owes its origin to the word 'Catuṣkikā' which in juxtaposition with the word 'dvāra' has been found used in the 'Kṛtya-kalpataru'.¹ It means the frame-work of a door.

For interest the Hindi word is 'sūd' which in sense and form is connected with the Sanskrit word 'sodaya' which means augmented (by interest). It is one of the least known words for interest in Sanskrit. It is found in one or two works only.²

The word 'Brāhmaṇī' is used in the Rāmāyaṇa in the rather peculiar sense of a lizard with a red tail. It is interesting to note that in the 'Bhojpuri' dialect of Hindi such a lizard is called 'Bamani' which is, as is patent, a derivative of the 'Brāhmaṇī' of the Rāmāyaṇa.³

An ox in Hindi is known as 'Sāṇḍ'. It is evidently derived from the Sanskrit word 'Saṇḍa' meaning an ox having testacles not castrated. The word is found used in many works in literature.

The word 'dhaḍā' in Hindi stands for the weight of a tin or utensil in which the thing to be measured is to be put. This word is derived from the Sanskrit word 'dhaṭa' which has the slightly different meaning there. It means "a balance or the scale of the balance (Monier Williams)".

There is a word 'ghāṭa' in Hindi and 'gāṭa' in Panjabi which means a lump of flesh on the back of the neck. It is a 'tatsama' word. The Sanskrit word also is 'ghāṭa'. Monier Williams gives its meaning as the nape or the back of the

1. Rājadharmakāṇḍa, p. 68. Gackwad Oriental Series.

2. Yājñavalkya Smṛti, etc. See Monier Williams.

3. 'Brāhmaṇī karakād iva'. III. 2. 9. 5. Brāhmaṇī—raktapucchikā (Commentary).

neck, and notes its use in lexicons only. From 'ghāṭa' is derived the word 'ghaṭraul' in Hindi which stands for a particular disease. In the hilly regions of the U. P. and the Panjab this disease is fairly common. Drinking of dirty water is said to be one of the main causes of it.

There is a word 'chīnk' for sneezing in Hindi. It is generally derived from √'chikk' to sneeze. The nasalization in 'chīnk' is generally explained away as sporadic. That this could not be the case is proved by the discovery of the word in 'Gobhila Gṛhya Sūtra' where the word *chīnkā* which is closest to Hindi *chīnk* is found used.¹

The Sanskrit original for *gājar* or carrot is supposed to be *grñjana*. Many text-books of the present day give this word for carrot. It is, therefore, of interest to know the Hindi word for carrot is a *tatsama* word. The word for *gājara* in Sanskrit is also *gājara*. The word is found used in the *Vīramitrodaya*.² The antiquity of the word goes further back when it is remembered that the word occurs in one of the quotations from the *Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa*, included in the *Vīramitrodaya*. This important discovery throws welcome light on the peculiar philological tendency that reveals itself in such words. There are certain words whose use in Sanskrit is so scarce or so limited that in course of time when the same word is found used in the *Apabhraṃśa* or the modern vernaculars it is refused to be believed that it is the same Sanskrit word and so an attempt is made to find out another original for it.

The Sanskrit word *akreya* means which cannot be purchased. The Hindi derivative of this original Sanskrit vocable is *akara* which is found used in the Braj dialect of the Hindi language. Similar is the case with the Sanskrit word *upānah* [shoe] which in a slightly different form *panahī* is found used in the villages of the U. P. especially in the eastern part of it.

1. p. 52. See *Nārāyaṇa Bhāṣya* on it.

2. *Śrāddhaprakāśa*, p. 47. Chawkhamba edition.

Monier Williams gives the meaning of the word '*tundi*' as the navel and finds its mention only in the extant Sanskrit lexicons. He could not trace its use in literature. In this light it is interesting to find that this word which was so obscure as not to have been found in the vast Sanskrit literature has left a descendant in the Panjabi derivative *dhunni* which has the same meaning as the word *tundi*.

The Worterbüch gives the word *tera* meaning squinting. According to Monier Williams *terākṣa* means 'squint-eyed'. Sanskrit literature does not furnish any use of it. Nor is it found in any other vernacular except Panjabi where it is used in the form *tīrā* and has the same meaning as its Sanskrit original.

The Panjabi word *kirāḍ* is a caste name. It has in it an element of contempt also. This word owes its origin to the Sanskrit word *kirāṭa* which is found used in the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha*.¹ Another form of the word in Sanskrit is *kirāṭin* which has been defined by Hārīta as one who sells prohibited ware like oil or ghee.² Ancient society did not, of course, look kindly on the *kirāṭin*. So the original idea of contempt persists in its derivative word *kirāḍ* too.

In Hindi the word *varaḍ* or *virāḍ* means an insect that eats into canes. The word is derived from the Sanskrit word *varuṭa* which is found used for an insect that lives on canes.

The word *mailā* and *kucailā* are used in Hindi in juxtaposition with each other. *Mailā* is derived from Sanskrit *malina*. *Kucailā* is Sanskrit *kucaila* itself. It is no mere conjecture. The word is found used in the sense of 'the badly clothed' in the *Brahma Purāṇa*. The word has maintained its *tatsama* form through the ages.

The *Mahābhārata* uses the word *guḍhadravya*³ for bribe. Etymologically it means hidden money. In Hindi the word

1. Asti Vindhyāṭavī kakṣo kirāṭo dhanadhānyavān. Vi. (i). 88. 16.

2. Kirāṭi ghr̥tatailataṇḍulādyavikreyavikravī-Hārīta quoted in Kṛtya-kalpataru, Gārhaṣṭhya Kāṇḍa, p. 227.

3. Śāntiparva 85. 13.

for bribe is *ghūs*. Can we not hazard a conjecture that this *ghūs* is derived from the Sanskrit *gūḍha* the first member of the compound used in the Mahābhārata. It is not uncommon to see the first or the second members of the Sanskrit compounds dropping out in modern vernaculars.

The Hindi word *kaṭār* meaning a dagger is derived from *kaṭṭāraka* or the Sanskrit-looking *kaṭyāraka* found in one of the Sanskrit *dūta-kāvyas*¹.

Aparārka² takes the word *trasarī* in the sense of silk, which seems to be the origin of the Hindi and Panjabi word *tassar* meaning a variety of silk.

In Panjabi the word *innu* and *binnu* means a support made of *muñja* for a water-jar. The Hindi form of the word is *inḍvā*, *inḍvī*. The Sanskrit word for this is *inḍu* which, however, means two coverings for the hand (to protect them in removing the Ukha fire) [Monier Williams].

Two varieties of sugarcane are called *kāṭhā gannā* and *ponnā gannā* in Panjabi. The former is thinner and less juicy than the latter. The word *kāṭhā* is derived from *kāṣṭha* which is used in the same sense in combination with *ikṣu* in Sanskrit.³ *Ponnā* is the corruption of '*paunḍra*' which again is the name of a variety of sugarcane.

The Panjabi word *khabbā* (left-hand) is derived from the Sanskrit word *kharva*. That the word *kharva* apart from its other meanings, denoted the left-hand also is proved by a valuable reference in the Aparārka Tikā where Paithīnasi is quoted as saying that the word *kharva* means the left-hand.⁴

The popular Hindi word *ghūmanā* in the sense of rotating or walking is derived from $\sqrt{\text{ghūrṇ}}$, 'to rotate', 'to roll'. In this very sense it occurs in the Indudūtam.⁵ Walking

1. Vānmaṇḍanagunādūta, verse 26. 2. p. 9311.

3. Monier Williams traces the word in Sanskrit lexicons only.

4. *kharvo vāmahasta itī Paithīnasiḥ*-Aparārka on Yājñ. p. 105.

5. *hastāmbhoje dadhatam amalām vaidrumīm akṣamālām rāgaṃ prāptām iva gurugunair ghūrṇamānām ca citre*. V. III, p. 63, *Kāvyamālā*, Sanskrit Series Vol. XIV.

is only a step further from rotation. When the garland of beads is spoken of as '*ghūrnamāna*' in contradistinction with the more accepted use of the $\sqrt{ghūrṇ}$ with reference to the head [to mean dizziness or reeling], we are brought very near the use of it in the common parlance in the sense of walking.

A very common word used in day-to-day speech is *netī* in the sense of the 'churning chord.' The word is derived from the Sanskrit *netra*. Originally the word *netra* means an eye but later it comes to mean a string of the churning stick. The Raghuvamśa records the use of the word in the sense of a silken garment (7. 39).

The common Hindi word *nicuḍanā* is derived from the Sanskrit word *niculita* which occurs in one of the Dūta-Kāvya.¹

Thus we see that there are not a few derivatives in some of the modern Indian languages whose originals can only be traced through the deep study of literature. More often than not, they are obscure words. Their use is limited to only a few works and there also it has to be traced with difficulty, for many of them are so rare as to have escaped the eye of the indigenous as well as foreign lexicographers. To locate them requires persistent effort. Considerable literature has to be ransacked for it. Then only a few words can be discovered. An attempt has been made here to find out rather obscure originals of a few well-known words in Hindi and Panjabi, the two important modern Indian vernaculars.

1. Phenakṣaumāmbaraniculitān yaṇ niṣadyāsu hr̥dyān vīcīhastair vikirati maṇīn nityam ambhodhir eva. Bhṛṅga Sandeśa of Vāsudeva. Triv. Sans. Series. verse, 25.

THE TEXT OF THE DIK AND KĀLA-SAMUDDĒŚAS OF THE VĀKYAPADĪYA AND ITS COMMENTARY

The text of the Vākyapadīya is badly corrupted at many places. The work has not been critically edited so far. Of the Dik and the Kāla Samuddeśas the condition of the Dik Samuddeśa published in Vol. II Fasciculus I of the Banaras Sanskrit Series is especially bad. In the course of the study of these Samuddeśas have been noticed a number of corrupt readings of which only a few are noted hereunder along with their possible emendations.

DIK SAMUDDĒŚA :

The very first verse of the Dik Samuddeśa p. 157 Banaras Sanskrit Series should be read inverted. In 'Svatantrā dravyarūpatā cāsti vidiśaḥ', third line from bottom p. 157, 'vidiśaḥ' should be read as simply 'diśaḥ'. On p. 158 last line 'eko hi prāmānikaḥ sa kāryasya' should be read as 'ko hi prāmānikaḥ kāryasya'...

In the introductory remarks of the commentary to verse 4 line 1 'diganapekṣākāryam' should be corrected to 'diganapekṣāt kāryam'. Further in line 3 'pūrvaparādiptyayalingam' should be read as 'pūrvaparādiptyayalingam'. The second half of the verse itself is a hopeless muddle. The reading 'kramarūpe na kalpataḥ' there should be corrected to 'kramarūpe tu kālataḥ'. This emendation has the support of the commentary too. The commentary says—'kālaśaktikṛtapratibandhābhyanuḥjñāvaśāt'. (line 6 under verse 4). This agrees only with the reading 'kālataḥ' and not 'kalpataḥ'. In line 1 of the same verse 'mūrtiḥ sarvadravyaparimāṇam' is apparently a wrong reading. It should be 'mūrtir asarvadravyagataparimāṇam'. Again in line 2 under the same verse 'vyāpakādīnām ākāśādīnām' should be emended as 'vyāpakānām ākāśādīnām'.

The explanation of verse 5 ends after 'vyavahārah sidhyatītyamūrtapūrvakosāvityarthah'. (line 5 p. 159). With 'iha deśānām' begins the introduction to the next verse. The number 5 therefore should be put after that. Further, in 'ata eva pūrvādityam' (last line on p. 159) 'ata eva' should be corrected to 'svata eva'. This agrees eminently with the context.

How at times wrong punctuation plays havoc with the correct understanding of the text is clearly borne out in the comment under verse 6. We quote the whole comment here as it is and then put down the punctuated one.

"Deśenāsvatantram rūpam ādhārādisvabhāvam arpyate iti tatra pūrvāparādibhāvasya svarūpād eva bhāvād anyan nimittam digākhyam kalpyate naivopakāreṇa. Tatra paratantrasvabhāvakalpanā. Nāparam pūrvādirādī tāvat svabhāvam avalambitum utsahate. Yena tatrāvasthitasvabhāve deśavat pūrvāparādibhāvārtham nimittāntaram eṣaṇīyam syāt. Yādrghbhāvā hi sā kāryaparikalpyā tāvad eva tattvam nāparam tatra śaktīnām pāratantryasyaivopapatteḥ. śaktyantarakalpane śaktimatvāpatteḥ. śaktimato tiprasaṅgāt sūryasaṃyogas tu pūrvāparāditvam nāpūrvam tatrārdhatte api tu svabhāva eva śaktir ity abhiprāyaḥ."

AFTER PROPER PUNCTUATION:

"Deśenāsvatantram rūpam ādhārādisvabhāvam arpyata iti tatra pūrvāparādibhāvasya svarūpād eva bhāvād anyan nimittam digākhyam kalpyate. Naivopakāreṇa tatra paratantrasvabhāvakalpanā. Nāparam pūrvādirāditāvat-svabhāvam avalambitum utsahate, yena tatrāvasthite svabhāve deśavat pūrvāparādibhāvārtham nimittāntaram eṣaṇīyam syāt. Yādrksvabhāvā hi sā kāryaparikalpyā tāvad eva tattvam nāparam. Tatra śaktīnām pāratantryasyaivopapatteḥ. śaktyantarakalpane śaktyānantyāpatteḥ śaktimato' tiprasaṅgāt. Sūryasaṃyogas tu pūrvāparāditvam nāpūrvam tatrārdhatte, api tu svabhāva eva śaktir ity abhiprāyaḥ".

On page 161 under verse 8 line 1 'vāsvam avadhim apekṣya' does not convey any sense. My suggestion is that

'vāsvam' should be replaced by 'svāṅgam'. The meaning then becomes clear. On p. 164 line 3 saḥābhedaḥ seems to be the correct reading in place of saha bhedaḥ which does not agree with the context. On the same page in lines 3 & 4 from bottom there is an absurd reading—'śabdād avadhibhinnām'. This must be 'śabdovadhibhinnam...'. On p. 165 under verse 12, line 5 'tathā hy aṣṣaḥamāṇaḥ' should be corrected to 'tathā hy avidyamāṇaḥ'. The reading in the printed text yields no meaning. On the same page under verse 13 line 6 'sthūlāvayavyutpatir na syāt' is a highly misleading reading. It should be 'sthūlāvayavyutpattir na syāt'. Under the same verse in line 11 the words 'tathā hi' should be removed. For, they create a wrong impression on the reader that Helārāja is here referring to two views while he refers actually to only one. On p. 166 under the same verse in line 3 'atotra paramāṇau' etc. should be read as 'ato nātra paramāṇau', etc. Again, under the same verse in line 15 'tataś ca divyasambandhāt' is highly misleading. It should be corrected to 'tataś ca diksambandhāt'. On the same page in the introductory lines to verse 14 'dikṛta ekā karaḥ' should be read as dikṛta ekākāraḥ. Further, in the commentary, line 1 the word 'prakalpate' is an ugly interpolation. It should be deleted. On p. 167, under the same verse, line 5 yogāsvabhāvaḥ' should be read as 'yogasvabhāvaḥ'. On the same page in verse 16 line 1...'bhedo' bhedaḥ' should be read as 'bhedo bhedaḥ' (without an *elision mark*). In the same verse in line 2...'bhedaḥ ato yuktataraṃ viduḥ' should be read with an *elision mark*...'bhedaḥ ato' yuktataraṃ viduḥ. Under the same verse in line 5...'tatrāpy avayavabhedābhedaḥ' should be corrected to...'tatrāpy avayavabhedād bhedaḥ'. On p. 168 under the same verse in line 1 'na kevalaṃ ghano' is definitely a corrupt reading. The conjecture is that here 'ghano' might have been originally 'svato'. Again, on the same page under the same verse in line 3...'bhāvabhedena nālam' is grammatically incorrect. It should be...'bhāva-bhedāya nālam.' On page 168 under verse 18 line 6...vidyā-

vaśādivinno is obviously a wrong reading. What it should be I have not been able to make out. Again, in the same verse 'pravṛttim' should be 'prakṛtim'.

KĀLA SAMUDDĒŚA :

Even in the Kāla Samuddeśa edited by K. Sāmba Śiva Śāstrī there seem to be some corrupt readings. Thus e. g. on page 69 Trivandrum edition of the Vākyapadīya under verse 54 lines 2-3, we have 'tadvyatirikto'...It should be 'tadavyatirikto'. Similarly on the same page in line 3 'vartamānatvāc cānantarāmapyatitatām' should be 'vartamānatvāc cānantarām apyatitatām'. Similarly on the same page under verse 55 line 2 from bottom 'sarvānugrahād' should be 'sarvānugamād' and 'tad eva' in the last line should be 'tad etat'. On page 76 under verse 70 line 1 'ghaṭikobhayavartino' should be read, I believe, as 'ghaṭikodaravartino'.

The Kāla Samuddeśa is a little better edited as K. Sāmbaśiva Śāstrī had better Mss. The condition of the Dik Samuddeśa (published in Banaras Sanskrit Series) is rather deplorable. No doubt, the editor had only a single Ms., yet he should have exerted himself a little and suggested better readings. As it is, the text is a veritable mess and it has taken me hours together to pour over corrupt readings and then put down possible emendations.

INDUDŪTA OF VINAYA VIJAYAGANI—A TEXTUAL STUDY

Indudūta of Vijayagani as published in the 14th volume in the *Kāvya-mālā* series is a highly corrupt work. From an editorial note on page 45, Footnote I, we come to know the reason of it. The editor says that only one manuscript of it could be found and that too was corrupt and broken at many places. It is unfortunate that the editor has done nothing to improve upon the text or to fill in the lacunae, with the result that the verses at many places have lost in clarity of meaning and have become quite unintelligible. Centuries of careless handling of the work has so thoroughly corrupted the text that it becomes impossible many times to arrive at a hypothetical reading approximating to the original, however ingeniously one may try to do it.

The colophon of *Indudūta* says that it is an imitation of the *Meghadūta*—*Meghadūta-chāyā-kāvya*. From this it is clear that the author composed it in imitation of Kālidāsa's *Meghadūta*. But even a cursory perusal of it shows that it is an unsuccessful attempt altogether. Excepting of course the *Mandākrāntā* metre and a few expressions here and there the work has very little similarity with the original whose imitation it claims to be. The text of the book, as available in the *Kāvya-mālā* series, is broken at many places, and even where it is not, it is highly corrupt. But apart from it, the value of the work as a literary piece is not very high. The poet in keeping with the later poets many times over-stretches himself. His language at places suffers from unnecessary padding; as for example, in verses 27 and 50.

The poem does not have uniformity in style. It suffers from jerks. Generally verses are without a charm but occasionally after a few verses there occurs a flash when the

poet gives us an original *utprekṣā* or *upamā*, as for example, in verse 24 where he imagines that the moon is pale like a withered leaf because it is separated from its beloved, the night. In the day time the moon is seen to be grey in colour and this greyness the poet imagines to be due to the sorrow that the moon may be feeling on account of being separated from its beloved, the night. Now this is a very happy idea. The poet has used here an *ayoniya upamā*. In verse 65, Abhramatī is shown pleased to see her son, the moon. The mushroom growth of reeds on the banks are her hair standing on end, the surging waves are her hands raised to clasp her son. Now this is another nice 'utprekṣā'. At another place the author gives us a nice instance of *hetūtprekṣā* (verse 9). Maidens generally are jealous by nature but they feel ashamed when they see other maidens' superior charm. This was precisely the reason why Laṅkā drowned herself in the vast ocean when she saw the glittering beauty of Vātāpādri. The Vasvaukasārā went out of sight and the Bhagavatī concealed herself in Pātāla. The poet is fond of alliteration also as for example—Pañca pañcāṇ (verse 22) Māraviṇāṃ navinām (V. 64). Vīcihastair udastaiḥ (V. 65) Kelililāvilolān (V.67). Nāvyanīrā gabhīrā (V. 83) and Kāntāḥ Vanāntāḥ (V. 90). He uses *yamaka* also as e. g. Narmadā narmadormi in V. 83, but in his effort for it he does not pay proper attention to meaning. Here the poet speaks of the river as yielding joy (*sukhayati*). This it does by means of its multitudinous joy-yielding waves. Obviously the epithet *narmada* is redundant, for it adds little to the sense. This the poet adds out of sheer fondness for alliteration. Another particularly charming example of *yamaka* is found in V. 92. It is *Sumanaḥ Saṃvitānām latānām*. Here *Saṃvitānām* does not mean anything. Probably it is a scribal error for *sañcitānām*. Similarly in verse 112 the author uses the expression *Brahmasabrahma* etc. Here the additional *sa* is useless. It should be *Brahmrūpam*. Occasionally the poet writes verses where he uses expressions such as *kāntam ekānta-kāntam*, which are, of course, sweet and suit the occasion.

Generally the work suffers from *scribal* errors besides other discrepancies which have been discussed as under :—

In verse 2, line 3, the author says '*vinaya-vinataḥ*' i. e. *vinayena vinataḥ*. Both of these have the same sense and either of the two could suffice. It is an example of '*adhi-kapadatvadoṣa*'.

In verse 3, line 1, the word '*śikara*' should be read as '*śikhara*'. The word '*śikara*' gives no sense, nor could the word *śikara* be supposed here for that would infringe the metre. In the last line the author has mentioned *pañcakūṭa* mountain afterwards but the pronoun *yatra* preceding in the second line creates a doubt and is an example of *vidh-eyāvimarśa* i. e. nondiscrimination of the predicate.

Again in verse 5, line 1, *kṛīḍopavanapadavī* should be separate from *kṛīḍatām*. In the text it is jumbled up and obscures the sense. In separating the two the prose order becomes clear. *Kṛīḍopavanapadavī* is the agent (*kartā*) and is connected with *āviṣkaroti*. *Vātoddhūta*...are the music instruments comparable with the symphony of the citizens which cause the peacocks to dance. This has been mentioned together with the humming of the black bees. The proper construction would be *dhvanadvāditrahṛdyā nrtyatkeki-prakarasubhagā kṛīḍopavanapadavī*.

In verse 9, line 1, in *purama*, the syllable *pu* should be read as *pa*. This should be *parama* as that alone makes sense. The reading in the text *puramaguru-dhyāna-sandhāna-līnāsvāntaḥ* is also otherwise faulty, *sandhāna* being redundant. Again in the second line in '*kāntam tam iti rajaneḥ*' the author has used '*iti*' between *kāntam* and *rajaneḥ* which splits both the words and is therefore misplaced. Viśvanātha, the author of the *Sāhityadarpaṇa* has given a list of such usages and syntactical irregularities in his work.

In the first line in '*dr̥ṣṭvā cainam*' in V. 9 the author uses the pronoun '*enam*' (accusative from *etad*) which is followed by '*tam*' in the second line. Here the pronoun

'adas' (amum) should have been used; as it is, it is also a case of *bhagnaprakramatā*.

The word *sadyah* and *drāk* in the second hemistich of the same verse are synonyms; either of the two would have been sufficient.

In verse 16, line 4, the first syllable is missing, it is... *totpatu*. It may be *cintotpattau* meaning 'on the rise of anxiety'. In line 3 of the same verse *cittavṛttim* should be read as *cittavṛttiḥ*, it being the subject. It should be in the nominative and not in the accusative case.

In verse 18, line 4, the word *prāṇyāḥ* should be changed to *prāṇināḥ*. But it would infringe the metre. If it remains *prāṇyāḥ*, it would be grammatically wrong. The better reading may be *prāyāḥ santāḥ*.....etc.

In verse 20, line 3, the particle *ca* after *aśvam* is unnecessary for, *ca* is a conjunctive particle. There is nothing which it may conjoin or connect.

Similarly in verse 21, line 1, the *ca* after *kautukī* is useless as it connects *yautake* with *kautukī* which makes no sense. If we replace it by the word 'san' the sense will be clearer.

In verse 24, line 1, the word *varghayati* should be *vardhayati*. This is evidently a scribal error or a printing mistake.

In verse 28, line 3, *jagadvyāpi* should be combined with *sauryapratāpaḥ* to make the sense clear. It is this which pervades the whole universe.

In verse 33, line 2, the word *indindira* is used in the sense of a large bee, which is very rare.

In verse 34, line 2, *kṛṣḍāvāpi* should be joined with *sa-vanasarasaiḥ* to make the sense clear. It would mean the winds which have become cool with a bath in the pleasure-lake. In line 4, of the same verse *stāt* should be read as *syāt*. It is evidently a mistake.

In verse 35, line 1, the reading *antimajinavarāḥ* is wrong. If we connect it with *Yama*...etc. then too it makes no sense. In case we read it as *Jinavarān* it will qualify the

prāsādān in the second line. The sense will thus become a bit clearer.

In verse 37, line 2, *visarga* should be added to the word *vimānā*. It is the plural of the word *vimāna* that is meant here and not the feminine of the word *vimāna* meaning *vigato māno yasyāḥ*.

In verse 38, line 3, the word *kṛti* in *abhisṛtikṛtikṛtām* is superfluous. The editor has put an asterisk mark here. The expression appears to him to be quite puzzling. We can suggest here a conjectural emendation. According to us the whole line may be recast as '*vighno yat syād abhisṛtikṛtām yoṣitām ca tvadiyaiḥ*'. There does not remain any superfluous word then.

In the final line of the same verse *dūranirvāsīte* should be *dūranirvāsītaḥ* and *syāt* should be *syāḥ*. This emendation would eminently suit the context.

In verse 40, line 3, the reading *kṣaṇam iyaṁ api* should be changed to *kṣaṇam ayam api*, for it is connected with *parisara*, which is in the masculine. *Prekṣaṇīya* should be read as *prekṣaṇīyaḥ*. In the extant reading the masculine *parisara* is followed by a pronoun in the feminine which is evidently wrong.

In verse 42, line 1, *vicariṣyatyaavaśyam* should be read as *vicariṣyasyavaśyam* as it is connected with *tvam*.

In verse 43, line 2, *kāryasiddhe nidānam* should be *kārya-siddher nidānam* as it is in construction with the word '*vacanāṁ*'. If it has to be justified—*sthitasya gatiḥ cintanīyā*, it may be taken as a vocative and may be dissolved as '*svikṛtanījasuhrdaḥ kāryasya siddhir yena sa svikṛtanījakārya-siddhiḥ*' i. e. who has taken the responsibility for the success of his dear friend.

In verse 45, line 4, *udghātanaiḥ* should be read as *udghāṭanaiḥ*. Or it may be author's own reading in the sense of *utkṣepaṇa*.

In verse 49, line 3, the word *vaya* seems to have confounded the editor; for, he has put a question-mark after it. It is a scribal error. *Vaya* is *varya*. The top-mark for 'r'

might have been omitted in the original manuscript. This conjecture also gets support from the close proximity of *varya* with *vaidūrya*. Here the author seems to be aiming at a nice alliterative effect.

In verse 51, line 4, *svam* should be *sva*. Again, the word *bahalavidapi* should be replaced by the word *bahala-viṭapi*. Here *da* for *ta* may be a scribal error or a printing mistake.

In verse 52, line 3, the text is broken. If we supply the word *khara*, the lacuna can be filled up. This is supported by the context also. After the dots indicating the break in the text we have the word *karaḥ*. Before the dots we have *uṣṇāṃśor api*. If *khara* is supplied we would have the complete expression *uṣṇāṃśor api kharatarakarāḥ* 'meaning scorching rays of the Sun. This will also be in keeping with the author's love for alliteration which is so evident in the work.

In verse 55, line 2, the author has used the word '*ripu-surajitā*'. Due to scribal error or some other reason the order of the words has been inverted. The reading should have been '*suraripujitā*'.

In verse 57, line 1, *eṣām* should be *asya* for, according to the context it refers to the Moon. *Eṣām* cannot refer to *prāsādānām* in the previous verse for, pronouns refer to words which are used in close proximity to them.—'*sarvanāmnāṃ sannihitaparāmarśitvam*. Now even if this *nyāya* is not taken into consideration or its application in all cases is not conceded, the word *eṣām* cannot be connected with *prāsādānām* in the previous verse for, there the complete expression is *prāsādānām trikam* which is in the singular. *Eṣām* therefore is indefensible. It should be definitely replaced by *asya*. Although grammatically this emendation may be right yet it cannot be easily fitted into the metre for the final syllable then will remain short, '*laghu*' which in the first pāda is generally considered a fault.

In verse 58, line 3, the editor has put a question-mark after the word *kaṭukamatinā*. The word *kaṭuka*, of course,

confuses one on account of its being used in a less known sense and again on account of its close resemblance with the word *kaṭu* meaning 'bitter'. Here, however, the word does not mean 'bitter'. It means 'pungent', 'sharp'. *Kaṭukamatina*, therefore, means 'by the sharpwitted'.

In verse 60, line 2 breaks after the word *gantum* *urdhvam*. The lacuna may be filled by supplying the word 'sudūram' meaning thereby that the palace intends to go very high in the sky.

In verse 61, line 1 is again found broken after *adri*. The lacuna may be filled by supplying the word *dr̥dhām* as it is connected with the word *puṣṭim*. The 'anvaya' will then be *etāḥ dr̥dhām puṣṭim dadhatu*. The expression *dr̥dha* agrees perfectly with the sense. In line 3 of the same verse 'sya' may be added to 'Auṣadhīśa' to fill up the lacuna.

In verse 62, line 2, *mithyānubhāvam* should be *mithyā-nubhāvā* for, it is connected with *tīrtharājī*, which is in the nominative singular. The whole of the second line is a compound qualifying the word 'tīrtharājī' of the first line.

In verse 63, line 2, the word *dr̥ṣṭā* should be changed to *draṣṭā* for, it is connected with the word *janaḥ*. There is no other word with which it can be connected. *Dr̥ṣṭā* is evidently a scribal error for *draṣṭā*.

In verse 67, line 1 is broken after *akhila* and the next word after the break is 'rajanān'. If we supply the syllable 'pu' to fill up the lacuna, the expression will be *prīṇaty eṣā-khila-purajanān* meaning that it pleases all the inhabitants of the city by giving them its pure waters. In line 4 of the same verse the reading *neyagādanagaryāḥ* is puzzling. The editor also has put a question mark there. Even in spite of our very best efforts it has not been possible to hit upon the correct reading in this case. The word *punīte* in line 3 of the same verse should be read with another 'ca' as it is not connected with *vicihastaiḥ* in the instrumental plural.

In verse 68, line 3, the word *upanayaiḥ* should be changed to 'upanayeh'; otherwise, the sentence would be

left without a verb and the meaning would also suffer. The author wants to say 'do not trouble the separated persons with your unbearably sharp rays' and for this purpose the construction should be *pādaḥ māśma upanayeh*. In the same line the word *prasahyaiḥ*, which from the text as handed down to us appears to be connected with *upanayaiḥ*, is nothing but a scribal error. It ought to be *asahyaiḥ*.

In verse 74, line 3, the text is broken towards the beginning. If we supply 'gra' to fill up the lacuna the complete word will be 'grāmaikaikam' meaning each and every village. This very well fits in the context and makes the sense perfectly clear.

In verse 75, line 1, again the text is broken. If we supply the syllable 'gu' the complete word will be *pratipada gurūn* which will fit in well with the context.

In verse 79, line 1, *śamanakakubhiḥ* should be changed to *śamanakakubham* for that alone makes sense. The sentence is 'tasmād draṅgāc chamanakakubham prasthitasyāntarā te', when you go to the southern direction from that city. Not only should the instrumental case be avoided with the word *kakubh* when it is connected with the word *prasthitasya*, the plural in *śamanakakubhiḥ* also is unjustified for, Śamana's or Yama's quarter is one and not many. The correct instrumental plural would, however, be *kakubbhiḥ* which militates against the metre.

In verse 82, line 1, *prauḍhadurgām* which qualifies *Bhṛgupuram* should evidently be *prauḍhadurgam*.

In verse 88, line 4, the word *nejaḍopi* should be changed into *no jaḍopi* for, that only makes sense. The whole line would then be 'pitroḥ paśyan ka iha suratam lajjate no jaḍo'pi' meaning 'what fool in this world would not be ashamed when he sees his parents sexually united?'

In verse 91, line 4 is altogether missing. We may conjecturally reconstruct it as—'preṅkhacchākham anilatar-alocchūnabhaṅgibhir urvīm'.

In verse 92, line 2, the reading is 'vividhasumanah

saṃvitānām latānām. Here the word *saṃvitānām* is a big problem. If it is taken to be in the sense of a canopy of flowers a great difficulty would arise for, in the genitive plural the form would be *saṃvitānānām*. If the word *saṃvita* in the sense of 'surrounded by' or 'full of' is taken then the metre would be infringed. The only alternative left to us is to suggest such a word in place of it as may not be far removed from the form of the present word and at the same time may yield an appropriate sense. *Samcitānām* is one such word. The complete reading then would be '*vividhasumanahsamcitānām latānām*' meaning creepers laden with a large variety of flowers. This is a case of confusion of 'च' and 'च', which are so similar in form.

In verse 95, line 3, *nihitā meru* should be changed into *nihito meru*.

In verse 96, line 1, the word *nīlacchāyām* should be *nīlacchāyam*, for it qualifies the word '*puram*'. In the second line a similar word is used '*śubhracchāyam*'. This is perfectly correct. In line 3 of the same verse the word '*pinge*' should be changed into *pingaiḥ*, for it qualifies '*ikṣudandaiḥ*'. The reading evidently should have been *pingaiś caṅgaiḥ* meaning 'yellow-coloured (i.e. ripened)' and of a superior quality. 'Caṅga' is a Prakrit word. It may be that the poet originally read *pingair aṅgaiḥ*.

In the second line *vismṛtaiḥ* should be changed into *viṣṭṛtaiḥ* as that alone makes sense.

In verse 97, line 3 is broken. The particle 'su' would serve well to fill up the lacuna. The word then will be '*surajāḥ*'.

In verse 98, line 4, the word *kṣaudre* is confusing. The word *kṣaudra* means honey. Here it has the unusual sense of *kṣudraiḥ kṛtaḥ*, performed by the mean.

In verse 103, line 1, the text breaks after *cārtha pau*. If we add *rān* to *pau* we would have the complete reading *carthapaurān*. In *cārtha* the 'r' is superfluous. The proper word should be *cātha*. It means 'and also'. The meaning of the whole line would now be as follows: 'You will see the

people mounted on elephants, horses, and also the other citizens.' The emended text thus suits the context eminently.

In verse 105, line 2 *Sudharmyā* of Indra is mentioned. It should be changed to *Sudharma*, for that is the word for an assembly-hall of the gods. *Sudharmyā* is, therefore, incorrect.

In verse 106, line 2, the *sakhayati* is probably a misprint for *sukhayati*.

In verse 107, line 4, the anusvāra should be added to the word *lakṣmī*, for it is to be connected with the word *nidadhataḥ*. In verse 110, line 1, the word *kaṭhiṇa* is evidently wrong. It should be *kaṭhina*. The third line of the same verse is broken. The lacuna may be filled up by adding *śyā* to *mā* meaning 'light blue coloured.' The word *dyati* is evidently a misprint for *dyuti*. Line 4 of the same verse is again broken in the end after *bahi*. The lacuna may be filled up by adding *śca*.

In verse 111, line 1, the word *asiti* should be read as *asita*, for there is no word *asiti* as such. It qualifies the word *śmaśru*. The meaning is 'dark moustaches'. In the same line the *kūrcāṅkurodyān* is evidently wrong. It should be *-rādyān*. In the same verse line 3 to 4, are *vaidrumīm akṣamālāṃ rāgaṃ prāptāṃ iva gurugūṇair-ghūrṇamānāṃ ca citre*. Here the word *citre* should be *citram*; the garland of pearl-beads cannot evidently rotate in an image. Or *citre* may go with *aṅke* in the next verse.

In line 3 of verse 113 *arhan* should be *arhān*, for it is connected with the word *lokān*.

In verse 115, line 1, in the word *namad asumatām* the genitive is used for the dative, which runs counter to Sanskrit usage.

In verse 117, line 1, the word *jāpa* has been used. It is a solecism. The correct form is *japa*. In verse 120, line 4, the word *sampadi* should be '*samsadi*'. The construction of the sentence would then be '*surāṇāṃ samsadi Indram*' etc.

In verse 130, line 2, the word *manāstvena* should be

manastvena. In the same verse line 3, the text is broken after *sampraty ahani*. After this word there is only one letter *ṣi*. Possibly *ni* is missing. The original reading might have been *sampraty ahani niṣi vā*. It is logical that *niṣi* should follow *ahani*.

Finally, it may be remarked that inspite of our very best efforts, there is still one verse where a reading is enigmatic. In verse 99, line 3, the reading is *kuṭrāpyādyādyaraka-janitāḥ*. It is a puzzle. The editor has also put a question-mark here.

THE STORY OF UDAYANA AND VĀSAVADATTĀ THROUGH THE AGES

Udayana Vatsarāja, the descendant of the great Pāṇḍavas, is the ruler of Kauśāmbī. He is highly gifted in the art of lute playing and is fond of taming wild elephants. His neighbour Caṇḍa Pradyota of Avanti, also known as Mahāsena,¹ has a daughter named Vāsavadattā.² She is young and extremely beautiful and her father intends betrothing her to Vatsarāja. He sends a messenger to Udayana asking him to be a tutor to his daughter in music and come to Avanti to teach her. The latter refuses out of sheer self-esteem and returns the messenger with the counter-message that the king had better send his daughter to him to take lessons in music. Pradyota feels insulted and conspires to entice him. He places a large blue elephant in the forest adjoining the borders of his kingdom and keeps a body of armed soldiers concealed nearby. Arrangements are already made to inform Vatsarāja about the existence of such an auspicious elephant. As Vatsarāja is out of his capital on a hunting expedition to Veṇuvana on the frontiers of his kingdom, the elephant is placed in the Nāgavana at a distance of a couple of leagues from there. He runs to the spot with scant attendants, thinking that the blue elephant would get charmed by his lute. He approaches it all alone, but is surrounded by Pradyota's soldiers, taken captive and transported to Avanti.

1. KSS. and the BKM. differentiate between Pradyota and Mahāsena mentioning them as rulers of Magadha and Avanti respectively. (KSS=Kathā-saritsāgara; BKM=Bṛhatkathāmañjarī).

2. She was born with the blessings of Vāsava (Indra) and therefore was named after him 'as given by Vāsava', i.e. *Vāsavadattā*.

When the news of his capture reaches Kauśāmbī his minister Yaugandharāyaṇa with some other confidants sets out to obtain the release of his master from Pradyota. They reach there and secretly begin to work for their mission.

Once it so happens that an elephant runs amuck and creates havoc. At this juncture Udayana's help is sought and the wild elephant is tamed by him. So he is granted some concessions for this heroic deed and is appointed music teacher to Vāsavadattā. They fall in love with each other and their love ripens through their constant meetings and the marriage is consummated by the Gandharva rites. King Vatsarāja takes Vāsavadattā into confidence and makes her willing to elope with him. For this a suitable opportunity is awaited. The conspiracy of the minister Yaugandharāyaṇa to make the elephantess 'Bhadrāvati' furious succeeds and they run away to Kauśāmbī.

There the king drunk with the beauty of Vāsavadattā and indulging himself wholly in merry-making, neglects the imperial duties completely. After some time the Vatsa Kingdom is invaded by an aggressor named Āruṇi from Pāñcāla and the king is forced to live in the village of Lāvāṇaka.

In these circumstances the only remedy the Vatsa minister could see is an alliance with the powerful neighbouring king of Magadha and the only way of effecting this is to establish matrimonial relations with him, in other words, to wed their king to Padmāvati, the sister of Darśaka, the king of Magadha. But Udayana is too deeply attached to his queen Vāsavadattā to entertain any such proposal. Vāsavadattā's co-operation is then sought. She readily accepts the scheme of the minister and consents to lead a life of grass-widowhood till it is carried out. Ultimately one day when the king is on a hunting expedition the royal *pavilion* is set on fire and a rumour is spread that Vāsavadattā and the minister have perished in the conflagration.

Vāsavadattā along with the minister Yaugandharāyaṇa leaves for Magadha, disguised as his sister. There she is put

in the charge of Padmāvati by the minister under the pretension that she is his sister whose husband had gone abroad on a journey. Vāsavadattā lives with Padmāvati under the assumed name of Avantikā. After some time a messenger is sent by the minister of Vatsarāja for the hand of Padmāvati and the king's consent is sought and within a few days Padmāvati is married to Udayana. Thus, with the help of the Magadha prince and of Mahāsena, the aggressor Āruṇi is defeated and the lost kingdom of Kauśāmbī is recovered. Udayana with his newly wedded queen Padmāvati returns to his kingdom. At this point the secret of Vāsavadattā's disguise is disclosed and she is again united with her husband. Their mission is fulfilled.

DRAMATIC TOUCHES IN THE STORY

Bhāsa while dealing with the story adds that after their elopement their marriage was recognised by Vāsavadattā's parents and was formally celebrated with their painted scrolls. Again, Vāsavadattā is entrusted to Padmāvati in a hermitage where she had come to pay her respects to the Queen Mother. The enormity of Vāsavadattā's sacrifice can be judged from her pathetic remark at the time when she is asked to weave a garland for Padmāvati's marriage.

The dramatic story of the Svapnavāsavadattā reads that after a few days of the royal marriage Vāsavadattā accompanies Padmāvati to a pleasure-garden. At the same time the king Udayana and his friend Vidūṣaka also reach there. Vāsavadattā requests Padmāvati to hide themselves behind a bower to avoid the sight of strangers, and hidden there she hears the king confessing his great love for Vāsavadattā.

In some other scene Vāsavadattā is informed of Padmāvati's severe headache and she rushes to the Ocean-Pavilion to comfort her. There mistaking the sleeping person for Padmāvati she sits on the bed, but soon after, from the dream-talk of the sleeping person she comes to know that he is none but her own beloved husband Udayana. Then for fear of being recognised she slips away from there.

Udayana with his newly wedded queen and her retinue is back to his kingdom. There comes the messenger from Mahāsena with congratulations on victory and with a picture-scroll of the confirmation of the marriage of Udayana and Vāsavadattā. Out of curiosity and respect Padmāvatī looks at the pictures and finds resemblance of Vāsavadattā to Avantikā entrusted to her care. Presently, Yaugandharāyaṇa, in the guise of a Brāhmaṇa appears on the scene to claim his sister. The whole mystery is then solved by the minister and everything ends happily.

But the story as depicted by Mātrrāja Anaṅga Harṣa differs in many respects from that of Bhāsa. In his drama 'Tāpasavatsarāja' the minister has a personal interview with the queen Vāsavadattā and acquaints her with the crisis in the state. Moreover, he takes into confidence her father Mahāsena and induces him to force Vāsavadattā to accept the plan for the good of the state. So a letter from her father is brought to her with a demand for sacrifice. She agrees to the proposal and it is some time after the rumour of the conflagration is spread that she under the guise of a Brāhmaṇa's sister is put under the care of Padmāvatī. This helps create a natural atmosphere in the development of the story. Padmāvatī has been represented as already cherishing love for Udayana. The king on the prediction of a holy man goes to Magadha to marry Padmāvatī with the hope that by doing so Vāsavadattā may be recovered by him. The victory of the king's armies is reported and while on his way back to his capital he comes to Prayāga and there determines to immolate himself, being disappointed in his efforts to find Vāsavadattā. Vāsavadattā is also brought there by the minister Yaugandharāyaṇa. Out of self-reproach she also determines to immolate herself. It is so arranged that both the funeral pyres made for them are near to each other. It is when Vāsavadattā is ready to immolate herself that the minister rushes to the king (who is also preparing for the same end) with the request to protect his sister from burning herself in the fire. The king

rushes towards her and both recognise each other and the mystery of the whole plot is unravelled by the minister Yaugandharāyaṇa. They are reunited and come back to their kingdom with all good successes and prosperity.

Now there comes the story of her later life based on the two dramas of Śrī Harṣa. From the point of Vāsavadattā's life both the stories run similarly. She is the senior-most queen of the realm, enjoying all the privileges of her position. But after some time either by the tricks of the ministers or accidentally two new faces appear to share her undivided love for the king. So she grows jealous and adopts some severe means to get rid of them but to her great surprise she finds them at last her own kith and kin and forgives them and allows the king to fulfil his desire. The two targets of her cruel treatment are Sāgarikā and Ratnāvalī.

THE POPULARITY OF THE LEGEND AND THE TREATMENT OF IT IN SUBSEQUENT VERSIONS.

Udayana, the king of Vatsa is the central figure in a large number of Sanskrit stories of love and adventure. The historical Udayana appears in the Purāṇas as a ruler of the Paurava dynasty. His name appears among the twenty-nine Puru kings, tracing their lineage to Arjuna, the hero of the Mahābhārata war. They removed their capital from Hastināpura to Kauśāmbī as the former capital had been destroyed by the floods of the Ganges. But the Jeyune chronicles mention him as the fifth from the last king of the line and the successor of Śatānika and predecessor of Vahīnara.¹ From a passage in one of the Buddhist canonical writings we learn that he reigned shortly after the death of the Buddha² and consequently he was a contemporary of Caṇḍa Pradyota of Avanti; of 'Pasenadi' (Prasenajit) and his son 'Vidudabha' of Kosala; and of 'Bimbasāra' (Jain

1. See F. E. Pargiter 'The Purāṇa Text of the Dynasties of the Kali Age', Pp. 3-8. Oxford 1913.

2. Cullavagga III. 12-15 ed. H. Oldenberg, 'The Vinaya Piṭaka', 2, 290-292, London 1880.

Śreṇika) and his son 'Ajātaśatru' of Magadha.¹ Most of the historians of the present day agree on these points and establish matrimonial relations of Udayana with Avanti, Magadha and Aṅga kingdoms.² Moreover, the literary figure of king Darśaka, the ruler of Magadha, has been identified with the famous ruler Ajātaśatru of Magadha,³ and Padmāvatī as his sister.

It is not possible even now to trace the origin and the growth of the legends that gathered around the figure of Udayana. But even in the canonical Pāli writings we find a few hints of his amorous traits that would make him a suitable hero for romantic adventure,⁴ just as his contemporary Pradyota had gained early an unenviable reputation for ferocity. It is, therefore, not surprising that popular fancy should have woven a story that brings the two monarchs together in dramatic contrast, narrating the capture of Udayana through Pradyota's stratagem and the former's subsequent elopement with his captor's daughter as a prize. And who shall say in view of the romantic annals of Rajput chivalry, that there may not have been a kernel of truth in the incident ?⁵

That the story of Udayana had long been popular in the secular literature of India is proved by a statement of Śrī Harṣa,⁶ its use in the dramas of the early poet Bhāsa and many other later poets, and numerous incidental references to it in technical⁷ works and classics.⁸ Śūdraka in his

1. History of Ancient India by R.S. Tripathi, p. 90; Majjhima Nikāya 108—Gopakamogga.

2. History of Ancient India by R.S. Tripathi, p. 90.

3. Lectures on the Ancient History of India (1919) by R.D. Bhandarkar : Second Lecture.

4. Gullavagga, loc. cit. Saṃyutta-Nikāya 35-127 (Bhāradvāja sūtra) ed. L. Feer London 1894.

5. Lectures on the Ancient History of India by Bhandarkar Pp. 58-68.

6 & 7. Ratna—Act. II. St. 3. Loke hāri ca Vatsarāja caritam. Arthaśāstra book 9 Ch. 7. Dṛṣṭā hi jīvataḥ punarāvṛttir yathā Suyātrodayanābhyām.

8. Meghadūta 1.80. Prāpyāvantīn Udayana kathā kovida—.

Mṛccnakatīka refers to Yaugandharāyaṇa arousing his friends to free his master Udayana.¹ Dāmodara Gupta refers to the romantic story of Udayana and Vāsavadattā. The dramas Tāpasa Vatsarāja, Viṇāvāsavadatta, Unmāda Vāsavadatta, Ratnāvalī and Priyadarśikā are wholly based on the same theme. The fullest treatment of the Udayana legend in the Pāli literature is found in the Dhammapada commentary, a work of the 5th century A.D.² Here we get an account of Udayana's earlier career, his acquisition of the lute to charm the elephants of his protector, the ascetic Allakappa, his captivity, his wooing of Vāsavadattā, and his elopement with her on a female elephant named 'Bhadrāvati'. This portion of the history has been briefly narrated by Buddhaghosa also in his commentary on the Majjhima Nikāya.

For the Jain account of the legend we have the 'Triṣaṣṭi Śalākā Puruṣa Carita of Hemacandra, the Kumārapāla Pratibodha of Somaprabha and the Mṛgāvati Caritra of Mālādhārī Devaprabha. In short, they present very few parallels to the episodes which we find in Harṣa's dramas, but in general, in the elopement episode they are more in agreement with the Buddhistic accounts than with the Kāshmīrian version.

Thus we have the main current of Sanskrit and Pāli literature down to the eleventh century A.D. before we find a consecutive presentation of the tale in the two works of Kāshmīrian writers, the famous Kathāsaritsāgara of Somadeva and the Bṛhatkathāmañjarī of Kṣemendra. Both claim to be faithful abridgments of the ancient Bṛhatkathā of Guṇādhya. But another abridgment of the ancient Bṛhatkathā 'Bṛhatkathā-śloka-saṃgraha' of Buddha Svāmin, which seems more faithful to the original, has proved that the Kāshmīrian versions are not so faithful as they claim to

1. Mṛc. Act. IV. St. 26. Uttejyāmi suhrḍaḥ parimokṣaṇāya Yaugandharāyaṇa ivodayanasya rājāḥ (Āryaka's episode).

2. Ed. H. C. Norman 1.2. 161-231. London 1909.

be.¹ So in the light of the above discussion we come to the conclusion that the legend of Udayana and Vāsavadattā had been current among the masses and literary circles for more than one thousand years till it got its legendary form in KSS. and BKM. But out of the so far known authorities on the subject we think Bhāsa is the earliest and he has the first-hand knowledge of the historical as well as romantic incidents and has thus presented the story in a most faithful manner. Thus taking Bhāsa as a starting point we will consider the treatment of the story by the subsequent writers. As the two dramas, precisely on the same theme on which Bhāsa's two dramas are based, have been discovered recently, so first of all let us take them into consideration. One of them is the 'Viṇā Vāsavadatta' by an anonymous author² and closely similar in plot, style and spirit to the 'Pratijñā Yaugandharāyaṇa' and the other is 'Tāpasavatsarāja' by Anaṅga Harṣa Māṭṛrāja, agreeing in theme and incidents with the 'Svapnavāsavadattā.' Both the dramas, Pratijñā and Viṇā deal with the story, (leaving aside strange mythological stories of the birth of Udayana and Vāsavadattā), with the adventures and the capture of Udayana, his romance and elopement. But the most remarkable difference between the two is with regard to the

1. For a detailed study on the subject see :—

- (i) "Udayana as a Historical Personage"—vide Cambridge History of India, p. 187-188; 308; Dr. Bhandarkar—Lectures on Ancient History of India, pp. 58-63; Pargiter—Ancient Indian Historical Tradition, pp. 285-86.
- (ii) (For legendary sources)—P. D. Guna. "Pradyota, Udayana and Śreṇika—A Jain legend," Annals of the Bhandarkar Research Institute—July 1920; KSS. Book II. Taraṅga I-6; Book III. Taraṅga 1-2; BKM. Book II, III. BSS. Sarga IV—18-20. V. 89-174.

2. Prof. C. R. Devadhar (Poona Or. Vol. X, p. 88) identifies it with Vatsarāja caritam by Śūdraka. Shastri (Intro. to Āścarya, p. 28—Balamandram press, 1926) and Kuppuswami identify it with Unmāda Vāsavadatta of Śaktibhadra. Note: Bhāsa's criticism of artificial elopement is definitely based on this drama.

central theme. In the *Pratijñā* Yaugandharāyaṇa more importance is attached to the character of the minister Yaugandharāyaṇa while in the *Viñā* it has become a secondary thing and the valour and the romance of Udayana have taken precedence over it. Like the story in KSS. it begins with the anxiety of Mahāsena about the marriage of Vāsavadattā and his seeking of some boon from a god or a goddess,¹ and with this inspiration follows the capture of Udayana. In *Pratijñā* it appears, the plot is executed out of a feeling of sheer jealousy and revenge and it is accidental that the romance takes place. But in the *Viñāvāsavadatta* it is purely guided with the intention of marrying Vāsavadattā to Udayana.² Moreover Bhāsa's play does not portray the beginning and the development of the romance between the hero and the heroine in its entirety. Not only that, both the principal characters do not at all appear in person on the stage; but in the *Viñāvāsavadatta* full three acts (iv-vi) have been devoted to the beginning and the development of their love, and they remain throughout on the stage. Vāsavadattā's craze for music which has simply been referred to there has been depicted at length here in *Viñāvāsavadatta*. The music lesson to which Bhāsa refers in the *Svapna* does not occur at all in the *Pratijñā* but in the *Viñā* it actually takes place in a romantic atmosphere.³ The other incidents like the female elephant Bhadrāvati getting furious and elopement, etc. are similar in both the plays. A reference to Āruṇi, a powerful king of Pañcāla, about whom we do not hear in later versions, is found in this play.⁴ It is said that he has an alliance with the king of Ujjain on account of his enmity with Udayana.⁵

The other play which stands in comparison with Bhāsa's *Svapnavāsavadatta* is the *Tāpasavatsarāja*. A

1. In *Viñā* he prays to Śaṅkara and in KSS. to Cupdī.

2. *Viñā* Act. I, p. 5-16.

3. *Viñā* Act I, p. 5-16.

4. *Ibid*, Act, VII. 2.14-16.

5. *Ibid* Act I, p. 8,

comparative study of the Svapna, Tāpasa and KSS. shows that this drama (Tāpasavatsarāja) agrees more with KSS. and BKM. than with Svapna. In Svapna we do not have any knowledge of the outlines of the minister's plot and of the active help of Vāsavadattā's brother or father in executing the plot. According to the legend in the KSS.¹ Gopāla, the brother of Vāsavadattā, is taken into confidence by the ministers Rumaṇvat and Yaugandharāyaṇa, is called from Ujjayinī and the whole plan is explained to him. He goes with them and gives his consent. But in Tāpasavatsarāja in place of her brother her father is taken into confidence and instead of his personal presence a letter is obtained from him to persuade Vāsavadattā for the great sacrifice². On the point of Āruṇi's invasion it closely follows the dramatic rather than the legendary version and portrays Vatsarāja as deeply indulging in amorous sports, neglecting the imperial duties and quite indifferent to his formidable enemy Āruṇi of Pañcāla.³ Again there appears Nārada before the king starts for sports to Lāvāṇaka and tells him of the coming calamity, which will only be of a limited duration, being followed by prosperity.⁴ But in Tāpasa the story follows a slightly different pattern. After the supposed death of Vāsavadattā and the minister Yaugandharāyaṇa, Udayana is taken to holy Prayāga where a monk named Lāmakāyana meets him and consoles him with the prediction that he will meet his beloved queen again with the help of his second wife and thus makes him agree to marry Padmāvatī. The Viduṣaka who is himself in the know of the plot takes him to Rājagṛha where a Parivrājikā, Sāṅkrtyāyanī, has already been sent with the picture of the king to influence and persuade Padmāvatī to go in for the king. The plan succeeds

1. KSS. III Lambaka, Taraṅga, I, St. 22-28.

2. Tāpasa, Act. I, 1-2, hānir balasya sa taṁ viṣayopabhoge.....na Pañcālaṁ vetti prasabham uparinyastacarāṇam.

3. KSS. Lambaka III, Taraṅga I, St. 44.8 ibid, 52.

4. kañcit kālaṁ ca te duḥkhaṁ bhaviṣyati na ca tvayā. tatrāti-mohaḥ kartavyaḥ sukhāntaṁ bhavitā hi tat.

and Padmāvati following Udayana, who has become a *Tapasa*, puts on the robes of an ascetic and renouncing her royal palace lives in a garden worshipping the image of the king Udayana.¹ Vāsavadattā's meeting with Padmāvati takes place in a park as in KSS. and not in the Tapovana as in the Svapna. But in the way Vāsavadattā is presented in disguise as the sister of an old Brāhmaṇa and as one whose husband has gone abroad, this drama follows Bhāsa and not KSS. and BKM. where she is presented as the daughter of Yaugandharāyaṇa, an old Brāhmaṇa.²

In both KSS. and *Tapasa*, Vatsarāja comes to Rājagṛha specially for the purpose of marrying Padmāvati; in the former in response to an invitation from the Magadha king, and in the latter directed by the predictions of the monk Lāmakāyana. In the Svapna, however, he is represented as having come over to Rājagṛha on some other mission. In this respect the story of BKM. also is identical with KSS.³ Again, according to KSS. the king, on the prediction of Nārada, is sure that Vāsavadattā is living and that it is a plot of the ministers. This agrees well with the consolation of the monk Lāmakāyana found in other versions of the story. The firm belief of the king in his future reunion with his beloved queen is found in both the KSS. and *Tapasa*. There is no reference to the unfading garland and the Tilaka in the *Tapasa* which we find in the KSS. and BKM. and which leads the king to suspect that Vāsavadattā is living. The self-reproaches of Vāsavadattā and her determination for self-immolation described at the end of the play *Tapasa-vatsarāja* are also described almost identically in the KSS.⁴ of which Bhāsa makes no mention.

For the meeting and reunion with Vāsavadattā all the

1. *Tapasa*, Act. III.

2. BKM. Book III, Lāvāṇake Padmāvativivāhaḥ st. 75. Rājaputṛi suteyaṃ me.

3. BKM. Lāvāṇake Padmāvati vivāhaḥ 93.

4. KSS. Lambaka III, Taraṅga 2 St. 44-47, 64.

authors choose different places. In the KSS.¹ it takes place at Lāvāṇaka after her leaving Magadha, in the Tāpasa also it takes place after her leaving Magadha but the place is Prayāga where both the parties are ready to immolate themselves, out of sheer despair on a funeral pyre. Bhāsa effects the meeting in the palace of Darśaka following the recognition of Vāsavadattā on the painted scroll. These are the major differences found in the different versions of the story.

As we have already referred to all the possible sources of Udayana's legend above, we will now briefly discuss Harṣa's treatment of the story. In both the Nāṭikās there are passing allusions to one or the other of the several episodes of the story. The author has freely utilised the sources and presented to us a changed picture of the various incidents of the legend. The amorous sports of king Udayana had long been popular in the secular and Buddhist literature which the dramatist used to the best advantage. The idea of the marriage with Ratnāvalī is probably the same as we find in the marriage of Padmāvatī described by Bhāsa and others, for it is purely for the sake of political alliance planned by the ministers. and based on the prophecy of a seer or an astrologer that the husband of the particular princess will be a *Samrāṭ*. A passing reference to it is made in the narrative of Kṣemendra about princess Padmāvatī. This is how Harṣa collected the material for the two romantic episodes of Vatsarāja's life. To depict Vāsavadattā's jealousy he might have got ample material from the life in the harems of the contemporary princes. He has depicted Udayana as a sensualist, indulging in all kinds of pleasures; a man of *patāṅgavṛtti*; and Vāsavadattā as a high-minded, jealous queen. In short, Udayana is a hen-pecked husband and Vāsavadattā a jealous wife.

In the above paragraphs we have already discussed the difference found in the Kāshmirian versions of the Bṛhatkathā. There is one more faithful abridgement of the origi-

1. KSS. Lambaka III, Taraṅga 2, St. 10.; BKM. Book III, 38-90.

nal Bṛhatkathā known as Bṛhatkathā-śloka-saṅgraha. But there we do not get the Udayana legend in full. Only incidental references to the principal events and the personages of the story are found. The incidents connected with the birth and the early years of Udayana's life are related at length. There is an allusion to the elopement episode and to Bhadrāvatī and Nalagiri; and mention is made of the two queens Vāsavadattā and Padmāvatī, as well as of the four ministers, Ṛṣabha, Rumaṇvat, Yaugandharāyaṇa and Vasantaka.

POETRY IN THE VĀMANA PURĀṆA

The Purāṇas have all along been considered a mass of dull and drab poetry. But occasionally the simple purāṇic bard is seen to write poetry which is at once sweet and charming. Under the stress of emotion he does not unoften write verses which come out of the innermost recesses of his heart. His verses then come to possess that flavour (*rasa*) which the rhetoricians say is the soul of poetry. Any Purāṇa can have a number of such verses which may provide thorough enjoyment and genuine pleasure to any connoisseur of literature. The Vāmana Purāṇa is no exception. Herein interspersed we find a few excellent verses which can be put forward as instances of good poetry. Of such instances mention here may be made of the description of Vārāṇasī. This description is so graphic and vivid and couched in such a sweet expression that it cannot but enthrall the reader. Thus while describing the grandeur and the affluence of the city the poet in the author of the Vāmana Purāṇa comes out with a number of verses which make an irresistible appeal. One of them is particularly interesting and bears reproduction here :—

vilāsinīnām raśanāśvanena
śrutisvaro brāhmaṇapuṅgavānām ।
śucisvaratvaṃ guravo niśamya
hāsyānvitāḥ santi muhur muhus tāḥ ॥¹

This verse describes the funny condition of even “the noble Brāhmaṇa pupils who having their minds distracted by the jingling (of the tiny bells) in the girdles of the wanton women begin to commit mistakes on hearing which the preceptors instruct them in proper pronunciation, there-

1. 3. 81. (Adhyāya 3, verse 81.)

by provoking those women to laughter again and again." The verse is highly charming inspite of the fact that it suffers from an ellipsis which has to be supplied with great difficulty and requires quite a good deal of imagination. The construction as it stands is incomplete and does not yield any connected sense. By supplying the ellipsis the construction would be like this :

vilāsinīnām raśanāśvanena brāhmaṇapuṅgavānām
 śrutisvaraḥ (duṣṭo bhavati) (tatra) guravaḥ
 śucisvaratvam (upadiśanti) |
 (tat) niśamya tā muhur muhur hāsyānvitā
 bhavanti ||

But once the ellipsis is supplied the beauty of the verse stands out in bold relief. What a picturesque description it is! One single verse gives us a complete scene : Brāhmaṇas sitting and learning their lessons, their distraction by the jingling girdles worn by the dallying damsels, the teachers intervening to correct them and the whole scene with the discomposure of the pupils appearing to be funny to the light-hearted girls who are only too conscious of their beauty and charm.

Another verse which more directly describes the supreme beauty of the ladies of the city of Vārāṇasī reads as follows :

vrajatsu yoṣitsu catuṣpatheṣu
 padāny alaktāruṇitāni dr̥ṣṭvā |
 yayau śaśī vismayam eva yasyām
 kiṃsvit prayātā sthalapadminīyam ||¹

"By seeing the red lac foot-prints of the ladies in the city of Vārāṇasī passing through the crossings the moon was indeed wondering whether a lotus-stalk growing on the earth was on the move".

Just as the verse quoted above is an excellent example of the figure of speech called *utprekṣā* in the same way the following verse is that of *bhrāntimān*. Here the poet's

imagination appears to be at its best. This verse can stand comparison with the very best of its kind in Sanskrit literature :

bhṛṅgās ca yasyām śaśikāntabhittau
 pralobhyamānāḥ pratibimbiteṣu |
 alakṣya yoṣidvimalānanābje-
 śvīyur bhramān naiva ca puṣpakāntaram ||¹

"In which (the city of Vārāṇasī) the bees attracted by the reflections of the bright lotus-like faces of the ladies on the walls beset with moon-jewels did not go, thanks to the confusion, to any other flower". The lotus-like faces of the ladies when reflected on the moon-jewel-studded walls opposite to them appear to the bees to be real lotuses. What a similarity the faces have with the lotuses !

In another verse the author of the Vāmana Purāṇa describes as to how the fatigue caused to the people by their defeat at a *sammohana* game is removed by the ladies' joining with them in sports in the waters of the oblong tanks (*dirghikās*) in their houses. The verse in question reads :

parīramaś cāpi parājiteṣu
 nareṣu sammohanakhelanena |
 yasyām jalakṛīḍanasamgatāsu
 na strīṣu Śambho gṛhadīrghikāsu ||²

"O Śambhu, in which (city of Vārāṇasī) there is no feeling of tiredness in the people defeated at a game which fascinates (*sammohanakhelanena*) as their consorts give them the pleasure of their sweet company in sports in the waters of the oblong tanks of their houses."

The city of Vārāṇasī is known for its tantalizingly beautiful courtezans. By means of a paranomasia the author gives a beautiful description of them in a verse where the adjectives having double meanings agreeing with Śaṅkara as well as with the courtezans are employed. The verse may be cited as a very good illustration of the figure of speech called *śleṣa*. It certainly deserves to be quoted here :

1. 3. 34. 2. 3. 35.

bhūtilubdhā vilāsinyo bhujāṅgaparivāritāḥ ।

candrabhūṣitadehāś ca yasyāṃ tvam iva Śaṅkara ॥¹

"In which O Śaṅkara, the harlots are greedy of the wealth (*bhūti*=*aiśvarya*) of the people just as you are of ashes (*bhūti*=*bhasman*); are surrounded by rogues (*bhujāṅga*=*viṣa*) just as you are by the encircling serpents (*bhujāṅga*=*sarpa*); and have their bodies anointed with camphor (*candra*=*karpūra*) much in the same way as your body is ornamented by the moon (*candra*=*śaśin*)".

The poet is never tired of describing the wealth and the grandeur of the city of Vārāṇasī. By means of the figures of speech *parisaṅkhyā* and *śleṣa* he describes the grandeur of it which arises as much from its physical aspects as it does from the spiritual. The following are the two verses where we meet with such a description :

pāśagranthir gajendrāṇāṃ dānacchedo madacyutau ।

yasyāṃ mānamadau puṅśāṃ kariṇāṃ yauvanāgame ॥

priyadoṣāḥ sadā yasyāṃ kauśikā netare janāḥ ।

tārāgaṇe kulīnatvaṃ meghe vṛttacyutir vibho ॥²

"O Lord, in which (the city of Vārāṇasī) there is the tying of the knot of the noose for entrapping the elephants only; but there is none for catching hold of the offenders; in which there is *dānaccheda*, cessation of ichor on the disappearance of intoxication in the elephants, but there is no *dāna-ccheda* (cessation of charity) elsewhere; in which the conceit and intoxication which appear at the approach of youth are found in elephants only, not in man; in which it is the owls that are *priyadoṣa*, (fond of the night), but other people are not *priyadoṣa*, (fond of evil things); in which there is *akulīnatva* (the state of not resting on the earth) in the multitude of stars only; but there is no *akulīnatva* (birth in a low family) and in which there is *vṛttacyuti*, (the flowing of water in the form of round drops) in clouds only; but there is no *vṛttacyuti* (loss of character) in the people.

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1. 3. 39. 2. 3. 37-38.

This is not all. The grandeur of the city of Vārāṇasī further prompts the author to pour out the following verse which describes in prominent relief the lofty temples going up in the sky;

tūṅgāni yasyāṃ suramandirāṇi
rundhanti candrāṃ rajanīmukheṣu |
divāpi sūryaṃ pavanānvitābhir
dīrghābhir evaṃ supatākikābhiḥ ||¹

"Wherein (the city of Vārāṇasī) the lofty temples obstruct, as it were, the moon at the time of the nightfall. Similarly do they obstruct the path of the sun during the day-time by means of their big flags fluttering in the strong wind."

After this beautiful and charming description of the city of Vārāṇasī in the very beginning of the work it is a welcome change to cross over to the description of the king of seasons, the spring, which affords the best ever opportunity to the poet for the exercise of his playful imagination. The description is fitted into the context of the seduction of the sages Nara and Nārāyaṇa by Rambhā coming to the Badarikāśrama accompanied by Lord Cupid and the spring sent as she is by Indra who is frightened by the severe penance in which the two sages are engaged. At the approach of the spring the whole atmosphere of the forest undergoes a dramatic change. The winter which had preceded it is no more with its biting cold winds. There is beauty and charm everywhere which is found described in the following equally beautiful and charming verses :

śiśiraṃ nāma mātāṅgaṃ vidārya nakharair iva |
vasantakesarī prāptaḥ palāśakusumair vane ||
mayātuṣaraiś ca karī nirjitaḥ svena tejasā |
tam evaṃ ahasal lodhrair vasantaḥ kundakuḍmalaiḥ ||
vanāni karpikārāṇaṃ puṣpitāni virejire |
yathā narendraputrāṇi kanakābharaṇāni vai ||
teṣāṃ anu tathā nīpāḥ puṣpitā iva rejire |

svāmisaṃlabdhasammānā bhr̥tyā rājasutā iva ||
 mañjarībhir virājante nadikūleṣu vetasāḥ |
 vaktukāmā ivāṅgulyā ko'smākaṃ sadṛśo nagaḥ
 raktāśokakarā tanvī devaṛṣe kiṃśukāṅkitā |
 nīlāśokakarā śyāmā vikāśikamalānanā ||
 nīlendīvaranetrā cā brahman bilvaphalastanī |
 protphullakundadaśanā mañjarīkaraśobhitā ||
 bandhujīvādhara śubhrasinduvāranakhāṅkurā |
 puṃskokilasvanā divyā kaṅkolavasana śubhā ||¹

"The lion of spring has come to the forest tearing as it were the elephant of the winter with its claws in the form of the flowers of the *palāśa* trees. The spring laughed at the elephant, the laughter being represented in the form of the *lodhra* flowers and the *kunda* buds and said, "The elephant has been won by my prowess and the cold". The groves of the blossoming *karnikaras* appeared as if they were princes wearing golden ornaments. Near them the *nīpa* trees gave the appearance of the honoured servants of a king, resembling very much the princes. The canes growing on the banks of the rivers appeared as if they were eager to ask the question by raising their finger (which with them was nothing else than their sprays) whether there was any tree which could equal them (in their beauty). O sage, the *Vasantalakṣmī* appeared like a slim, *śyāmā* girl. The red *āśoka* flowers were her hands, her body adorned with *kiṃśukaś*, the blue lotuses were her eyes, the fruits of the *bilva* tree were her breasts, the blooming *kunda* flowers her teeth, the cluster of flowers her hands, the *bandhujīva* flowers her lips, the white *sinduvāra* flowers, her tips of nails, the notes of the *puṃskokila*, her voice, and the *kaṅkola*, her clothes. She was auspicious, divine." The above description of the spring season with all its metaphors and similes leaves a lasting impression on the mind. It was given to the author of the Vāmaṇa Purāṇa alone to think of the spring as a lion and the winter as an

1. 6. 10—19.

elephant and to imagine a fight between them two wherein the one (the winter) is defeated by the other (the spring). It was again given to him to personify the spring beauty (*vasantalakṣmī*) and then go in for those flowers and trees which would provide him with the necessary wherewithal to create a lady of his imagination. In the blue lotuses, the *kunda*, the *bandhujīva*, the *sinduvāra* flowers he could discern the beautiful contours of the body of the lady of his imagination. These would then not remain inert matter but would be invested with life and flesh and form part of a human organism. All of these, the flowers, the leaves and the sweet notes of the *punskokila* (the male cuckoo) would then go to form a figure so sweet and so exquisite. The *vasantalakṣmī* would then not appear to be something imaginary, the product of the poet's mind, she would then look a real lady with her limbs, the lips, the teeth, the hands, etc., all like those of other human beings. No wonder then that here the personification nearly loses the sense of falsity.

Not only the natural beauty, the physical beauty too provides the necessary fillip to the muse of the poet to describe it with all the weapons in his armoury, the similes, the metaphors and the like. Thus when Mādhava meets Urvaśī for a moment or so he is left thinking and asks the question unto himself : *kiṃsvit kāmanarendrasya rājadhānī svayaṃ sthita*¹. "Is it that the very capital of Lord Cupid stands before me, assuming a human form?" Then in a way which goes to show that he has realised as to who she is, Mādhava comes out with the remark :

ajñātā śaśino nūnam iyaṃ kāntir niśākṣaye |

*raviraśmipratāpārtibhītā śaraṇam āgatā ||*²

"She is indeed the moonlight come incognito to take refuge because when the night had passed away she became afraid of the oppression she would have to suffer on account of the heat of the rays of the sun." But this was a mere conjecture of Mādhava and conjectures are not always right.

1. 7. 14. 2. 7. 15.

A moment of thought reveals the true identity of the lady. Mādhava was all smiles for he had realised that the lady was no other than Urvaśī, the lady born out of his own thighs. The reasons for these thoughts of Mādhava are provided by the exquisite beauty and the charm of Urvaśī whose feet are said in the Vāmana Purāṇa to have such a natural colour that though not anointed with red lac they appeared to be really having it (*pādāv alaktakasamatviṣau*). The climax comes when *Urvaśī* is compared with fibres of a lotus (*padmakīñjalkasannibhā*). With such a delicate form it was natural that she should be the cause of so much of surprise for Mādhava. Further description of the various limbs of the body of this queen of beauty is highly poetic. While describing the full-grown breasts of *Urvaśī* the poet says that they appear like the two persons come together. All of these similes here can be put in that category which is called *ayoniya*, (original, not borrowed) by rhetoricians. Next, the poet describes the line of down going from the thighs to the breasts (*stanataṭa*) thereby giving the appearance of a row of bees flying from a sandy beach to a lake. Her vast expanse of hips when encircled with a shining girdle appeared as if it were the Mount Mandara fastened with the serpent (Śeṣa) at the time of the churning of the milk-ocean¹.

In the Vāmana Purāṇa it is not only the *śṛṅgāra* which we meet with most. There are other *rasas* too which are fairly well represented. Thus we see that in the ninth Adhyāya there is a description of the fierce battle between the gods and the demons (*tumulaḥ saṅkulo' tibhayaṅkaraḥ*). Here we have the *rasas* like *vīra*, *bībhatsa*, and *bhayanaka*. The valiant soldiers of the opposing camps are described as engaged in such a close neck-to-neck fight that there was death and destruction everywhere. So much of blood was said to have been spilled that a stream of it flowed forth. The description of the stream is given below in the words of the author himself :

1. 7. 7-10.

tatas tu saṅkule tasmin yuddhe devāsura mune |
 prāvartata nadi ghorā śamayantī raṇe rajaḥ ||
 asṛktoyā rathāvartā yodhasaṅghaṭṭavāhinī |
 gajakumbhamahākūrmā śaramīnā duratyayā ||
 tivrāgraprāsamakarā mahāsigrāhavāhinī |
 antraśaivālasaṅkīrṇā patākāphenamālīnī ||
 gṛdhrakaṅkamahāhaṅsā syenacakrāhvamaṇḍitā |
 piśācamunisāṅkīrṇā dustarā prākṛtair janaiḥ ||¹

Then in that close fight between the gods and the demons a terrible stream flowed forth allaying the dust. Blood formed the water in it, the chariots the whirlpools. It flowed forth with the soldiers clashing with each other. It had big tortoises in the form of the temples of the elephants; the fish in the form of arrows; it was difficult to cross. It had sharks in the form of sharp-edged spears; it carried in it crocodiles in the form of large swords; it was bestrewn with moss in the form of intestines; it had garland-like foam in it in the form of flags; it had big swans in the form of eagles and herons and was adorned with ruddy geese in the form of the hawks. It was crowded with the sages in the form of the goblins (fiends) and was difficult to cross by ordinary people.

The above description of the battle-field cannot however claim for it an originality, for elsewhere too in literature we find not infrequently the riverine superimposition on it. Thus, for example, we find that in the Rāmāyaṇa we have a similar description of the battle-field where somewhat identical imagery is seen to be employed. The following verses will illustrate the point :

hatavirāughavaprām tu bhagnāyudhamahādrumām |
 śoṇitaughamahātoyām Yamasāgaragāminīm ||
 yakṛtplihamahāpaṅkām vinikīrṇāntraśaivalām |
 bhinnakāyaśiromīnām aṅgāvayavaśādvalām ||
 gṛdhrahaṅsavarākīrṇām kaṅkasārasasevitām |
 medaḥphenasamākīrṇām āvartasvananiḥsvanām ||

1. 9. 36-39.

tāṃ kāpuruṣadustārāṃ yuddhabhūmimayīm nadīm ।

rākṣasāḥ kapimukhyās te terus tāṃ dustarāṃ nadīm ॥¹

"The demons and the leaders of the monkeys crossed that river of the battle-field which was difficult to cross by cowards, which had banks in the form of the mass of the killed brave (warriors), had tall trees in the form of broken weapons, had a big volume of water in the form of the mass of blood and was flowing to the ocean of Yama, the god of death. This (river of the battle-field) had great slush in the form of the livers and the spleens, had moss in the form of scattered intestines, had the fish in the form of the trunks and the heads, had the green grass in the form of limbs and their parts, was crowded with swans in the form of eagles, was attended by herons and cranes, was full of foam in the form of fat and was resounding with the deep rumbling sound of the whirl-pools.

Though there is a community of thought in the two descriptions, laying the poet of the Purāṇa open to the charge of plagiarism, there is enough of originality which makes ample amends for the offence. While the *Ādikavi* compares the broken heads and trunks with the fish, this later and lesser poet compares the arrows with the fish. The arrows dart forth as the fish do. The comparison is surely more natural and pointed. Further while Vālmīki compares the flowing fat with foam, our author compares the (fluttering) flags with the rows of foam. Here too the comparison is more striking. To Vālmīki the identity of colour of both the fat and the foam is enough to justify the comparison. To the poet of the Vāmana Purāṇa the lightness and the floating nature of the two make good reason to institute a comparison between the flags and the row of foam.

In the Vāsiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa, too, we meet with the metaphor of the river employed for the battle-field. A verse from it may well serve as an illustration :

asṛṇnadīvahaddhastikaṭaṭakarpaṭanaugaṇam ।

1. vi. 58. 29-33.

raktasrotahsphuracchuklavastraṇḍīrapinḍakam ॥¹

("The battle-field) is the river of blood, the temples of the elephants who are being washed away in it form the boats with sails, while it has balls of foam in the form of the white clothes making their appearance out of this flow of blood.

At another place, too, we meet with fine poetry in the Vāmana Purāṇa, though it follows a conventional pattern and has practically no originality. The curiosity of the ladies to see the bridegroom is well known and has led Indian poets to pick up this phenomenon and paint through their imagination a beautiful picture of the ladies rushing to the windows to have a close look at the bridegroom and on account of this indecent haste-landing themselves in funny situations. The descriptions are identical everywhere, the author of the Bhāgavatapurāṇa, Kālidāsa in his Raghuvamśa and the Kumārasambhava, Aśvaghoṣa in his Buddhacarita and Lolimbarāja—all have an identical approach. The descriptions, as has been said above, run more or less along the same course. Thus we see here a lady rushing to a window with the garland in one hand and the braid of hair in another, another lady pouring the red lac all on one foot and leaving the other unanointed running to have a glimpse of Hara, the third rushing when the news reached her that Śiva had arrived, with one eye with the collyrium and the other without it, the collyrium-pencil being still in her hands. Still another carried away by the desire to see Lord Śiva ran naked while the one who was left behind because she could not run due to the heaviness of the breasts began to blame them for depriving her of the opportunity to have a look at Śiva. We may give this description below in the words of the Vāmana Purāṇa itself :

mālyadāma samādāya kareṇaikenā bhāminī ।
keśapāśaṃ dvitīyena Śaṅkarābhimukhī gatā ॥
anyā' laktakarāgaḍhyam padaṃ kṛtvā' kulekṣaṇā ।

1. III. 38. 51-52; 47; 50.

analaktakam ekaṁ hi Haraṁ draṣṭum upāgatā ||
 ekenākṣṇāñjitenaiṣa śrutvā bhīmaṁ upāgatam |
 sāñjanāṁ ca praghyānyā śalākāṁ suṣṭhu dhāvati ||
 anyā saraśanaṁ vāsaḥ pāṇinādāya sundarī |
 unmattevāgamanāgnā Haradarśanalālasā ||
 anyātikrāntam Īśanaṁ śrutvā stanabharālasā |
 anindata kucau bālā yauvanaṁ svaṁ kṛśodarī ||¹

The above discussion will convince any one that the Vāmaṇa Purāṇa though not technically a *kāvya* has a good sprinkling of poetic element which is abundantly characterized by *rasa* and which any composition to be called poetry must have. It has an appeal for connoisseurs (*sahyodayas*) for it forms part of a literature which is otherwise not very attractive so far as its literary aspect is concerned, notwithstanding its usefulness for a historian, a sociologist and a linguist. It relieves the tedium and so is all the more welcome. It also shows that popular bards and rhapsodists were not altogether incapable of writing good poetry which has an appeal even for the highly cultivated æsthetic sense of the present-day critic.

1. 58. 24-28.

A CRITICAL SURVEY OF SANSKRIT DŪTAKĀVYAS.

The idea of conveying messages through messengers is fairly old. Even in the Vedas Agni (Fire-god) is asked to carry the prayers of the sacrificers or their offerings to other gods. He is known as the *Devadūta* or *Vahni*, the bearer. It is through him that the *yajamāna* hopes to send his oblations to the other deities. He serves as a link between the sacrificer on the earth and the gods in the heaven. There is a distance of millions of miles between the two, yet the message is conveyed and is received by the *devas* through their *dūta*, the Agni. Agni in the Veda is supposed to be a god with a human form, invested with life and soul. As a matter of fact, it is the deified earthly fire which is supposed to carry the message or the offerings of the *yajamāna*. Thus the idea of things in Nature being treated as messengers goes back to a hoary past. And there is nothing improbable in it. Human emotions remain the same in all times and climes. A man widely separated from the one he holds dear would try to catch at anything that may serve his purpose. He would try that his feelings be conveyed to the person far away, that his ideas may touch his affectionate companion though he be thousands of miles away. This very idea is at the back of the sending of the presents too. By means of presents one likes to convey to the other person a measure of his feelings and emotional attachment to him but when the person is far away how is this emotional attachment to be conveyed? Even now-a-days when science and technology have annihilated distance, it is not always easy for people living far away to come together and exchange their ideas and feelings for each other. When

this is the state to-day, one has only to imagine as to what would have been the position in days of yore when means of communication were far too primitive and inadequate. Going out to a distant land would not mean a transient separation but keeping away for a long time, may be, for all times. In that event it was natural for people in those days to see any moving thing and then under the emotional stress think that it would convey an element of their mental agony to the person far away. This is the background of Nala's sending a *haṁsa* to Damayantī, his sweetheart. The story as it goes in the Mahābhārata is that King Nala fascinated by the news of the charms and beauty of Damayantī deputed a *haṁsa* to convey to her that he (Nala) is in love with Damayantī. Now Nala's employment of *haṁsa* as his *dūta* is very ingenious. The *haṁsa* goes to Damayantī's palace and delivers Nala's message. Damayantī is then smitten with love and thus both the lovers are equally attracted towards each other. It is this love which ultimately culminates into Nala's marriage with Damayantī. This was the traditional inspiration for Kālidāsa to pick up a cloud as messenger. The idea of employing a messenger for conveying messages was fairly old but Kālidāsa made a bold departure in that he employed an inanimate cloud as messenger. Hitherto from the scanty material available with us we can say that only animate beings had been employed as messengers. But the poet Kālidāsa's Muse could not be fettered by tradition. Its flight brought it to the regions where the difference of animate and inanimate ceases due to emotional stress and strain : "prakṛtikṛpanāś cetanācetanēṣu". And then a cloud no longer remains a conglomeration of smoke, fire and water: "dhūmajyotiḥsalilamarutāṃ sannipātaḥ." It becomes a living organism full of sentiments, emotions and feelings. It is addressed as 'brother.' The cloud is no doubt presented as a man. Kālidāsa attributes to it all the feelings of a man, and the tender emotions that the Yakṣa experiences. In spite of all the superstructure that has been raised to make the cloud appear a living being the inanimateness

of the cloud however peeps out. It is a human being in Kālidāsa's Meghadūta who thinks and speaks through the cloud. The cloud always remains in the background. The Yakṣa is always in the foreground. In his moments of extreme anguish and agony Yakṣa forgets that it is not an inanimate cloud that he is addressing. He thinks that the cloud also thinks like him and will act as he would like him to. Kālidāsa succeeds eminently in depicting the state of the human mind when a man is so absorbed in himself that the world outside him perhaps does not exist for him. And if at all it exists; it exists for him only. This is why the Yakṣa becoming oblivious of the fact that a cloud is a *Jaḍapadārtha*, (an inanimate object) picks it up as his messenger. That is the highest peak of his self-centredness. It was perhaps given to Kālidāsa only, to depict this extreme self-centredness which he depicts in three places in his works. In the Śākuntala the innocent Śākuntalā incurs the displeasure of the fierce sage Durvāsas on account of this very extreme self-centredness. Although the sage announces his advent she pays no attention to him. For her the entire world has become Duṣyanta. Similar extreme self-centredness has been depicted by Kālidāsa in his Kumārasambhava too. Pārvatī is so devoted to Lord Śiva that for her everything in the forest appears to be Śiva. It was this faculty of describing the extreme self-centredness that won Kālidāsa a name which will ever remain enshrined in the pages of Indian literary history. It is extreme self-centredness of Yakṣa that makes him impart to the cloud all his feelings and emotions. To whatever direction the cloud may move he thinks it is going towards his beloved's place. He gives it a message which it has to convey to the beloved.

The later dūtakāvya are modelled on the Meghadūta. Barring a few, all of them employ birds as messengers. This is perhaps more in line with the earlier Indian tradition. The employment of a *haṁsa* as a dūta, in the story of Nala and Damayantī in the Mahābhārata perhaps suggested the use of birds as messengers to the poets. Their

style, diction or delineation of sentiment owes much to that of the Meghadūta but the use of birds as messengers, they owe probably to a much older source. As it happened each poet tried to employ a different bird to serve as a messenger. If one poet employed a *haṁsa* the second one thought it wise to use a cuckoo or a peacock while the third one employed a bee. Thus it happened that poets went in search of newer and newer birds to serve as messengers. Each one vied with another to convey his message through a different bird. In a way it has been good too. For it has led to a greater variety and more charm. If the same birds had been used by the poets to serve as messengers the dūtakāvyas would have been a mass of dull and insipid poetry. As they are, they are quite pleasant and charming. This phenomenon has been rather helpful in providing an occasion to poets to exercise their ingenuity too.

Now a word about those dūtakāvyas in which abstract conceptions like morality or *śīla* are treated as messengers. This represents a later phenomenon. In Sanskrit dramas Prabodhacandrodaya is the only work where abstract conceptions like Prabodha, Buddhi, Krodha, Moha etc. are found as characters. No other similar work in Sanskrit has been discovered so far. We can place these dūtakāvyas in a category where the mind of certain people is highly obsessed with philosophical conceptions. A poet or a dramatist uses abstract conceptions as messengers only to give an expression to his innate love for them. He thinks that by personification they will become more easy and understandable to a common man. That is the approach of any practical philosopher, poet or a philosopher-playwright. Generally the philosophical conceptions are too abstruse and abstract for a common man. They are very often beyond his reach. He, therefore, wants to avoid them as far as possible. But for the thinkers and preachers who are out to preach their religion to a common man it becomes imperative to put them in a form that may be acceptable to the common man. In this way they hope to inculcate the highest truths of their

religion through the medium of light literature. Most of these *dūtakāvyas* where abstract conceptions are treated as messengers are composed by the Jainas. Their aim in choosing the abstract conceptions as messengers appears to be to propagate them and to make the readers acquainted with the broad principles of Jainism. It is a tribute to the ingenuity of the authors that they chose the medium of the *dūtakāvya* which since ages has caught the fancy of the people of the country. They realised that people would be only too prepared to listen to them and if properly approached, would be converted to their viewpoint, provided an attempt were made through the medium of lyric poetry which so much appealed to them. People in days gone by wanted to sing the *Mandākrāntā* verses of *Kālidāsa* and enjoy their lilting melody. Just as they could sing the verses of the *Meghadūta* they could very well sing the verses of the *Cetodūta* or the *Śīladūta* too and consciously or unconsciously imbibe the principles and doctrines enunciated therein. That must have been the idea of the authors of such *dūtakāvyas*. It may also be that these works were composed for the adherents of Jainism to acquaint them more fully with its principles and the doctrines in a language they could understand very well. It is human weakness that people like to read the light literature generally. Dramas, poems, stories and novels appeal to them and if they are used for a particular aim or purpose, that goes right deep into their mind. Bernard Shaw, the playwright and Somerset Maugham, the story-writer through their plays and stories, laid their fingers right at the weak spots of society. Their works, therefore, served their end much more forcefully than any amount of preaching could have done. People generally do not take kindly to preaching. That is why we find stories in the *Upaniṣads* and *Brāhmaṇas* called the *arthavādas*. These *arthavādas* serve to highlight a philosophical speculation and make it acceptable to the people much more forcefully than anything else. This is also the basis of stories in the *Mahābhārata* and the *Pañcatantra*. The reason given is "*bālānaṃ sukhābodhāya*". The *bālas*,

or the ignorant ones, are generally not able to climb up to the philosophical heights. They are the men of the soil. They can understand only the language of the soil. In the Meghadūta Kālidāsa blazed the trail that kept on burning even after many centuries. After the Meghadūta there was an outburst of unusual literary activity resulting in the growth of the dūtakāvya literature of considerable magnitude. The sweet music of the Meghadūta so inspired the later writers that they tried to sing in the way the great master had done but it is an admitted fact that they could not measure up to the standards of *Kavikulaguru*. Most of these dūtakāvyas were only cheap imitations of Kālidāsa's Meghadūta. Some of them were written for an avowed purpose of recapturing the spirit of the Meghadūta which unfortunately proved far too elusive. One thing that stands out by the study of the later dūtakāvya literature is that it has pretty little original to offer to the reader. The form and content in later dūtakāvyas in more cases than one is borrowed from the Meghadūta of Kālidāsa. Six or seven of them are written on the popular style of *samasyāpūrṭi* where one line from the Meghadūta is conjoined with three lines of the poet's own creation. Some of the dūtakāvyas are worthwhile while others are poor. The question is why was it that an element of gradual decay was visible in the dūtakāvya literature? An analysis of the causes that may be responsible for this is interesting as well as illuminating.

One of the reasons for this seems to be Kālidāsa's superiority over other poets. All along the Indian tradition Kālidāsa has been called *Kavikulaguru* or *Kavikulacūḍamani*. He is ranked superior to all other poets of ancient India. The other dūtakāvyas that were modelled on his work naturally therefore suffered by way of comparison. Some of the dūtakāvyas in themselves are not so bad as to be rejected out right by a literary critic, but when compared with Kālidāsa's Meghadūta they do not have much appeal.

Had it not been for Kālidāsa, these works would have

been ranked as specimens of good poetry worthy of recognition at the hands of scholars and critics. Such, for example are the Pavanadūta and the Nemidūta.

The second reason appears to be the decline in the general standards of literary activity in particular periods. On account of a number of reasons in a particular period there appears an outburst of unusual activity in all branches of learning, culture and civilization. In England in Shakespeare's time such an activity appeared. That was called the Renaissance period. On account of progress in all directions that period is known as the golden period of British History. But after Shakespeare for sometime we do not hear of an outstanding man of letters. Poetasters replaced the poets and imitators followed the original writers. The same thing happened in India too. Kālidāsa's period is known to Indian History as the golden period, for in that the Indian genius threw up a number of gems, the *Navaratnas*. Kālidāsa was one of them. There was an unusual activity in literature, arts, sciences and medicine. It is no use repeating what is so well known to history. After the golden period there came a time when tinsel replaced gold. Original activity came almost to a stop and there were very few writers left whose contributions led to the enrichment of literature and philosophy. Take for example, grammar. There we find the age of commentaries appearing after the *Mahābhāṣya* and the *Vākyapadīya*. In Medicine a rehash of *Suśruta* and *Caraka* comes on the scene. In Astrology India becomes a *śiṣya* of the Romans and the Greeks and in Mathematics and Sciences the days of the discovery of the zero which revolutionised mathematical studies in ancient days is gone. It is no wonder therefore that the poets coming after the first dūtakāvya do not measure up to the heights of Kālidāsa.

As time rolls on due to political or other factors the writers become less and less original with the result that some of the dūtakāvyas that are found today are not of much use as pieces of literature. Of course we can't dis-

miss them as useless as sources of the contemporary history and culture of the country but their literary value does not compel our attention.

This fact, though unfortunate in the extreme, is nevertheless true. It seems the later poetasters—it is a misnomer to call them poets—were so charmed by the Meghadūta that they also wanted to try their hand at writing works of the type. This might have served the purpose of satisfying the ego of these poets although some of them at least have very little value so far as poetry is concerned.

The third reason is the unusual influence exercised by the Meghadūta of Kālidāsa on the minds of the later poets which killed their initiative and smothered their originality. The Meghadūta was a model for them in style and content and they had to adhere to it. When something becomes a model, it leaves little room for originality and innovations and without originality and innovations it is very difficult to create a literature of permanent value and abiding interest.

The fourth reason may be the change in the political climate of the country. With the coming into power of the Mohammedans, Sanskrit suffered a definite setback in India. Hitherto the patronage which the Hindu kings had been extending to the authors of Sanskrit encouraged them to continue their literary activities. Now the Mohammedans were not only opposed to Sanskrit but were positively hostile to it. Imbued with their fanatical zeal to propagate Islam these barbarians from Turkey and Mangolia were out to crush and destroy everything that was Hindu. They carried fire and sword wherever they went. With a few noble exceptions they destroyed temples, harassed people and burnt libraries. In such an atmosphere when there were frequent outbursts of killing and incendiarism it was impossible for literature to flourish. Whatever literary activity that went on in the country in spite of the hostility of the paramount power owed its inspiration to the patronage of the Hindu aristocracy which could not be wiped out even by the frequent orgies of violence. Due to this peculiar

political situation in the country it was not possible for Sanskrit works of great merit to be produced and this partly accounts for the paucity of talent and lack of originality on the part of the writers and poets of Sanskrit that came on the scene. Serious literary activity can only continue when there is peaceful atmosphere all round. In an uncertain atmosphere when there is no body to recognize or patronize talent, only mediocrities hold the scene.

The fifth reason for the decay of the *dūtakāvya* literature in Sanskrit is the rise of the *Prākrits*, the *Apabhraṃśas* and the modern dialects. This is not to say that no *dūtakāvya* was composed after a particular time, it only means that as the regional languages progressively supplanted Sanskrit, works began to be composed in those languages. Writers began to exercise their poetical ability and express themselves through the medium of these languages. So those writers also who had the fascination for composing *dūtakāvyas* composed them in their respective regional languages and dialects spoken and understood by the people.

So we can say that there was no change in the desire and inclination of the poets to write *dūtakāvyas* or poems in which somebody or something had to act as a messenger to convey a message. This had so captivated the minds of the people that there could be no question of the cessation of the *dūtakāvya* activity. Their popular appeal persisted. The poets had to cater to the demand of the populace and they did it in their own language. So the *dūtakāvya* activity cannot be said to have suffered a setback in the country. What happened was the change in the vehicle of expression. What formally used to be written in Sanskrit came to be written in the different regional languages. Thus viewed, there was no decay of the *dūtakāvya* literature. But so far as *dūtakāvya* literature in Sanskrit was concerned, stagnation was slowly visible; gradually the number of *dūtakāvyas* written in Sanskrit began to fall till we arrive at a time when there remained only a trickle. *Dūtakāvyas* in Sanskrit are composed even now in India.

but they are few and far between. Occasionally a Pandit here or there brings out a small poem containing a few scores of *ślokas* to give expression to his poetical ability or to show off his competence in composing verses in Sanskrit. There is practically little originality in the attempt though the charm may be still there. The tradition so far as dūtakāvyas composed in Sanskrit is concerned, stands broken and no amount of occasional or casual efforts of a coterie of scholars of Sanskrit can hope to revive it.

CLASSIFICATION OF DŪTAKĀVYAS ON THE BASIS OF RELIGIOUS SECTS

Jaina dūtakāvyas

1. Pārsāvāhyudaya-Jinasena
2. Nemidūta-Vikramakavi
3. Meghadūta-Merutuṅga.
4. Śīladūta-Caritrasundaragaṇi
5. Pavanadūta-Vādicandra
6. Cetodūta-Anonymous
7. Indudūta-Vinayavijayagaṇi
8. Meghadūta-samasyālekha-Meghavijaya

Vaiṣṇava dūtakāvyas

i. Kṛṣṇa

1. Uddhavadūta-Rūpagosvāmin
2. Uddhavadūta-Mādhavakavīndra
3. Hānsadūta-Rūpagosvāmin
4. Padāṅkadūta-Śrīkṛṣṇa Sārvabhauma.
5. Pīkadūta-Rudraṇyāya Pañcānana
6. Panthadūta-Bholaṇātha
7. Bhṛṅgadūta-Śatāvadhānakavi
8. Manodūta-Viṣṇudāsa.
9. Pādapadūta-Gopendranātha Gosvāmin
10. Hāṇsa Sandeśa-Pūrṇa Sarasvatī

ii. Rāma

11. Hāṇsa Sandeśa-Vedāntadeśika
12. Bhramaradūta-Rudraṇyāya Pañcānana
13. Vātadūta-Kṛṣṇanātha Nyāyapañcānana Bhaṭṭācārya.

Śaiva dūtakāvyas

1. Hāṇsa Sandeśa
(Anonymous)

CLASSIFICATION OF DŪTAKĀVYAS ON THE BASIS OF DŪTAS

NATURAL PHENOMENA	NATURAL OBJECTS	MATERIAL OBJECTS	HUMAN BEINGS
<i>Megha</i> (cloud)	<i>Candra</i> (moon)		
1. Meghadūta Kālidāsa	1. Candradūta Jambūkavi	1. Padmadūta Siddhānta Vidyāvāgīśa	1. Uddhavadūta Mahākavīndra
2. Jaina Meghadūta Merutuṅga	2. Vāradūta Kṛṣṇanātha	2. Pādapadūta Gopendra- nātha	2. Uddhava- Sandēśa Rūpagosvāmin
3. Megha- dautyam Trāilokya Mohana Guhaniyogi	3. Aniladūta Rāma- Dayālu Tarkālāṅkāra	3. Patradūta Rudradeva Tripathī	3. Gopīdūta Lambodara Vaidya
4. Meghābhya- daya (Anonymous)	4. Pavanadūta Vādicandra	4. Tulasīdūta Trilocana	4. Pānthadūta Bhōlānātha
5. Meghadūta- samasyālekha Meghavijaya			5. Nemidūta Vikrama
6. Megha-prati- sandēśa Mandikal Rāmaśāstrī			
7. Yakṣa-mīlana Parmeśvara Jha.			

ABSTRACT CONCEPTIONS		B I R D S		MISCELLANEOUS
MANAS (<i>mind</i>)	MISCELLANEOUS	HANSA (<i>Swan</i>)	KOKILA (<i>Cuckoo</i>)	CAKRAVAKA (<i>Anas Casarca</i>)
1. Manodūta Viṣṇudāsa	1. Śīladūta Caritra Sundaragaṇi	1. Haṇsadūta Vāmana Bhaṭṭa Bāṇa	1. Pikadūta Rudranyāya Pañcānana	1. Kokasandēśa Viṣṇutrāta Sārvabhauma
2. Manodūta Rāmaśarmā	2. Vāṇmaṇḍ- anagaṇadūta Vireśvara	2. Haṇsadūta Rupagos- vāmin	2. Kokiladūta Haridāsa	2. Cakora- Sandēśa Perusturi
3. Manodūta Indreśa Bhaṭṭa	3. Bhaktidūta Kaliprasāda	3. Haṇsadūta Venkātānātha Vedāntācārya	3. Pikadūta Ambikācaraṇa Devaśaraṇa	2. Ghatakarpara Yamaka Kāvya, Ghatakarpara
4. Hṛdayadūta Harihara Bhaṭṭa		4. Haṇsa Sandēśa Raghunātha- dāsa	4. Kokila Sandēśa Uddaṇḍa	BHRAMARA (<i>bee</i>)
5. Manodūta Trailaṅga Vajranātha		5. Haṇsadūta Kavindrācā- rya Sarasvatī	5. Kokila Sandēśa Venkātācārya	1. Bhrūga San- deśa—Vāsudeva 2. Bhrāmara Sandēśa Mahālinga Sastri 3. Bhramaradūta Rudranyāya
6. Cetodūta (<i>anonymous</i>)		6. Haṇsa Sandēśa Pūrṇa Sarasvatī		MAYURA (<i>Peacock</i>)
		7. Haṇsa-Sandēśa (<i>Anonymous</i>)		1. Mayūra Sandēśa Udaya.

DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL DŪTAKĀVYAS

MEGHADŪTA OF KALIDĀSA

Kālidāsa's Meghadūta is a widely known love-lyric having one hundred and ten¹ verses in the Mandākrāntā metre. It has caught popular imagination in Sanskrit. The story goes that Kubera once turned out a certain Yakṣa for one year for neglect of duty. The Yakṣa took up his abode at Rāmāgiri mountain. On the first day of the month of Aṣāḍha, he saw a cloud on the sky and requested him to convey his message to his beloved consort residing at Alakā.

The poem is divided into two parts, the Purva Megha and the Uttara Megha. The former contains the description of the route which the cloud is expected to traverse and the latter contains a vivid description of Alakā, the dreamland of pleasure and the message which the cloud is asked to convey to the Yakṣa's consort.

The richness of Kālidāsa's imagination is revealed in the colourful descriptions of Ujjayinī, the Himālayas and the Kailāsa mountain. His art seems to be natural. The poem contains a graphic description of India's important towns, mountains, cities, rivers, pilgrim-centres etc. It

1. Vallabhadeva (10th century) has 11 verses; Mallinātha (14th century) 121 verses; Dakṣiṇāvartanātha (12th century) 110 verses; Pūrṇasarasvatī 110 verses; Tibetan version of Meghadūta 117 verses; Panabokke (Ceylonese version) 118 verses; India Office Manuscript of Meghadūta 110 verses; V. S. Agrawala edition, 115 verses; C. S. R. Sastri 115 verses. (He has also given a separate list of 5 ślokas which he considers to be interpolated.) Vidvan G. J. Somayaji Madras 124 verses; K. B. Pathak 120 verses; Sthiradeva 112 verses; Vasanta Ramachandra Nerurkar, Bombay 118 verses (He has given 9 verses separately which he considers to be spurious.) J. B. Chaudhury, Calcutta, 114 verses.

abounds in figures of speech, *Utprekṣā*, *Arthāntaranyāsa*, etc., and is written in a very simple and lucid style.

JAINA MEGHADŪTA OF MERUTUṄGA

Most of the *dūtakāvya*s are unfortunately not dated. This Jaina work, however, is different. It gives welcome information about its date. The author of this poem, Merutuṅga, was born in a village known as Nani in the year 1403 Vikrama era i. e. 1346 A. D. His original name was *Vāstika*. He was a great scholar of Sanskrit and Prakrit. He died at the age of 68.

This poem contains 196 verses in all the four cantos. In it the poet has given a description of Neminātha who becomes a recluse. His beloved wife sends him a message inquiring after the condition of the bereaved family.

MEGHABHYUDAYA (ANONYMOUS)

A fragmentary manuscript having 26 verses in different metres has been found recently.¹ The author and the commentary on it are both anonymous.

Though the colophon of this work is not known and the verses after the 26th are missing the work may belong to the 18th century.

The poet has composed this work on the model of *Kālidāsa's Meghadūta*. The opening verses are in the *Mandākrāntā* metre but after the tenth verse we find *Srag-dharā*, *Āryā*, *Upajāti* and such like metres. The poet has an intense fondness for alliteration, as for example :

navāmbuvidyullatayā samantataḥ
 tato vimuñcanti samam samantataḥ |
 vinodayann ambudharā kalāpino
 diviḥṣate candramasaḥ kalāpinaḥ ||

The substance of the available part is as under :

The rainy season has approached and the clouds, dark all round, accompanied with lightning have covered the sky. The peacocks and other birds including all the

1. Ms. No 5008, 11 pages, 26 verses, V. V. R. I., Hoshiarpur.

flora and fauna are pleasing everywhere. Everybody is rejoicing and the cool breezes are blowing. A lover is scheduled to go out and the beloved, inspite of her efforts, fails to prevail upon him to change his decision. She is much perplexed. The lover is away and the beloved beguiles her weary hours in a very sorry state till at last she loses her senses.

The messenger seems to be the cloud. The poem is a very nice piece of a love-lyric but unfortunately the complete work is not available. Some words are peculiar to us (for instance Jalāli). The poet seems to be a Vaiṣṇavite since he writes Rāma, Rāma, etc. at the end of every verse.

MEGHADAUTYAM OF TRAILOKYAMOHANA GUHANIYOGĪ

The author of this poem is known to us as Trailokyamohana Guhaniyogī who composed it about fifty years back. It consists of two hundred stanzas in the Mandākrāntā metre.

The language of the poem is very simple. The subject-matter is similar to that of the Meghadūta. In form too it has similarity with the Meghadūta with this difference that in this dūtakāvya the beloved sends the message to the lover.

The story goes like this : A Yakṣī receives the message from her lover and responds to it. She wants to convey her feelings and emotions and gives them a clear expression.

A large number of verses are a close imitation of the Meghadūta of Kālidāsa. The poet seems to have a good knowledge of rhetorics and prosody. This *virahakāvya* is one of the biggest works found in the dūtakāvya literature. The poet has no thorough mastery over Sanskrit grammar and has deliberately put in obscure words to display his skill in poetry.

PARŚVABHYUDAYA OF JINASENA

The Pārśvābhyudaya is divided into four cantos. There are three hundred and sixty four verses in all in this poem which are divided into four cantos—one hundred and

eighteen in the first, the same number in the second, fifty-seven in the third, and seventy-one in the fourth. Due to its having been written on the Samasyāpūrti scheme the whole poem has been composed in the Mandākrāntā metre except the last six verses of the fourth canto where five verses are in the Mālinī and the remaining one in the Vasantatilakā. The poem imitates the Meghadūta in every respect with this difference that at places the dull and the drab descriptions impede the flow of the work.

There need be no controversy about the date of the author of this work which was composed, as has been expressly stated by the author himself, during the reign of Amoghavarṣa I of the Rāṣṭrakūṭa dynasty. The following two verses of the poem may be quoted here with advantage :

iti viracitam etat kāvyam āveṣṭya Meghaṃ
 bahuguṇam apadoṣaṃ Kālidāsasya kāvyam ।
 malinitaparakāvyam tiṣṭhad āśaśāṅkaṃ
 bhuvanam avatu devaḥ sarvadāmoghavarṣaḥ ॥
 śrīvīrasenamunipādapayojabhṛṅgaḥ
 śrīmān abhud Vinayasenamunir garīyān ।
 taccoditena Jinasenamuniśvareṇa
 kāvyam vyadhāyi pariveṣṭitameghadūtam ॥

Amoghavarṣa is believed to have ascended the throne in Śaka 736 and continued to rule till Śaka 799.

The theme of the work is as under :

There is one Kamaṭha who having been expelled by king Aravinda goes to the bank of the river Sindhu to practise penance. When Marubhūti (Pārsvanātha), the younger brother of Kamaṭha learns this he comes to him (Kamaṭha). When Kamaṭha, sees Marubhūti he is atonce reminded of the past hostilities and thinks of killing him. On account of his Māyā he brings forth rain, roars like a lion and rails at Marubhūti. When he finds that all this has left Marubhūti cold he invites him for a duel and advises him to go to Alakāpurī when he would meet his doom at his hands. He further advises him to assume the form of a cloud after his death,

to go to Alakā passing on the way from Rāmagiri, wherefrom the journey would begin, to Āmrakūṭa mountain, the Daśārṇa country with its capital at Vidiśā, the rivers Nirvindhya and Sindhu, the city of Ujjayinī where it (the cloud) is advised to see the Jaina temples, the river Gambhīrā, the mountain Devagiri, the river Carmaṇvatī, the city of Daśapura and the river Sitā, the region of Brahmāvarta, Kurukṣetra, the sacred places of Balarāma in its vicinity and the Kana-khala mountain which will usher him to Alakā. The poet's description of Alakā is really charming. Equally charming is the description of the union of Vasundharā, the wife of Marubhūti in an earlier birth with her husband (Marubhūti). The whole scene is highly pathetic and emotional.

As Kamaṭha has been saying all this Marubhūti (Pārśvanātha) maintains his calm. At that Kamaṭha again challenges him for a fight but that too leaves Marubhūti cold. Then Kamaṭha creates a bevy of young girls on account of his Māyā. They approach Marubhūti singing and dancing, but Marubhūti (Pārśvanātha) remains unaffected. All his efforts gone in vain, Kamaṭha feels highly insulted. He lifts up a rock and when he is about to strike Marubhūti's head with it a Nāga king Dharaṇendra accompanied by his wife comes there. On seeing him Kamaṭha takes to flight but the Nāgarāja prevents him from doing so, offers him *abhaya*, reminds him of all his evil deeds in previous births and prays to God to have mercy on him (Kamaṭha.) And then he spreads an umbrella of his hoods on the head of Marubhūti who is none else than Lord Pārśvanātha himself. The wife of Nāgarāja too does likewise. At this Kamaṭha feels penitent and asks forgiveness for all his earlier crimes. When he is praying there flows forth a stream of tears from his eyes. At this sight the gods shower flowers from the heaven, and the *duṇḍubhis* are sounded. The gods come from the heaven to Pārśvanātha. The other *tāpasas* too come to him (Pārśvanātha.) At this the story of the *kāvya* comes to an end.

PAVANADŪTA OF DHOYI

Pavanadūta is the oldest available work barring the Meghadūta, Ghaṭakarparakāvya and Candradūta of Jambū-kavi. The poem contains 104 verses in Mandākrāntā metre.

The Pavanadūta of Dhoyi has been published in Sanskrit Sahitya Parishad Series, as work No. 11 and has been very ably edited by Prof. Chintaharan Chakravarti with a detailed introduction in English covering as many as 26 pages from which we learn much about the poet. According to Prof. Chakravarti Dhūyi, Dhoyi, Dhoi or Dhoyika as the poet is variously called belonged to the court of king Lakṣmaṇasena of Bengal of the 12th century A. D. He was known to have been one of the five jewels of Lakṣmaṇasena's court. The verse which enumerates the names of these five jewels does not specifically mention Dhoyi but mentions one *Kavirāja* who has been conclusively proved by Prof. Chakravarti to be no other than the poet Dhoyi who more than once in his Pavanadūta refers to himself as 'kavikṣmābhṛtām cakravartī' (verse 101), 'kavinarapati' (verse 102). The colophon of the work also reads 'iti śrī Dhoyikavirājavaracitam.' As has been said above king Lakṣmaṇasena belonged to the 12th century A. D. So Dhoyi must have flourished in that century. The upper limit of the poet is furnished by the discovery of the verses attributed to him which begin to appear in works like Saduktikarṇāmṛta (1205 A. D.), Jalhana's Subhāṣita Mukṭāvalī (middle of the 13th century) and the Śārṅgadharapaddhati (14th century).

The poet has selected a historical character as the hero of his work. It is said that once Lakṣmaṇasena invaded and conquered Malayācaladeśa. During his campaign a Gandharva girl of Kanakapurī was fascinated by his beauty, although she could not disclose her feelings to him. After a few days' stay the king left the place and the heroine became sad. She then sent the wind as messenger to convey her feeling to the king residing at his capital Vijayapuram in Bengal.

The poet has depicted a nice picture of the heroine who is in a very sad condition. The poem has won for him a name. It is a fact that very few poems can excel it or even equal it.

PAVANADŪTA OF VĀDICANDRA

This poem is written by Vādicandra who in the colophon gives the name of his Guru as Śāntinātha. The poem consists of one hundred and one stanzas in the Mandākṛāntā metre. It does not follow the usual style of the dūtakāvyas, as there is no mention of the route. Nor has it any of the attractions of a lyric-poem. The theme of the poem is :

Tārā, the wife of a king named Vijaya has been abducted by another king whom the poet calls by the name, Khecara or Khagapati. The lover while thinking of her beloved's talents bursts into tears and requests the wind to convey his message to her. Thereafter he tells it (the wind) the charms of the journey although the names of the places enroute are not given. The wind is to pass through the woods, the mountains, the rivers, etc. The wind is requested not to put off the lamps at that moment when the Khecaras are busy in their sexual merry-making, for they would like to see the naked bodies of their consorts (verse 14). The lover is busy in brooding over the departure till at last the wind reaches the beloved who is busy in meditation of Jineśa.

The wind reaches the abductor too. Then there are a few verses put into the mouth of the wind which are of a didactic nature. The wind informs the king that the consequences of abducting another's wife are not good. The mother of the abducting king intervenes just when he is trying to make preparations for a combat, and at her instance the abducted Tārā is handed over to the wind who brings her back to the lover.

VĀTADŪTA OF KṚṢṆANĀTHA

This virahakāvya of one hundred verses is written

by Kṛṣṇanātha Pañcānana who is said to have flourished during the last century.

The subject-matter of this work is Sītā's abduction; the same as mentioned by Vālmiki in his Rāmāyaṇa. The story of the poem in brief is that Sītā who has been abducted by Rāvaṇa, feels very sad and requests the wind to convey her message to Rāma.

The style of the poem is as attractive as that of the Padmadūta.

In the first part the poet describes the sad condition of Sītā. After this there is the description of the route to be followed by the messenger. Thereafter comes the description of Rāma's Āśrama. Then are described a number of things such as Sītā's friends, Muni Āśrama, sunrise, sunset, Rāma's condition in Sītā's absence, her message to Rāma, benedictions, prayers, etc., etc.

ANILADŪTA OF RĀMA DAYĀLU TARKARATNA

This poem has been composed by Rāmadayālu of Bhaṭṭapallī who was patronized by the king of Vardhamāna state. *The work has not been published so far.*

The theme of the poem is the same as that of the other dūtakāvyas concerned with Kṛṣṇa's and Gopīs' love-affairs. The messenger is wind i. e. anila, which is requested by the Gopīs to convey their feelings to Kṛṣṇa who is requested to come back from Madhupura to Vṛndāvana.

MARUDDŪTA OF R. C. ŚANTA ŚALIHĀSA

The latest of the dūtakāvyas of this category is the Maruddūta by Rameśacandra Śanta Śalihāsa. It is published serially in the *Divya-Jyoti*, a Sanskrit monthly from Simla; the last instalment having been published in its issue of November, 1961. It is a small poem of not much literary merit, and abounding in grammatical and other errors. It is a poor attempt and does little credit to the author.

The theme of the work is :

A follower of Mahātmā Gandhi is put in a prison.

After he has been there for sometime, he feels a longing for his wife and son, who are in Indraprastha, the old name for Delhi. The prisoner in these moments experiences the sweet touch of the Malaya breeze from a small opening in his cell and eagerly asks it to convey his message to his kith and kin who are living far away in Delhi. The breeze is to start from somewhere in Eastern India where the man is made to live in confinement during the British days and pass on its long journey through Vārāṇasī, Prayāga (Allahabad), and Kanpur from where it is to take a turn to Agra to have a look at the famous Tāj. From Agra it is to proceed to Delhi. At this the poem comes to an end. The message is not described. May be, it is to be taken up in the coming issue or issues but there is no indication to the effect in the November issue of the Magazine which in its previous issues carried the note 'to be continued'. In the course of the description of the journey the poet describes in vivid detail the famous cities and towns that fall on the way, Vārāṇasī, Prayāga etc. with all that is worth seeing in them. Here and there, there are poetic flashes, too, but their charm is very much marred by the inadequacy of expression and faulty idioms, which are unfortunately not a few in the poem.

INDUDŪTA OF VINAYAVIJAYAGAṆI

Vinayavijayagaṇi, a Jain poet has composed this work consisting of 131 verses in the Mandākrāntā metre after the usual pattern of the dūtakāvyas.

The theme of this work is :

Vinayavijayagaṇi, a native of Dvādaśāvarta, has observed celibacy and is absorbed in his meditations in the benign company of his gracious teacher residing at a pilgrimage-centre named Yodhapura. After the usual evening-prayers the poet is just out to pay his homage at the sacred feet of his Guru Tapagaṇapati but all of a sudden he goes to sleep and enters a dreamland. He looks at the rising moon and entreats him to convey his message to his revered

teacher. He praises the high family of the Moon, her pedigree showing her relation with Lakṣmī and other gods. Then he relates the route from Yodhapura to Surat. It is in the last verse only that he states his message. It is a request to the effect that the venerable teacher whom he is worshipping constantly may remain kind and considerate to him so that he may continue to follow his path and gain emancipation.

It is a nice little poem and makes a delightful reading. It is rich in fine figures of speech. The flight of imagination displayed by the poet is commendable. The predominant note in it is that of tranquility and not Karuṇa (Pathos) which is a common characteristic of the dūta-kāvya.

CANDRADŪTA OF ŚRĪKṚṢṆA TARKALĀṆKARA

This small dūtakāvya is attributed to Śrīkrṣṇa Tarkalāṅkāra. He was a great logician. He is said to be the son of Gopīkānta Bhaṭṭācārya who commented on the Kāvyaaprakāśa. The poet's intention is to propagate his doctrines or philosophy through the medium of the light literature.

The poem shows close similarity with the Padāṅkadūta where the poet is more interested in philosophical speculation through a poem.

From the Mālyavat Parvata, Rāma sends Hanumat to Laṅkā who comes back after seeing Sītā. Rāma is very sad because of Sītā's separation. In a state of awful bewilderment he espies the rising moon who is moving towards Laṅkā and asks her to convey his message to Sītā.

CANDRADŪTA OF VINAYAPRABHU

The work contains only 12 verses. The first eleven verses are in Vamśasthavila metre and the last one is in Anuṣṭubh. The theme of this work is that a lady separated from her lover sends a message to him through the moon. The moon is requested to inform the hero that his beloved is dying by inches.

The moon is moved by her piteous condition and be-

wilderment. She relates the sad plight of the lady to her lover who being charmed by the melodious voice of the moon comes back and thus the couple enjoys a happy reunion.

The poem is really a nice piece where the messenger not only relates the message but actually brings about the desired end.

CANDRADŪTA OF JAMBŪKAVI

The poet flourished in the 10th century. This small poem contains only 23 verses in the Mālinī metre. The work though small, can be placed among some of the masterpieces of the dūtakāvya literature. The work is also useful for the history of India for it gives chronology of a certain period. Most of the verses are Yamakas of a subtle nature. A large number of scholars or rhetoricians quote these verses in their works.

The theme of the poem is the conventional one peculiar to the dūtakāvyas. A lady separated from her lover requests the moon to go to her lover and inform him of her pangs of separation she is suffering from his absence. The moon is asked by the lover kindly to come back and enjoy her sweet company.

PIKADŪTA OF RUDRANYAYAPANĀNANA

Pikadūta is attributed to Rudra Nyāyapañcānana. Only a fragmentary copy of it having about 30 verses is available. The metre used in this work is Śārdūlavikrīḍita.

As in the Ghaṭakarpara-Yamaka-Kāvya and in some other dūtakāvyas, so in this poem also the messenger is sent by the beloved to the lover.

The tradition of describing the route to be followed by the dūta is missing in this poem. The story in brief runs thus :

Kṛṣṇa has left for Mathurā. Vṛndāvana is no place of attraction to Rādhā. It is simply repelling and fortunately for Rādhā a cuckoo happens to pass nearby. She humbly requests it to convey her message to her lover. She

does not like to send a beetle as it would surely cling to Kṛṣṇa's lotus-like feet, since it is in the nature of the beetles to run after the lotus-flowers. The beetle would surely fail to convey the message and come back again. Earlier Rādhā had sent her mind to Kṛṣṇa but it did not come back. The cuckoo is asked by the Gopīs to ride on an elephant and go to Mathurā. After all, what offence have the Gopīs given to Kṛṣṇa that he has entirely forgotten them? The cuckoo would tell him that his votaresses can no longer resist the pangs of his separation. Nevertheless, they sustain themselves in the hope of reunion with him. The trees and the birds, etc. of Vṛndāvana are all sad in his absence. The cuckoo is to request Kṛṣṇa to give cheer to the Gopīs and to come back to Mathurā.

PIKADŪTA OF AMBIKĀCARAṆA DEVAŚARMA

This poem is attributed to Ambikācaraṇa Devaśarmā who seems to be a poet of the present century. This poem has not been published so far.

The message and the theme of this work coincide with that of the Aniladūta of Rama Dayālu Tarkaratna.

KOKILADŪTA OF HARIDĀSA

This *virahakāvya* of one hundred and three verses is attributed to Haridāsa (or Harimohana) who composed it in the Śaka era 1777. One hundred verses of it are concerned with the message proper while the last three verses disclose the poet's own identity.

The theme of this work is that Kṛṣṇa has left Vṛndāvana. Rādhā is much aggrieved. She wants to convey her feelings through a *kokila*. The rest of the matter is an imitation of the *dūtakāvyas* of this type.

There is no mention of the route. The poet wrote the work to show off his poetical talents. The verses are at times too difficult and abstruse and thus much of the charm of the poem is lost.

KOKILASANDEŚA OF VEṆKATĀCĀRYA

This *sandేశakāvya* is different from the *Kokilasandేశa*

of Uddāṇḍa Kavi. The poem is written on the model of Kalidāsa's Meghadūta having 60 and 61 verses in the Mandākrāntā metre in the first and second parts respectively. The manuscript of the work is preserved in the T. M. S. S. M. Library, Tanjore. The theme of the work is :

Having enjoyed the company of sixteen thousand consorts, Viṣṇu becomes tired of Śṛṅgāra and desires to experience pathos. He becomes the king of Magadha and then under the curse of Agastya sojourns at Malayagiri. He is now separated from his wife and in a state of utter helplessness entreats a kokila to convey his message to his wife.

The route which the kokila is asked to follow runs from Malayagiri to Kusumapura. The messenger, as usual, is at the very outset eulogised and subsequently entreated to carry his message to his sweetheart. To reach Kusumapura the kokila is to follow a northward course and to commence its journey after paying homage to Mahendra mountain where the Malaya breezes are blowing. The messenger must have his wife to accompany him lest he (the messenger) should feel the pangs of separation like the hero. After crossing the hermitage of Agastya at Malayakūṭa the messenger is to go to Śātamakhapurī and Tāmraparṇī where the Brāhmaṇas are highly learned. Other intermediate stages are Madhurā and the Sahya mountain where the messenger will be delighted to pay homage to Raṅganātha, Śeṣanāga and Padmanābha. The kokila, will then visit Tañjā Nagara, the Kāverī, the sacred river Tuṅgabhadra, and the Kṛṣṇā and then would reach Kusumapura.

The actual message is described in the second part of the work.

The poem draws inspiration from the Meghadūta only in form and metre but not in spirit, although the predominant sentiment is pathos here too.

KOKILASANDEŚA OF UDDAṆḌA

The poem is written by Uddāṇḍa, the famous author of Mallikāmāruta. It contains 92 verses in the first part and

69 verses in the second part. The poem is an imitation of Śukasandēśa. The poet leaves no trace of his identity but the poet Udaya, the author of the Mayūrasandēśa, has mentioned Uddaṇḍa as a great favourite in the Bālya country. Uddaṇḍa has mentioned Chennamangalam as the destination of his messenger in Kokilasandēśa. This city is identified with Villarvattam. According to Malabar tradition Uddaṇḍa was a great scholar, poet and debator who kept up his rank in the Zamorin's *Ṭidvatsadas* (Learned Assembly). After twelve years, the local Brahmin scholars became jealous and propitiated Durgā. With the grace of Durgā, a baby was born in the Brahmin family of Kakkas-son. He grew up to be a great scholar, poet and debator. In his twelfth year he defeated Uddaṇḍa in Zamorin's *sadas*. The story of this poem runs thus :

A hero living with his beloved is taken away at night by a celestial being and is near the Conjeevaram temple. After two months, the month of Caitra approaches and he sees a kokila, through whom he sends the message to his beloved.

The route is described from Conjeevaram in the Chingleput District of the Madras State to a place called Chennamangalam (now a part of Kerala) between the two arms of the Alwaye river. The messenger is entreated to enter Malabar through Mysore (Hoysala kingdom) in the north-eastern corner. The poem closely follows Kālidāsa's Meghadūta in technique, and is supposed to be a complement to Śukasandēśa of Lakṣmīdāsa in so far as it describes such portions of Malabar as are not included in that poem.

The poem is written in the usual Mandākrāntā metre.

BHRṄGASANDEŚA OF VASUDEVA¹

Malayali poets have written dūtakāyas both in Sans-

1. Sandēśe' smin katham api guru Śrīpadāmbhojayugmadhyāna dhvasta prabalaatamsā Vāsudevena baddhe.

krit¹ as well as in Malayalam² on the model of Kālidāsa's Meghadūta. In this dūtakāvya, Vāsudeva has marvellously interwoven the external nature depicted in the Pūrva-bhāga with human feelings charmingly delineated in the Uttarabhāga. The number of verses is 95 and 80 in the first and second parts respectively. The poem has been published in the Trivandrum Sanskrit Series, Trivandrum.

The theme and substance of the poem is that being charmed by the enticing beauty of a lover enjoying sound sleep in his palace, a Yakṣī had snatched him away from the bedside of his beautiful consort Balanili.³ But she was forced to drop him down in a flower-garden in the vicinity of Padmanābhasvāmi temple at Trivandrum, due to the chance appearance of a Yakṣa. The lover finds himself in seclusion and is perplexed at this strange turn of events. In utter dismay he begins to contemplate over his fate but *the sweet hummings of a bhṛṅga* catch his fancy. The overwhelmed lover decides to send his message to his beloved through this *bhṛṅga*.

The poet here follows the conventional method of the dūtakāvyas. In the Pūrva-bhāga the route is described. The bhṛṅga is expected to travel from Trivandrum to Śvetadurga on the bank of Bharatapura, the abode of the beloved. The Uttara-bhāga contains the message which is expressed in a very simple style.

The poem is also known as Bhramarasandēśa, but the name intended by the poet was Bhṛṅgasandēśa.⁴

From Trivandrum to Śvetadurga is one month's⁵ journey but it is completed in two days only. The beetle is endowed with some super-natural power.⁶ In keeping with the dūtakāvya tradition the poet describes some important places he has visited. According to Sāmbaśiva Śāstrī, the editor of the work, "he (the poet) has, in fact,

1. For instance Mayūrasandēśa, Kokilasandēśa etc.

2. Kokasandēśa, Unnīlīsandēśa etc.

3. Verses 1 and 2.

4. Verses 5 and 49.

5. Verse 17.

6. Verse 6.

surpassed all others by consigning all his personal experiences to the swing of poesy”.

In this work the poet has mentioned the names of Śrī Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭapāda, Māṛḍallapaṇḍita¹ and the famous astrologer Acyuta Piśāroṭa.² All these men are probably his contemporaries. The poet has also praised the ruler of Trivandrum³ who ruled over Cochin between 1563-1602 A.D. This Sandeśakāvya seems to have been written during that period. It sheds a welcome light on the historical and also the geographical data of that period.

BHRAMARASANDEŚA OF MAHĀLIṄGA ŚĀSTRĪ

This is a recent work written in the year 1923 A.D. by Mahāliṅga Śāstrī in *Śikharinī* metre and has one hundred and ten verses. The poet has written this poem on the model of Kālidāsa's Meghadūta.

A resume of the subject-matter is:

Indra has killed Vṛtāsura. The sin of murdering a Brāhmaṇa begins to haunt him in the shape of a dreadful ghost and Indra has no other alternative but to conceal himself in the lotus-tank of the Ganges. He thus gets separated from his beloved consort Śacī and in this sad separation sends a messenger to her. A bee is entreated to carry the message to her abode, the Indrapurī.

The route runs from Jahnukṣetra to heaven. Himālaya, Badarikāśrama, Sthāṇvāśrama, Oṣadhiprastha, Kailāsa, Mānasa lake and Svargaloka are the important places which the bee would like to see and enjoy during his journey.

The poem ends with the statement that by virtue of accidental pious recollections, Indra becomes purified of his sins and is released from the sin of *Brahmahatyā*. Brhaspati assists Indra in regaining his lost grandeur and his beloved Śacī.

The poet aims at conveying the readers the philosophy of the Purāṇas, viz. 'kṣīṇe puṇye martya-lokaṃ viśanti,' that men come back to the earth from the heaven when

1. Verse 91. 2. Verse 89. 3. Verse 25.

their accumulated *punya*s (religious merits) are exhausted and when they do some good in this world they can again be eligible for admission to the heavenly abode."

BHRAMARADŪTA OF RUDRA NYĀYAVĀCASPATI

This poem is attributed to Rudra Nyāyavācaspati. The complete poem contains 125 verses. The subject-matter of this work has been taken from Vālmiki's Rāmāyaṇa with some innovations and alterations in the route. The theme of the poem is :

Hanumat has come back to Rāma who is staying at Citrakūṭa. Rāma hears from this messenger of the pitiable plight of his wife and becomes very sad. He recollects the days which he spent in the sweet company of his wife Sītā. He can no more bear separation and this creates a grave situation. Rāma becomes the Yakṣa of the Meghadūta. He is very sad. As the rainy season has arrived he thinks that all men must be with their consorts. It is just then that a bhramara appears there. Rāma entreats it to convey his message to Sītā who is under confinement in Laṅkā.

The poet then explains the route. He describes once again the sad condition of Sītā. Thereafter, the message is related to the bee. The last two verses are concerned with the poet's own identity, etc.

BHRṄGADŪTA OF ŚRĪKṚṢṆA

The credit of bringing this work to light goes to Sri S. P. Chaturvedi of Allahabad, (formerly of Nagpur). It was published in the Nagpur University journal No. 3, December 1937. A critique on it was published by Mr. Chaturvedi in the Proceedings and Transactions of the All India Oriental Conference, VIth Session, 1930, pages 623-632. We quote relevant extracts from it which give quite a nice description of this hitherto unknown work.

The work contains 126 verses in Mandākrāntā metre. Unlike the Meghadūta there are no *Pūrvabhāga* and *Uttārabhāga* divisions in the work. All the verses go to form one

unit—the work itself. The last stanza is in Upajāti metre and states the names of the author and the work.

The theme of the *dūtakāvya* is :

A Gopī in feigned anger (*prāptamānāntarāyā*) quarrels with Kṛṣṇa and spends a restless night. The following morning, she sees nearby a bee humming merrily on the opening lotus flowers. With big tears in her sleep-idle eyes, she breathes a heavy sigh and asks the bee to take her message to her lover Śrī Kṛṣṇa. The way shown to the messenger is not exactly one which the messenger must follow to reach its destination. What our author aims at is to mention and describe the various scenes of *Vrajabhūmi* which are of great interest to the Gopīs and other devotees of Śrī Kṛṣṇa. The bee is asked to go first to the house of Nanda (*yāhi nandasya geham*). The garden, the Mālatī-bower, scenes of amorous sports (*kāmakriḍāparimala*), the arch—all these are admirably described. Then comes the royal avenue (*rājavāthi*), where beautiful damsels are seen hurrying to their lovers' places and heart-attracting ball-games (*kandukakriḍaḥ*) are being played. Reaching Gokula through a spacious gate, the messenger is to see the image of Gaṇeśa in the court-yard, and the worship of Rohiṇī. He is advised to enjoy the playing on musical instruments and the amorous dance in honour of the deity. Thence he goes to the way leading to the (river) Yamunā and listens to the witty and confidential talks of the ladies who have gone there to fetch water. He is to keep himself aloof from these temptations and proceed on his undertaken errand. Now comes the temple of *Vagdevatā* (the goddess of speech) by whose grace even the animals can compose excellent poetic lines. This is followed by a very beautiful description of Lord Śiva's temple (*Kailāsadhāma*).

PATRADŪTA OF RUDRADEVA TRIPATHĪ

This is a recent *dūtakāvya*¹ written by Rudradeva Tripathī, son of Ramākānta Śarmā who is described by the

1. Published in *Samvat* 2012

author as an astrologer. The work is published by Pandit Bhimadeva Tripāthi of Shri Maheshwar Printing Press, Mandsoor (M. P.). It consists of 37 printed pages and contains 163 verses written in the Mandākṛāntā metre. At the end of the work there are five photographic reproductions of the things and places described in the work, which has elicited praise from such critics as the editor of the Madhura-vāṇī. The theme of the work is :

The author Rudradeva Tripāthi who is living in Bombay with one of his maternal uncles, Govinda Rāma Śarmā, sends a letter to his preceptor who is also one of the maternal uncles of the author living in Daśapura in the Mālava country. The letter is sent as a messenger to convey the best regards of the pupil, the author, to the preceptor, Rāma Chandra on the Guru Pūrṇimā day. Just as the cloud in the Meghadūta is treated as a living being and human actions are ascribed to it, similarly our author Rudradeva Tripāthi attributes all human actions to the letter. He also describes the route to be followed by the letter which lies between Bombay and Daśapura and passes through Dadar, Balsar, Bullimore, Navasari, Bhṛgupura, Revatī and Ratnapurī, etc. In between the poet takes a few moments off and describes in vivid detail the various places and scenes of Bombay with all its beauty-spots like Chowpatti, the Juhu Beach thronged with the merry-making people helping themselves with *Bhelpūri*, etc. and the buses and the trams plying. The journey of the letter commences from the Bombay Central Post Office from where it is put in a Dak van, carried to the Railway Station and put in a train-compartment. It is described to be a witness to all that takes place in the compartment; the breakfast by the people, the boisterous laughters of the people and the like. When the letter reaches Daśapura, it is asked to go to a Vidyālaya or a College-building where the author had pursued his studies sometime back. The letter is to deliver the message of best compliments of the pupil, the author, to the preceptor, the maternal uncle of the author.

HAṆSADŪTA OF VĀMANABHAṬṬA BĀṆA

Vāmanabhaṭṭa, a Brāhmaṇa of Vatsagotra, was the court-poet of Vemabhūpāla, the famous author of Śṛṅgārā-dīpikā in the 15th century. The famous poet Bāṇa Bhaṭṭa, the court-poet of Śrī Harṣa who composed Kādambarī and Harṣacarita was also a Vatsagotra Brāhmaṇa. Bāṇa Bhaṭṭa is said to be a unique prose-writer. In order to equal the fame won by him, the former wrote a large number of books including this Haṇsadūta. The subject-matter is the same as that of the Meghadūta.

A Yakṣa separated from his beloved, sends a message to his beloved consort Kandarpalekhā through a swan, who is expected to travel from Mount Malaya (the extreme south of India) to Alakā. The swan is to travel through Tāmaparṇī and reach Madurā, the land of the Pāṇḍya kings. Thereafter he is to go to Cauvery, the lands of the Rāṅga and the Colas, the Śiva temple of Puṇḍarikapura, Conjeevaram, the Pārvatī shrine at the bank of the river Kampā, and then he is to cross the river Kanakumukharī. Thereafter he is to pass through the Āndhras, the Kṛṣṇavatī, the Tuṅgabhadra, the Godāvarī and then traverse the Vindhya mountains, and cross the rivers Yamunā and Gaṅgā and travel through Vārāṇasī, Ayodhyā, Kurukṣetra, the Himalayas, the Krauñca mountain, the mount Kailāsa and reach Alakā.

The second part of the work contains a fine description of Alakā, the abode of Yakṣa, and his message to his beloved consort.

The work as a whole is very interesting and is closely similar to the Meghadūta. The poet has a thorough mastery over language and rhetoric.

HAṆSADŪTA OF RŪPAGOSVAMĪ

Rūpagosvāmī, a disciple of Śrīcaitanya, was a great Vaiṣṇava of Bengal. Besides this Haṇsadūta, a work of 142 verses in Śikhariṇī,¹ a large number of other works are his compositions. The theme of this poem is :

1. Some editions contain 101 verses only.

Lalitā, on behalf of Rādhā and other cowherdresses sends a swan from Vṛndāvana to Mathurā where Lord Kṛṣṇa resides. The swan is requested to follow the track of Kṛṣṇa's chariot driven by Akrūra. He is further requested to have rest under the Kadamba tree behind which Kṛṣṇa used to hide himself while stealing the clothes of the Gopīs. He is also expected to visit the Govardhana mountain, a favourite resort of Kṛṣṇa, the Tamāla tree, the Kāliya lake where the Vṛndādevī had transformed herself into a Tulasī leaf, and from there to the famous town of Mathurā. The swan is to go there and see Kṛṣṇa busy in merry-making with the maidens singing songs of his glory. Kṛṣṇa will certainly be busy hearing sweet songs of Vikadrū and the legendary tales narrated by Akrūra. Kṛtavarman, Satyaka, Garuḍa and others must be busy in Kṛṣṇa's service. The swan must look for an opportunity to see Kṛṣṇa when he is alone, otherwise, he would not like to hear the message sent by the village-maidens. He must request Kṛṣṇa not to forget them who were once his very near and dear ones, particularly Rādhā who cannot resist the pangs of separation any more.

The poem is rich in similes and the flight of imagination is spontaneous, although the theme is borrowed from Śrīmad Bhāgavata (X—41, 57).

HAṆSADŪTA OF VENKATĀNATHA VEDĀNTĀCĀRYA

Venkatānātha and his son Varadanātha are famous poets of the 14th century. They are the followers of Rāmānuja. A large number of Sanskrit and Tamil works have been written by Vedāntācārya.

The theme of this poem is based on the Rāmāyaṇa. The messenger is a swan instead of Hanumān. The route which the swan is directed to follow is described. It runs from Mount Malayavat to Ceylon. The route described here is a repetition of the route described by Vāmana Bhaṭṭa Bāṇa and the poet has sufficient explanation ready for it. This path is safe and the heavy rains would not obstruct the movement of the passengers there. Hence the

messenger is requested to travel through the Eastern Coast of the Madras Presidency. It is a bit longer route no doubt, but it will be free from any difficulty. The swan is expected to go to Karṇāṭaka, Āndhra, Venkaṭācala, the river Kanakamukharī flowing near Añjanādri, Satyavatīkṣetra, Hastīśaila at Conjeevaram situated on the northern bank of the river Vegavatī, the Cola country, the Śvetaśaila, the Candrapuṣkarinī on the bank of which the Vṛkṣācala and the Pāṇḍyadeśa are situated. Thereafter comes the Tāmraparṇī, then the Subala mountain on the sea and finally the messenger reaches Ceylon. Sītā is found sitting under the cluster of green trees, where he conveys the message of Rāma.

The message is nothing new to us. But the poet aims at relating through an outburst of pathos, the Vedānta doctrines and philosophy only in a new garb. However, the poet has tried to make this poem attractive by the beauty of his composition. He saves it from becoming a dull and monotonous song.

HAṆSASANDEŚA OF RAGHUNATHADASA

The theme of the work is exactly the same as that of the Haṇsasandeśa of Rūpagosvāmī. Generally the dūtākāvyaś show the route first and then the message is conveyed but here the case is reverse. The poet relates the message in the first half of the poem and the second half contains the route.

The theme is as follows :

Rādhā, the chief cowherdess cannot stand the pangs of separation from Kṛṣṇa. She deposes Lalitā, her trusted friend, to convey her message to Kṛṣṇa, who is living in Mathurā. The messenger is requested to describe the day-by-day worsening plight of the Gopīs. Kṛṣṇa has deserted them and this has made them miserable. Every month that passes brings fresh pain and agony. Their condition thus is getting from bad to worse.

They want nothing from Kṛṣṇa except a sweet and kind glance towards them failing which, they may not be able to

keep their body and soul together.

HAṆSASANDEŚA OF PŪRṆASARASVATĪ

The poem is written on the model of the Meghadūta with this difference that herein the message is being sent by the beloved to the lover. The story goes that once a maiden of Kāñcīpura saw Lord Kṛṣṇa going out for a festival. She was charmed by his beauty but since he was residing at Vṛndāvana the poor beloved could not tolerate his separation. In utter confusion and dismay she sent a message to him. A swan was the messenger. The route from Kāñcī to Vṛndāvana is described in a very nice way.

The poet seems to have lived sometime between the 12th and the 16th centuries.

HAṆSASANDEŚA (ANONYMOUS)

The poem is in line with the other dūtakāvyas, so far as the Mandākrāntā metre is concerned but in the subject-matter it differs. The work is mainly concerned with Yoga and Vedānta. The complete poem consists of 101 verses and is divided into two parts having 50 and 51 verses respectively in the Pūrvasandēśa and the Uttarasandēśa.

The theme is :

A devotee transforms his soul into a swan and sends it to *Rudrabhakti* i.e. "Devotion to Śiva". Due to worldly engagements he remains away from his beloved, the *Bhakti* (Devotion). He, therefore, sets aside the worldly attachments and through his *Karma* regains his consciousness along with his beloved *Bhakti* (Devotion).

ŚUKASANDEŚA OF LAKṢMĪDĀSA

This small poem is attributed to one Nambudiri Brāhmaṇa Lakṣmīdāsa of Karinnampilly, a small village situated on the bank of the Alwaye river (in modern Travancore). He seems to have flourished in the 13th century. The poem is composed on the model of the Meghadūta. The message is sent through a parrot from Rāmeśvaram to Trikkanaṃatilakam near Cranganur. It is one of the most

important cities of the ancient Malabar kings. On his way, the messenger is to pass through Comorin and Trivandrum.

It is a nice lyric piece of one hundred and sixty two stanzas (having 73 and 89 verses in the first and second parts respectively). The hero is living in happiness in the sweet company of his beloved. In a dream he finds himself suddenly transported to Rāmeśvaram or Rāmasetu, the famous pilgrim-centre in South India. He then sees a parrot to whom he ascribes human organs, feelings and supernatural intelligence and through it sends his message to his wife at Guṇapuram.

It is a very interesting work but the message and the feeling of separation both take place in a dream.

KĪRADŪTA OF RĀMAGOPĀLA

This poem of 104 verses has been written by Rāmagopāla who is one of the scholars who composed *Vivādārṇavasetu* under the patronage of Rājā Kṛṣṇacandra of Navadvīpa.

The theme of this poem is the same as that of the other poems dealing with Kṛṣṇa and the Gopīs' love-affair. The messenger is a parrot who surely is the proper agency to convey the feelings and emotions of the Gopīs to Kṛṣṇa.

KOKASANDEŚA OF VIṢNUTRĀTA

Viṣṇutrāta was a Malabar poet who flourished in the 16th century. He lived in a village named Vazappilli. This poem contains 120 and 196 verses in the first and the second parts respectively in Mandākrāntā metre. The poet has followed the traditional method of the *dūtakāvyas*. The first part contains the description of the route to be followed in its travels by the messenger and the second part gives the message which is to be conveyed to the beloved.

A prince of Śrīvihārapura is being abducted by some unknown powerful magicians and taken away to a far off place. The prince does not know as to where he is and what has happened to him. He is much confused in a lonely place, and is not able to discover the identity of that place. He recollects the days spent in merry-making and

then he thinks of the condition of his beloved wife. The bewilderment at that is acute. In this sad plight the lover sees a *koka* flying there whom he requests to take his message to Kāmārāma, where his beloved lives. The *koka* goes to the beloved and tells her of the pangs of separation felt by the hero.

The poem is the longest one in the whole of the dūta-kāvya literature in Sanskrit.

CAKORASANDEŚA OF PERUSŪRI

It is a fine love-lyric which in essence follows the Meghadūta. The poet seems to have adorned the court of a king in Southern India, who had perhaps conferred upon him the title of Navīna Patañjali since the poet in the colophon calls himself Navīna Patañjali. The work is preserved as a fragment. The first part of the poem having 69 verses is complete in itself except a few omissions, but the second part having 40 verses is incomplete. Verses 9 to 20 are found intact while all the remaining verses have a lacuna.

The theme of the work is that a certain lover did not pay due respect to Vyāghrapāda while he went to bow before Sundareśa. The former cursed him and the poor lover had to sojourn at Kailāsa mountain. Only a month before the expiry of his term of curse, the lover sent a *cakora* through whom he sent his message to his beloved. The message, unlike in other Kāvya, is not verbal, but written on a tree bark with mineral dyes. The first part describes the journey from Kailāsa to Hala (the present Madhurā) the capital town of the Pāṇḍya country in the extreme south of India. The second part contains the message which is however incomplete.

The historical value of the first part is considerable, as there are descriptions of every important town, river and temple on the way. The second part (incomplete) describes the place where the beloved lives.

In the available part the author shows great qualities of literary craftsmanship and striking originality. His conceits are not unusually laboured, and the chiselled and bejewelled

phraseology gives an impression of rare beauty. The work can be ranked as an excellent production in the entire *dūtakāvya* literature.

MAYŪRASANDEŚA BY UDAYA

Prince Udaya was the famous author of *Kaumudī*, a commentary on the *locana* on the *Dhvanyāloka* of *Ānandavardhana*. This work is written on the model of *Kālidāsa's* *Meghadūta*. It contains 107 and 92 verses in the *Pūrva* and the *Uttarabhāgas* respectively.

The message is sent by a person named *Śrīkaṇṭha* of *Syānandūra* (modern Trivandrum) to his consort residing at *Annakara*, a small village in Cochin State.

The distance to be travelled is eight miles only. A peacock is the messenger for this job. The route is described in a very simple style. There is a lot on the way to attract the attention of the messenger. The *Uttarabhāga* contains the message. The lover explains his sad condition due to his separation from his beloved wife.

The work is a nice imitation of two or three works of the South Indian poets namely, the *Śukasandēśa*, the *Kokilasandēśa* and the *Unnirilīsandēśa* (Malayalam *Kāvya*). All of the three works are drawn upon but the presentation is the author's own. He has woven the material drawn from the three *dūtakāvyas* into an artistic whole. In that lies his novelty. The poem is rich in nice descriptions of some of the most important towns of South India. The style is very simple but the method of narration is not very appealing.

KAKADŪTA OF GAURAGOPĀLA ŚĪROMAṆI

This *Virahakāvya* was composed by *Gauragopāla* in 1811 Śaka year. The theme of this poem is the same as that of the *Aniladūta*. Herein the message is sent by the cowherdresses to *Kṛṣṇa*.

The poet does not like to rely upon the messengers engaged by other poets. They have used Cloud, Swan, Wind and so on to deliver their messages but he criticizes such *dūtas* and in a large number of verses argues the superiority

of Kāka to other dūtas. In his opinion only the Kāka is the fittest agency for *daūtya-karma* (conveyance of messages).

Unlike the other writers in the field, this poet does not worry much about the message of the messenger. He even does not care for the Gopīs. That is why he has failed to convey their message to Kṛṣṇa.

The poet seems to have composed this work to show off his skill in grammar and command of vocabulary.

BAKADŪTA OF MM. AJITNATHA NYĀYARATNA

Ajitanātha of Nadia is the author of this poem. Unfortunately only a fragmentary copy of this work is available. The poem is written in different metres. The route to be covered by the messenger runs from Kṛṣṇanagara to Navadvīpa.

Due to the absence of the initial part, the theme of this work cannot be made out with certainty but from the available stanzas one can gather that some Bhramarī whose husband is away sends her message through a *Baka*.

Bhramarī is perhaps some heroine deserted by her lover who in utter sorrow seeks to convey her feelings to the lover. She asks him to think of her pitiable condition and come back to her.

It is a good love-lyric and the poet seems to be at his best here.

ŚUNAKADŪTA BY K.B. KṚṢṆAMŪRTI ŚARMĀ

This small Sandeśakāvya of 30 verses in Mandākrāntā metre, has been composed by K. B. Kṛṣṇamūrti Śarmā of Deccan College Research Institute, Poona. The work was published in 1954 A.D. in the quarterly Sanskrit magazine 'Sarasvatī Suśamā' in the year 2011 of the Vikrama era.

The theme of the poem is :

Intending to present an ornament to his beloved who is the daughter of his maternal uncle, a lover breaks into the house of a rich man and steals some gold but is caught red-handed and is awarded one year's imprisonment. He is feeling sad but he cannot escape from that

stone-built jail. He, in utter helplessness calls upon a dog whom he pleases *with a base sweet cake* and entreats it to convey his feeling to his beloved consort who is residing at Mahiṣanagara¹, at a distance of six miles to the west of that jail. The lover further instructs the dog to go through a village having the Viṭṭhala temple. The message is intended to console the beloved for some time till the lover reaches there.

The jail term expires. The lover earns some money by business, purchases gold bangles and offers these to his beloved. Thus the poem ends with a happy reunion of the two lovers.

The poem is written in a very nice style on the model of Kālidāsa's Meghadūta. The poet mentions this fact in his last verse.

UDDHAVADŪTA OF MADHAVAKAVĪNDRA

Uddhavadūta, a nice poem of 141 verses is attributed to Mādhavakavīndra of Talitanagara, who composed it on the pattern of the other dūtakāvya. The entire poem is written in the Māndākrāntā metre.

The theme of this work is only an elaboration of the idea found in a verse of the Bhāgavatapurāṇa wherein Kṛṣṇa sends Uddhava as a messenger to his parents and Gopīs residing at Vṛndāvana.

This poem begins with an enquiry about a stranger who visits the Gopīs. The Gopīs soon come to know that Uddhava is a messenger sent by Śrī Kṛṣṇa. He brings a message for Gopīs who without hearing him abruptly begin to describe their own miserable condition due to their separation from their friend. Under an emotional stress one of the cowherdesses becomes senseless. Uddhava tries to bring her to senses. He is perplexed to note that he cannot deliver the message to the Gopīs who instead start cutting jokes with him and ask him to convey their message to Kṛṣṇa. Finally Uddhava tells Rādhā (the Gopī who fainted)

1. It is only an imaginary name.

that he has come with a message from Kṛṣṇa.

The messenger appreciates Rādhā's devotion to Kṛṣṇa.

UDDHAVASANDEŚA OF RŪPAGOSVAMIN

This poem was composed by a celebrated scholar named Rūpagosvāmin in the sixteenth century. It adopts the Mandākṛāntā metre. The entire poem consists of one hundred and thirty eight verses.

The subject-matter of this work is the same as that of the Uddhavadūta with slight variations. Kṛṣṇa persuades his friend Uddhava to convey his message to Gopīs residing at Vṛndāvana. The route from Mathurā to Vraja is related with a vivid description of some important things worth seeing on the way. Kṛṣṇa sends his best wishes for his friends and pays homage to his parents.

The poem gives an account of some sacred places, rivers, centres of pilgrimage and thus is very useful to trace out the geographical conditions in the contemporary period. The poet also gives a true history of the important towns flourishing in his time.

UDDHAVADŪTA OF RAJAVALLABHA MIŚRA

The credit for bringing to light this hitherto unknown dūtakāvya belongs to Pandit Baladeva Upādhyāya, formerly of the Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi. He has published a beautiful critique on this work which was published in the Indian Historical Quarterly, Vol. XII. 1936. We quote below some excerpts from it pertaining to the author of the work, its theme and literary excellence.

"The author of this dūtakāvya is Rājavallabha Miśra who has also written upon it a useful commentary.....The kāvya was finished on the fifth day of the bright fortnight in the month of Āśvina (September-October) in the Vikrama year 1889 (i. e. 1832 A.D.).

The poem consists of 115 verses in all. The last two verses written in *Anuṣṭubha* metre give the date of the composition and describe the object of the work. The remaining 83 verses are chiefly concerned with the theme which is ta-

ken from the life of Kṛṣṇa, a constant source of inspiration to poets. The poem opens with Uddhava seated under the *Kadamba* tree and surrounded by the young Gopīs of Vṛndāvana. The ladies naturally become exceedingly pleased to find the friend of their dear Kṛṣṇa and take the opportunity to give vent to their pent-up feelings of deep anguish at the indifference of their once most beloved companion and begin to shower bitter reproaches on the familiar scenes and objects of the Vṛndā groves. The Gopīs' lament begins in verse 3 and extends upto the 16th verse. Their reproaches are directed at first to the mount Govardhana (3), to the cuckoo (4 & 5), to the cloud (6-8), to the river Yamunā (9), to the black bee (10), to the animals of the forest like the deer and peacock (11), to the mango tree (12) and lastly to the Vṛndāvana itself which was once the scene of their confidential talks and meandering walks. This wail of the ladies moves Uddhava who is deeply pained at finding the love of the Gopīs disregarded by his own companion. He gives them the message of true and novel love which inspite of physical separation, always gets fixed and greatly developed under such trying circumstances (19).

After this Uddhava returns to Mathurā where he gives a full and glowing description of the noble sentiments of the Vraja Gopīs and the deep agony of their heart due to cold indifference shown to them by him. This speech of Uddhava forms the main body of this poem and extends from 21st to 82nd verse. The description of Gopīs' condition has its desired effect on Kṛṣṇa's mind, who is deeply touched (83). With this the poem comes to an end.

The author has achieved notable success in placing before his readers his own conception of true love and in describing the noble emotions of the human heart when separated from a person who is truly lovable.

PANTHADŪTA OF BHOLANATHA

This small work has been composed by a modern poet

named Bholānātha of Tikuri. It has 105 verses in Śārdula-vikrīḍita metre with the exception of two¹ which are in the Vasantatilakā metre. Two verses i.e. 63 and 64 have been found incomplete and verse 104 is altogether missing. The work has been published in the Prācyavāṇī Sanskrit Series, Calcutta.

The poet commences the work with a *maṅgalaśloka*², enunciating the philosophy of the Gītā.³ It would thus appear that the poet is an adherent of Vaiṣṇavism. Generally the dūtakāvyas are written in two parts, the first part giving the route, and the second the message but this poem is an exception, as the poet starts with the message abruptly after the benedictory verse.

The theme of the work is as follows :

Srikrṣṇa leaves Vṛndāvana and sojourns at Mathurā. He does not send news of his whereabouts. Nor does he send a message to the cowherdresses of Vraja with whom he has been playing throughout his childhood and whose sweet company he has been enjoying. Once Rādhā goes to the river Yamunā,⁴ and sees its blue waters. She loses her senses when she remembers Kṛṣṇa's absence, but comes to herself when her friends sprinkle fresh water of the holy river on her face. At the same time the Gopīs catch sight of a traveller bound for Mathurā through whom they like to send their message. They entreat him to tell Kṛṣṇa that it does not behove him to forget them altogether although he has spent his childhood days in the company of the sweet maidens of Mathurā. They are in a very miserable plight and Durgā stands witness to this fact. The Gopīs remark that Kṛṣṇa has perchance, lost his sense and sensibility since he has sucked Pūtana's⁵ milk. He should follow the example of Śiva who is of the form of Ardhanārīśvara. Kṛṣṇa is definitely a cunning⁶ lover, a hypocrite⁷, and really the son of rustic parents.⁸ One of the Gopīs continues to censure him⁹ till at last she falls

1 Verse 102, 103; 2. Verse No. 1 and 2; 3. *Yadā Yadā Hi Dharma-sya.....Gītā*; 4. Verse 5. Verse 20; 6. Verse 21; 7. Verse 22; 8. Verse 23; 9. Verse 24—30.

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The theme of the work is as follows :

Śrīkṛṣṇa leaves Vṛndāvana and sojourns at Mathurā. He does not send news of his whereabouts. Nor does he send a message to the cowherdesses of Vraja with whom he has been playing throughout his childhood and whose sweet company he has been enjoying. Once Rādhā goes to the river Yamunā,⁴ and sees its blue waters. She loses her senses when she remembers Kṛṣṇa's absence, but comes to herself when her friends sprinkle fresh water of the holy river on her face. At the same time the Gopīs catch sight of a traveller bound for Mathurā through whom they like to send their message. They entreat him to tell Kṛṣṇa that it does not behove him to forget them altogether although he has spent his childhood days in the company of the sweet maidens of Mathurā. They are in a very miserable plight and Durgā stands witness to this fact. The Gopīs remark that Kṛṣṇa has perchance, lost his sense and sensibility since he has sucked Pūtana's⁵ milk. He should follow the example of Śiva who is of the form of Ardhanārīśvara. Kṛṣṇa is definitely a cunning⁶ lover, a hypocrite⁷, and really the son of rustic parents.⁸ One of the Gopīs continues to censure him⁹ till at last she falls

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on the ground¹ senseless. Another gopī then continues the thread saying that Kubjā and Kṛṣṇa are both crooked ones and Fate has skilfully made a fit match although Kubjā cannot compare with Rādhā's feet.² Kṛṣṇa is a murderer³ of womenfolk,⁴ and a cowherd.⁵ He has attained a high rank only with the divine power so kindly bestowed upon him by Yaśodā; but he must not boast of his valour since the same mother who fed him on her milk has withdrawn her affection from him. After killing Kaṁsa he has enthroned Ugrasena clearly with a motive to *carouse* with his handsome maidens; and he is liable to be punished for this act.

Finally Rādhā declares that he is her only resort and that she is entirely devoted to him. Her only prayer is that she should remain his lovable consort in all the future births that she may have.

The idea of the poet as it would appear from the theme detailed above, is to propagate Viṣṇubhakti through this small love-lyric.

GOPĪDŪTA BY LAMBODARA VAIDYA

Lambodara vaidya appears to be a court-poet of the modern times. He enjoyed the patronage of a Rājā named Jagaddurlabha. The poem has not been published so far. In essentials this work is similar to the other dūtakāvya with the Kṛṣṇa-Gopī theme.

The message is being sent by the cowherdresses to Kṛṣṇa whom they see when he is going in his chariot. The dust raised by the high speed of the chariot falls into their eyes. The cowherdresses feel hurt and all of them fall senseless. After a time they send a messenger to convey their feelings towards their Lord.

NEMIDŪTA OF VIKRAMA

Vikrama, the author of the Nemidūta was the son of Asaṅga. He lived at Khambhat (Gujarat). Rṣabhadāsa, a celebrated poet in Gujarat was his brother. The last line in each

1. Verse 3, 31; 2. Verse 35; 3. Verse 38; 4. Verse 40;
5. Verse 42.

stanza in this work is taken from the Meghadūta of Kālidāsa. The poem begins with the message. No route is mentioned herein.

The first chapter contains a description of Neminātha's pleasures and activities in his boyhood. The second chapter describes the Vasanta or the spring season and the pleasures of the hero in that pleasant season. The third chapter gives a description of the marriage preparation of the hero. The last chapter contains a description of the grave and the sad state of Rājamātā, and the beloved consort of the hero, who sends her message to him asking him to abandon the idea of becoming a recluse.

The poem aims at placing before the readers the virtues of the Jaina Dharma.

MANODŪTA OF INDREŚA BHATṬA

This small poem of 45 verses in different metres is attributed to one Indreśa of Gokula who flourished towards the end of the 18th century. He belongs to the Vallabhācārya school.

The poet Indreśa sends his mind from Mathurā to Dvārakā where Kṛṣṇa resides. The route is described in the same style as in the other dūtakāvyas. The messenger is to go to Jaipur, Kotah, Kartarpur, Udaipur and such other places and reach Dvārakā. On the way it is to have the much sought for *darśana* of Kṛṣṇa in various forms. The mind is entreated to go to Kṛṣṇa and request him to call the poet to stay with him.

The poem is written in a beautiful style.

HRDAYADŪTA OF HARIHARA BHATṬA

Harihara Bhaṭṭa, the author of the Hṛdayadūta was a famous Vaiṣṇava of the Vallabhācārya school. He was born in a village named Devarṣigrāma (modern Deoria) near about the year 1560 of the Vikrama era.

Generally the dūtakāvyas are found in Mandākrānta metre but this poem is written in Vasantatilakā except the last verse which is in Sragdharā.

It is an excellent devotional poem. The subject-matter

is the message sent by the poet to Śrīkṛṣṇa. The poet's own heart is the messenger. The route to be followed by the *dūta* runs from Prayāga to Mathurā. The poet aims at giving expression to his own thoughts through the medium of a *dūtakāvya* and he criticises the Vāmamārga while he appreciates the Dakṣiṇamārga in the Nīrguṇa viśiṣṭa-mārga of Śrī Vallabhācārya. There are some verses in which original ideas have been expressed in a beautiful language. The poet has made a successful attempt to fashion the dry bones of philosophy and religion into a throbbing body with a glorious *kāvya*-soul full of inspiration and sentiment. The message commences after verse 104. The messenger is asked to request Lord Kṛṣṇa to allow him a place on his lotus-like feet.

MANODŪTA OF TRAILAṄGA VAJRAṆĀTHA

This poem of 102 verses in Śikhariṇī is written by Vajranātha who composed it in the year 1758 at Vṛndāvana. The poet adopts for his theme the famous episode of gambling in the court of the Kauravas at Hastināpura and the insult of Draupadī.

The poem begins with some benedictory verses. From the 11th verse onwards six verses are devoted to the visit of Duryodhana to Pāṇḍavas' Yajña. The Kuru king is amazed at the strange palace of the Pāṇḍavas who laughed at him. He comes back deeply sad and tells Śakuni the cause of his sorrow, who after consulting him prepares a scheme of playing dice with Yudhiṣṭhira who is not so experienced in it. The trap is laid to deprive him of his richer empire and even Draupadī. The scheme is put into operation and it achieves the desired result. Draupadī is dragged into the court by Duḥśāsana.

The real *dūtakāvya* commences from verse 133 where Draupadī in a state of utter helplessness asks her own mind to go to Dvārakā and request Kṛṣṇa to come and help. Lord Kṛṣṇa hurries up and furnishes *sarīs* of multifarious designs and thus saves her from a grave situation. The poem

ends in praise of Viṣṇu worship which is the only path to achieve eternal peace.

The poem is a labyrinth of a queer type where the poet, while describing the court of Yudhiṣṭhira, is busy with demonstrating his knowledge of and skill in astrology, medicine, military science, architecture, mīmāṃsā, grammar, etc. But the work is not lacking in rhetorical excellence. Qualities of composition such as anuprāsa, cohesion, lucidity and pregnancy of expression are found throughout the work. The figures of speech have enriched and embellished the composition. Few poets could be so talented as the author. Though modelled on the Meghadūta this dūtakāvya is, as a matter of fact, least indebted to it.

MANODŪTA OF VIṢṆUDĀSA

Viṣṇudāsa, one of the best known poets of Bengal flourished in the 15th century. He was the saint-poet closely related to Caitanyadeva. He composed this poem of 101 stanzas in order to convey his feelings to the common people. The message and the messenger are both super-human.

The theme of this work is as follows :

After having studied the sacred books like the Purāṇas the poet feels that one must fully devote oneself to penance and worship. In the beginning the poet thinks of his own deeds and then makes up his mind to seek refuge in Viṣṇu's worship. His own mind is the messenger whom he tells the route and the charm of the *Viṣṇubhakti*. He asks the messenger to go through Gokula, Yamunā, Vṛndāvana and reach Kṛṣṇa. In the end he explains his message of atonement and longing for Bhakti in order to attain emancipation.

MANODŪTA OF RAMAŚARMA

Only a fragmentary copy of this work is available with the Vaṅgiya Sāhitya Pariṣad, Calcutta. From the colophon of this poem we gather that the work is a messenger-poem written in a very simple style though it is not free from some minor lapses which confuse the sense and mar the beauty of some of the stanzas.

The theme of the work is :

The poet is a great scholar having complete faith in and true devotion to Kṛṣṇa. He is absorbed in *Bhakti*. In his contemplative mood he experiences a catechism, a discussion in question and answer-form, between the mind and a *Dviḥja*. The mind and the *Dviḥja* discuss the *Viṣṇubhakti*. The *Dviḥja* requests the mind to convey his message to Kṛṣṇa to be kind to his devotees. The *Dviḥja* reveals some noble virtues of the mind while conveying its message to Kṛṣṇa.

ŚĪLADŪTA OF CARITRASUNDARAGĀṆĪ

It is a fine poem composed by a learned Jaina poet named Caritrasundaragāṇī having 131 verses in Śikhariṇī metre. The method adopted by the poet is very attractive and simple. He has interwoven the last line of each verse of the Meghadūta in all of his stanzas.

The story runs as follows :

Prince Sthūlabhadra was enjoying his days in the sweet company of his beloved wife Koṣā. Feeling very sad due to the sudden demise of his father, he abstains from the sensuous pleasures and abruptly brushes aside all the worldly attachments. He considers all the wealth, and the relations etc. to be debasing objects and observes celibacy. As a recluse he sojourns with a saint named Bhadrabāhu, his venerable Guru.

Koṣā, his devoted consort, in utter despair requests him to remain with her. She tries to attract him by narrating the charms and the pleasures of life. She suggests him to stay in his own capital where he has a very nice pleasure-hill and a temple built by his predecessors with great labour and carry on with his worship there. But by dint of his forceful arguments and his noble character the saint atlast moulds his wife to accept the path of emancipation. In the end she also leaves her home and becomes a true votaress of her husband and embraces Jainism.

The object of the poet is to propagate the canons and the virtues of the Jaina religion.

VAṆMAṆḌANAGUṆADŪTA OF VIREŚVARA

This work is attributed to Vireśvara. This poem is written in the Śārdulavikrīḍita except the last verse which is in Mālinī. The total number of verses is 201.

Unlike other dūtakāvyas which are generally Virahakāvyas, this work is written in a different style and with a different motive.

The subject-matter of the work is :—

The poet longs to win the sympathy and patronage of a king named Bhīmasena, and sends him his own poetic quality as a messenger, though as an intermediary, a learned Brāhmaṇa is engaged for this work. The Guṇadūta is to go from Rāgapura to Kālībhatti (in Māyāpura) and complete the journey in five days. The Guṇadūta, enroute to the place of destination, passes the first night at Maṇḍapa village, the second with Navīsariha, and the third at Prātaśvenapura. The fourth night will be spent under the magnanimous hospitality of Oṃkāra of Cārava and his younger brother Rāmaji. On the last day before the messenger reaches Kālībhatti, he is to relate the message of the poor poet first to Daśaratha, the royal priest, and then under his advice and by his benign grace to king Bhīmasena.

The poet is a great grammarian and a perfect master of Sanskrit poetics. He has created his own independent theme and is under least obligation to his predecessors.

BHAKTIDŪTA OF KALĪPRASADA

This small poem having 23 stanzas has been composed by a modern Pandit named Kālīprasāda.

It deals with the way to emancipation. The message is sent through *Bhakti* (devotion).

TULASĪDŪTA OF TRILOCANA

Tulasīdūta, a love-lyric of 55 verses is attributed to Trilocana who composed it in 1933 Vikrama era i.e. 1805 A.D.

Like some other dūtakāvyas the Tulasīdūta is also written on Kṛṣṇa and Gopis' love-affairs. Kṛṣṇa has gone to

Madhopur and the cowherdesses sit together and discuss among themselves this desertion. They see a Tulasī plant in the garden through which they choose to convey their feelings to Kṛṣṇa. The last twenty verses are concerned with the message which the Tulasī plant is requested to convey.

The poet has not described the route to be followed by the messenger but this is definitely said that it is not to go all by itself. The Gopīs send two guards to escort their messenger. One is the sandalwood fragrance and the second is their own *Bhakti*. The gopīs request the messenger to relate their message to Kṛṣṇa when he is all alone and in seclusion and not when he is thirsty, hungry or going to bed.

PADMADŪTA OF SIDDHANĀTHA VIDYĀVĀGIŚA

Padmadūta is a poem of 62 verses by Siddhanātha in Mandākṛāntā metre.

The theme of the poem is :

Sītā is in confinement at Laṅkā. She is suffering from the pangs of separation. To her good luck she, through some reliable source, hears that Rāma is building a bridge over the sea and will reach Laṅkā as soon as it is completed.

The news blazes the dimly flickering love-candle and Sītā gets very sad. She cannot stay without her husband but she is helpless. Fortunately she sees a *padma* (lotus). She requests it to convey her feelings to Rāma.

The poet is a Naiyāyika. The philosophical and even the autobiographical portions of this work make a difficult reading. The work has not been commented upon so far.

The poem is also a strange riddle. The first 12 verses deal with objects which arouse the passion of the heroine. Then one verse describes the dūta-darśana. A number of verses are devoted merely to the praise of the lotus. Then follows a description of the virtues of the hero and his courageous deeds. It is only in the last verse that the reader comes to know of the message.

There is no mention of the route followed by the messenger.

PĀDAPADŪTA OF GOPENDRANĀTHA

This poem is attributed to Gopendranātha of Navadvīpa.

The poet reveals that Śrī Gaurāṅga has gone to Nīlaśaila. His dear wife is suffering from the pangs of separation. She wants to convey her feelings to Śrī Gaurāṅga through a *nimba* tree growing in her courtyard. The messenger is to travel from Navadvīpa to Śrīkṣetra via Nadia state, Śāntipura, Trivenī, Sundaravana, Bay of Bengal, Vaitaraṇī river and such other places.

MUDGARADŪTA OF RĀMAVATARA ŚARMA

This is a modern work written by a learned scholar. It is a parody of 148 verses having digs at the modern society. Mūrkhadēva (a stupid) does not believe in having a progeny since his father will serve the purpose of his son. Mūrkhadēva therefore, observes celibacy and abstinence but he will live in the Kāmagiri Āśramas. For him even the mortal frames of learned scholars are unchaste. He sends a messenger to his 'widow' wife to tell her of his own state. The route for the messenger is very long. The messenger shall go to New York, Victoria Terminus, Persian Gulf, Red Sea, France, Switzerland, the Mediterranean Sea, Egypt, Italy, Gibraltar, Spain and so on.

The poem is very interesting and offers a well-considered criticism of all the evils prevailing in the modern Hindu society. The poet follows the traditional method of the dūtakāvyas and interweaves phrases and lines from the Meghadūta into different stanzas of his work.

PADĀṆKADŪTA OF ŚRĪKṚṢṆA SARVABHAUMA

This small poem contains 46 verses in the Mandākrāntā metre. It was composed at the instance of King Raghurāma Rāya who ruled over Bengal in the beginning of the 17th century. The poet was a famous scholar of the time and wrote a large number of other works of vital importance.

The theme of the work is :

Rādhā is feeling sad since Kṛṣṇa left for Mathurā. The pangs of separation are daily becoming acute, and the Gopīs consider his stay at Vṛndāvana to be a tragedy. Kṛṣṇa had promised to come back soon to the Gopīs but now it appears that it was only a hoax. Gopīs send their 'mind' as a messenger but it does not turn up. Desire, on account of its heavy weight cannot serve the purpose of Gopīs. The Gopīs, therefore, decide to send the foot-print of Kṛṣṇa as a messenger and ask it to go to Mathurā or Gokula wherever Kṛṣṇa may be found.

The messenger is requested to go to their cunning lover and entreat him to come back failing which Rādhā would die.

The main interest of the work lies in the appropriate use of the Nyāyaparibhāṣās for conveying poetic concepts.

GHATAKARPARA-YAMAKA-KĀVYA

Ghaṭakarpāra holds a high position among the poets of Sanskrit. He is considered to be one of the nine gems of the court of Yaśodharmadeva Vikramāditya, and a contemporary of Kālidāsa.

Although this Yamakakāvya consists of 23 verses only, it is a fine specimen of Sandeśakāvya. The difference between the Meghadūta and this kāvya is that here the message is being sent by a lady to her lover. The messenger is the same in both the works. The time of sending the message is the rainy season but the duration of separation is different. The lady suffers a month's separation while Kālidāsa's Yakṣa full one year's.

The poem begins with the description of the rainy season (the first six verses). The following six verses are addressed to the cloud. Then the lady narrates the message in some verses followed by others which are her own soliloquy. The last two verses give the poet's own identity, etc.

The poem has won appreciation of a large number of learned scholars like Śaṅkara, Vidyānātha, Divākara and Abhinavagupta.

GEOGRAPHICAL IMPORTANCE OF THE DŪTAKĀVYAS

The geographical importance of the dūtakāvyas cannot be over-estimated. As most of the dūtakāvyas are modelled on the Meghadūta of Kālidāsa they faithfully follow its structure and do not usually omit its essential points. As Kālidāsa has shown the route which the cloud had to follow in its movement from Rāmagiri to Alakāpurī, the authors of the other dūtakāvyas too, (some of them of course) were not found wanting in the mention of the routes to be followed by their respective *dūtas*. As these poets have gone in for all kinds of different *dūtas* so they have described different routes too with the result that they throw a flood of light on the geography and the topography of the country in the different periods during which the dūtakāvyas continued to be produced in its various parts. We may mention below some of the dūtakāvyas and the routes shown in them.

MEGHADŪTA OF KĀLIDĀSA

Journey : Rāmagiri—Alakā

Route : Rāmagiri—the plateau of Māla—Mount Āmrakūṭa—river Narmadā—Daśārṇa country—Vidiśā on the river Vetravatī—rivers Sindhu and Nirvindhya—the country of Avanti—Ujjayinī—the stream Gambhīrā—Devagiri hill—the river Carmaṇvatī—the region of Daśapura—the country of Brahmāvarta and Kurukṣetra—the river Sarasvatī—Kanakhala—the Mānasa Lake—the Mount Kailāsa—the city of Alakā.

HAṆSADŪTA OF VĀMANA BHATṬA BĀṆA

Journey : Malaya range—Alakā

Route : Malaya range (Travancore range)—Tāmraparṇī—Madurā—Kāverī—Śrīraṅgam—Cola country—Aruṇācala—Kāñcī—Kāla-hasti-mandira—Kanakamukharī (river)—Kīṣṇavenī (river)—Tuṅgabhadra

—Godāvarī—Pañcavaṭī—Vindhyaśāla—Sarayū—
Gaṇḍakī—Krauñcaparvata.

PAVANADŪTA OF DHOYI

Journey : Malaya range—Vijayapura.

Route : Malaya range—Pāṇḍya country—Tāmraparṇī—Uragapura (Uraiyur)—Setubandha Rāmeśvara—Kāñcīpura—Kāverī—the mount Malayavat—Pañcāpsaras (lake)—Āndhra country—Godāvarī—the city of Kalinga—Vindhya Pradeśa—Narmadā—Yayātinagarī—Suhmadeśa—Trivenī—Vijayanagara (Bengal), the capital of King Lakṣmaṇasena.

HAṆSASANDEŚA OF VEDĀNTADEŚIKA

Journey : Mount Malayavat—Laṅkā.

Route : The mount Malayavat—Añjanādri (Veṅkaṭādri)—Kanakamukharī (river)—Tuṇḍirapradeśa—Satyavratakṣetra—Kāñcī—Vegā (river)—Hastīśaila—Cola country—the white mountain (Śvetaśaila) Kāverī—Śrīraṅgam—Pāṇḍya country—Vṛṣabhādri—Tāmraparṇī—the mount—Malaya—the mount Suvela (on the shore or the middle of the ocean)—Laṅkā.

ŚUKASANDEŚA OF LAKŚMIDĀSA

Journey : Rāmeśvaram—Guṇakāpuram (Trikkāṇāmatilakam).

Route : Setubandha Rāmeśvaram—along the bank of the ocean—Tāmraparṇī (river)—Maṇaṅlūr, the capital of the Pāṇḍya kings (Manalor)—Sahyaparvata—Kerala country—Syānandūra—(Trivandrum) Kulpurī—(capital of the Kūpaka kings) Kolambadeśa (Quilon)—Vallabhagrāma (Tiruvalla)—Bimbali—Sindhudvīpa (the cantonment of Bimbali kings) (Katalaturuttu) Phullā (river)—Subrahmaṇya mandira—Paśupatikṣetra—Cūrṇī (Alwaye or Periyar)—Mahodayapurī (Tiruvancikkulam), the capital of Kerala kings—Guṇakāpurī (Trikkāṇāmatilakam).

KOKILASANDEŚA OF UDDAṆḌA

Journey : Kāñcī—Jayantamaṅgala.

Route : Kāñcī—Kampā river—Kṣīrasindhunadī (Palar)—Cola country—Bilvakṣetra—Kāverī—Hosaladeśa—La-kṣmīnārāyaṇapura—Sahya mountain—Kerala region—Vāṇmayī (river)—Puralī (Kottayam) Śam-baradeśa—Koladeśa—Kukkuṭakroḍa (Calicut) Pra-kāśadeśa—(Vekkattunar)—Śvetāraṇya (Tripran-gor)—Nīlā (river)—the region of Netranārāyaṇīya Brāhmaṇas—the Raṇakhala region (Porkal)—Vṛṣa-purī—Khalapurī (Tiruvancikkul) Saṅgamagrāma (Iringalakkut)—Kurumbavana—Añjanakhalapurī (Tiruvancikkul)—Cūrṇī (river)—Jayantamaṅgala (Cannaṁangala).

INDUDŪTA OF VINAYAVIJAYAGAṆI

Journey : Yodhapura—Sūrat.

Route : Yodhapura (Jodhpur)—the mount Suvarṇagiri—the temples of Mahāvīra and Pārśvanātha—Jālandhara (Jalor)—(the city of) Rohiṇī—the mount Arbuda (Mount Abu)—Acalaparvata—Jaina temple of king Kumārapāla—Sindhupuram on the banks of the river Sarasvatī—the river Sābhramatī (Sabarmatī) Rājadraṅga (Ahmedabad)—the city of Vāṭapadrī (Baroda)—Narmadā—Bhṛgupura (Broach)—the river Tāpī (Tāpti)—Sūryapura (Sūrat).

MEGHADŪTASAMASYĀLEKHA OF MEGHAVIJAYA

Journey : Aurangabad—Dvīpapurī (Div Bandor, Diu, Gujarat).

Route : Navyaraṅgapurī (Aurangabad)—the mount Deva-giri—the city of Devagiri—the mount Solor—the mount Tuṅgilā—the river Tāpī—Bhṛgupura (Broach)—Narmadā—the river Mahī—Siddha-śaila—Śatruñjaya (a Jaina pilgrim centre)—Dvīpapūrī (Diu).

MAYŪRASANDEŚA OF UDAYA

Journey : Trivandrum—Kottayam.

Route : Trivandrum—along the ocean—Viṣṇu temple at Varkala—Quilon—Ingudī country—the capital city

of Kaṇṭiyūr—a Kālī temple and the Vallabha temple—the Manikaṇṭha temple—Vaṅculā (river)—Kottayam.

KOKASANDEŚA OF VIṢṆUTRĀTA

Journey : Vihārapurī to Kāmārāmā.

Route : Vihārapurī—Varaṇā—the lake of Sundara—the capital city of Sacandrā—the city of Śāntākārā—Ramyā (the river)—the region of Lokabhadra Śiva—Ayodhyā—Kāmārāmā.

THE ANYOKTIS IN THE VASIṢṬHA RAMAYANA

Of the figures of speech *Anyokti* is one of which some of the most interesting examples are to be met with in the Vāsiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa. *Anyokti* is an indirect way of saying things which is nevertheless effective. There are occasions when we do not want to say something directly to a person. It may be discourteous, may wound his vanity, may provoke his anger and embitter our relations with him. Similarly if some pleasant references are made to a person at his very face it may tantamount to a crude form of sycophancy. To avoid this, a resort is made to the poetical device called *Anyokti*. Here some other thing, may-be a bird, a tree or for that matter any kind of natural phenomenon is employed as a medium through which the poet expresses his feelings. It is not this some other thing directly addressed and spoken of that is meant. It is another person who is in reality addressed and sought to be described. This oblique way of saying things has been very popular with Sanskrit poets. Sanskrit literature abounds in some of the finest *Anyoktis* which for their charm and appeal remain unrivalled. The *Anyoktis* of Paṇḍitarāja Jagannātha have become a household word in the Sanskrit world. Since ages the *Anyokti* form of poetry has caught the imagination of the people and the poets have been taking special delight in it. They have been taking to this form of writing even for the purpose of developing a point or enunciating a principle. It is for this purpose that a large number of *Anyoktis* have been written in Sanskrit. There are quite a good number of them written for another purpose too, viz., for praising the kings or patrons and for deriding them. In the Vāsiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa it is the latter variety of *Anyoktis* which is generally met with. There are, especially in the second half of the Nirvāṇapra-

karaṇa, some of the finest *Anyoktis*, a few dealing with cuckoos, crows and other birds and a few others dealing with miscellaneous things. Some of the finest examples of the *Anyoktis* in the *Vāsiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa* are given below :

kiṃ kiṃ kokila kūjasi drutaravaṃ haṛṣāt samullāsitaṃ
grīvakoṭarataḥ praveśaya punar mā bhūc ciraṃ te bhramaḥ |
uddāmaiḥ kusumair nirantarataṃ nedaṃ madhor jṃmbhitaṃ
hemantena kṛtās tuṣāranikaraiḥ śuṣkā amī pādapāḥ. ||¹

"O cuckoo, why are you crying aloud with joy? Your cooings you should withdraw to the cavity of your throat. Do not be under an illusion for long. This is not the advent of the spring season which is characterized by the thickness of the wildly growing flowers. These trees have been made dry by winter by its masses of snow." Here a cuckoo is asked to stop its cooings for it is winter and not spring. The implication here is that there is a time and a place even for the sweetest expressions, such as the warbling of a cuckoo and that one should not go on telling the non-receptive audience of one's qualities and attainments etc. in a moment of excitement. When the people around are in no mood to listen or are otherwise not interested, one should better keep quiet and not waste one's breath; for words uttered inopportunely may not only be tasteless, but also distasteful.

The same idea has been expressed in the following very interesting *Anyokti* :

bhrātaḥ kokila kūjitair alam alam nāyāty anarghyo guṇas
tuṣṇīm āśva viśr̥ṇaparnapataḥ lacchanne kvacit koṭare |
uddāmadrumakandare kaṭuraṭatkaḥ kāvalisaṃkulaḥ
kālo' yaṃ śīśirasya samprati sakhe nāyaṃ vasantotsavaḥ ||²
"O brother cuckoo ! stop your cooing. (For) hereby you do not acquire a precious quality. Keep mum (lying) somewhere in a hollow (of a tree) covered with a layer of withered leaves, in the recesses of the lofty trees. O friend, this is not the festival of spring. It is the time of winter, full of rows of crows producing jarring notes".

1. vi (ii). 116. 77. 2. vi (ii). 215.80.

In the following verse too, the poet gives us an equally charming and interesting *Anyokti*. The idea that he wants to convey is that when a person is seen to be promising, many come forward to claim him for themselves, It is this clamour for owning him that presents the most disgusting sight. This idea is put by the poet in the form of the *Anyokti*. A young one of a cuckoo is, as soon as it tries to win the hearts of others by its sweet notes, claimed as its off-spring by a crow which makes a sudden appearance in a pleasure-grove where the audience which had begun to enjoy the sweet notes of the cuckoo, feels perturbed and disappointed. The verse which presents this *Anyokti* runs thus :—

vācā komalayā sukokilaśiśuḥ kalyāṇakalpām kathām
sarvāvarjanam ārjavena kurute yāvat puro rāgiṇām ।
tāvan mattanayo' yam ity avirataṁ drāṅkārabhīmāravair
dhvāṅkṣeṇopavane nipatya nabhasaḥ sarve kṛtā nīrasāḥ ॥¹

“As soon as the young one of a cuckoo with its tender notes makes in all its innocence a blissful utterance captivating one and all in the presence of music-loving, anxious audience, there appears from the sky quite suddenly a crow which with its ceaseless harsh cries claims it to be its own off-spring. At this every body present in the garden feels upset and sad.”

Another verse where a cuckoo is used as the medium of the *Anyokti* is as follows :

śrotrotsavam tava kalaṁ kalakaṇṭha ko' tra
nādaṁ śṛṇoti iti vighrahasandhidūtam ।
kākair ulukakalahair iha gulmakeṣu
kreṅkāragharghararavaiḥ śrutir āgatāstam ॥²

“O sweet-throated cuckoo ! who is there to listen to your sweet notes, the feast to the ears, the harbinger of peace in love quarrels ? Here in these shrubs the ears have become deafened by the fights among crows and owls.” The idea here is that the din and turmoil that is raised by the petty people is responsible many a time for turning the

1. vi (ii). 116. 76. 2. vi (ii) 116. 75.

people's minds away from the finer things of life. The author of the *Vāsiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa* has been able to give expression to this idea most effectively. It could not have been better expressed.

Of the *Anyoktis* where a crow is employed as the medium for propounding some truth, mention may here be made of the two which are found in the canto one hundred and sixteenth of the second half of the sixth book which has preserved for us a few of the finest *Anyoktis* of the Sanskrit literature. One such we have where a crow is said to cause headache to a person by drowning the humming of the bees by its harsh cries. The verse purports to convey the idea that a loud noise very often drowns sweet words of reason. A wise man may not be able to create a loud noise. In his soft accents he may say some words of profound wisdom which may go unheard, drowned by the thunders of the fools. This is really the most distressing sight. A sensible man cannot but feel sorry for this state of affairs in society where those who speak the loudest come to hold the stage while the others, profoundly learned and immensely wise are elbowed out. Nobody listens to them or rather, nobody is allowed to listen to them. The verse where this interesting *Anyokti* is found is:

kākaka kaṭukalkārava
kavalitaṅgaṇa kardame bhraman sarasi |
antarayasi madhuparavaṃ
yad ato me śirasi phalabhūtaḥ ||¹

"O you wretch of a crow! since you have swallowed up the virtues (of the swan and others) with your harsh worthless cries, and since you drown the humming of the bees (by your loud noise), while moving about in the mud of a pond, you are a source of headache to me."

The second one is where an interesting question is put to a crow. We see that a crow is by nature very suspicious. It does not tolerate its share being taken by birds

I. vi. (ii). 116. 63.

other than those of its own species. But when it comes to the young one of a cuckoo all its cleverness departs and it begins to rear it as its own off-spring. This makes it a butt of ridicule. The idea is that you may be very discreet about things in general but when it comes to a thing which you are fond of, for which you have a passion, all your reason may forsake you. Love of offspring is a passion common to all life. This *Anyokti* is found in the following verse :

he kāka karkaśarava krakacaikacihna
tādr̥k svaśaṅkanam api kva nu te' dya yātam ।
kasmād anarthakam idaṃ pikaṇākaṃ eka-
putrāśayā tad api te hy upahāsasiddhyai ॥¹

"O you crow ! you caw harshly and share the distinctive nature of a saw (you are as sharp as a saw). Where has gone today that apprehensiveness of yours that you are bringing up uselessly this young one of a cuckoo in the hope of obtaining only one off-spring, which Nature has vouchsafed to you, you being *ekaputra* or *sakṛtpraja*. This makes a fit object for ridicule.

Of the *Anyoktis* having a cloud as the medium, mention may be made here of the two which are so interesting and remarkable that they can stand comparison with some of the very best of their kind in the whole of the Sanskrit literature. One of them is :

śrīmadvṛtta mahāśayātapaḥara proccair gabhīrākṛte bhūbhṛ-
nmūrdhasu bhūṣaṇaṃ bhavasi bho bhūme rasaikāspadam ।
etat tu kṣapayen manāṅsi yad idaṃ megha tvayā varṣatā
harṣād ūṣarapalvalasthalataruṣv ambhovibhāgakramaḥ ॥²

"O cloud ! you are an ornament on the heads of the mountains. You are the source of the water on the earth. You have a brilliant conduct. You are magnanimous. You remove the heat. Your appearance is very solemn. But (inspite of all these qualities) this will cause pain to the minds of the people when in your joy you send showers, you divide your waters equally between fallow lands.

I. vi (ii), 116. 70. 2. vi (ii), 116. 50.

ponds, land and trees”.

In other words in the garb of a cloud a person is reproached here who, while giving, does not make distinction between the deserving and the undeserving. If a person like a cloud which pours its waters at a place where they are not wanted and go waste, gives liberally without giving due thought to the qualities and the requirements of the person who receives the gift, cannot earn a good name. His charity may be misused by the unscrupulous and in that case the donor cannot escape the blame, however well-meaning he may be. While doing a good turn pick-and-choose is what is really necessary. When there is such a pick-and-choose then the good work done by the donor will earn him the appreciation of all and the possibility of a good thing leading to evil results would also be obviated.

The second is :

nityaṃ snāsi sutīrthavārivisarair uccaiḥ padastho' mbuda
śuddhaḥ san vipināvanau nivasasi prārabdhamaunavrataḥ ।
riktasyāpy atikāntir eva bhavataḥ kāyāśrayā lakṣyate
protthāyāsanīm ātanoṣi kim idaṃ tucchaṃ tavāceṣṭitam ॥¹

“O cloud ! you always take bath in the expansive waters of the holy places sitting high up. Thus purified, you undertake a vow of silence and live in forest lands. Even when you are emptied of your contents, your body appears very lustrous. (But) what is this mean act of yours that you get up and produce (smashing) lightning and thunder (thundering noise) ?” Here in this verse in the garb of the cloud some-body is reproached for inconsistency in, and impropriety of conduct and that is what makes it an *Anyokti*. A person may be virtuous, pure, self-restrained and generous. His conduct should consist of these virtues. When generous, he should be sweet as well. He should not preface his act of making gifts with harsh words for the recipients. These will humiliate them and will take the grace out of his charity. As a matter of fact, the works on social ethics

1. vi (ii). 186. 51.

point out that while giving something in charity one should not be actuated even by an element of pity for the suppliant. Even that is considered undesirable, but if, in addition to this, one were to use harsh words, that would certainly be uncharitable.

Another verse which employs a crow for an *Anyokti* is as follows :

ālōkya paṅkajavane saviḷāsavantam
kākaṃ kalaṅkasadṛśaṃ bhr̥śam āraṭantam ।
hā kaṣṭhaśabdaśatanaṣṭaviceṣṭito yo
no rodiri krakacakena vidāryatām saḥ ॥¹

"Seeing a crow looking like a dark spot, sporting in a lotus-bed and continuously crying, a person who, though rendered inactive by hundreds of the jarring notes does not weep, let him be torn asunder by a saw". The implication of the *Anyokti* is that the sight of a mean and ignoble person occupying a place, which in the fitness of things belongs to the noble, and acting disgustfully should sadden and distress any sensible person. A person who remains unmoved, deserves all contempt and condemnation.

There are a few beautiful and charming *Anyoktis* of *Akāśa* or the sky in the Vāsiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa. In one of these the sky, though possessing all good qualities is said to have one bad thing about it, which is, that it sheds burning heat. The idea is that a person should be good-natured, amiable and sweet apart from his being possessed of many other qualities and merits. But if he is not amiable and flies into rage, thereby creating unnecessary heat, all his other qualities will be of no avail. The absence of this one quality is enough to lower him in public estimation. This interesting *Anyokti* is found in the following verse :

kalpābhradrumavīrudunnatidṛśāṃ kartāsi dhartāsi ca
ākāśendughanārkakinnaramarutskandhāmarāṇāṃ api ।
sarvaṃ ramyam asaṅkulāśaya samasvacchasvabhāvasya te yat
tv etad dahanatvam aṅga tad aho mukhyāya khedāya naḥ ॥²

1. V (ii) 116. 71. 2. VI. (ii) 116. 114.

"O sky! you lead to the growth of trees, creepers and bring forth clouds at the time of universal destruction and you sustain the moon, the sun, the *Kinnaras*, the *Marut-Skandhas* and the gods. O magnanimous one, of you who have an even and clean nature everything else is charming, but that you shed burning heat is the cause of our great torment."

We have another equally beautiful *Anyokti* of the sky. The sky and through that medium some other thing also is the object of censure here. The sky merits censure, for it allows a cloud to rest on it and sends down a shower of hail for pounding people below, implying that however high and noble a person may be he should not allow others, who may use his patronage for oppressing the people, to surround him. They will bring him a bad name. These underlings very often prove the greatest drags on the reputation and the prestige of the high-placed persons who may have personally nothing reproachable about them. It is not an uncommon sight in this world to see the petty officials of the village and district levels working under the protective shadows of their superiors or the provincial government bringing disrepute to the entire administrative machinery by their oppressive acts and third-degree methods. That these small fry are allowed protection by the superiors proves the greatest weakness of them. Such a beautiful all-time truth is enunciated by the author of the *Vāsiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa* in the following verse :

ākāśa kāśam asi nirmalam accham uccair-
adhāra unnatatayottamam uttamānām |
tvām etya kin tu viralaṃ karakāghano' yaṃ
lokaṃ vimardayati tena paro' si nīcaiḥ ||¹

"O sky! you are shining, pure and clean. On account of your loftiness you are the substratum of the best. But you are the meanest of all too, because considering that you have a space, a hail-showering cloud resorts to you and pounds

1. VI. (ii). 116. 15.

the people (by a shower of hail).

Yet another similarly interesting *Anyokti* is found in the verse :

ākāśa karṣakaṣa eva nikarṣaṇaṃ te
manye ciraṃ samucitaṃ na tu kiñcid anyat ।
śūnyo' si yaj jaladhararkṣavimānacandra-
sūryānilān vahasi bhāsi na cārthaśūnyaḥ ॥¹

"O sky ! I think, what is proper for you is that you should be rubbed for quite sometime on the touch-stone and nothing else, for even though a void you carry on you the clouds, the stars, the aerial cars, the moon, the sun and the air and thus appear not to be a void."

The poet means to say that the nature of things and persons is sometimes difficult to ascertain. Particularly the nature of the great is inscrutable. It is undefinable, for it is tinctured by inconsistencies, by the opposites which go ill together. Apparently stern, a great person may be really gentle ; apparently callous, he may be full of the milk of human kindness ; apparently short-sighted, he may be really far-sighted, seeing things beyond the ken of ordinary mortals. Surely his nature is a complex which defies analysis and baffles comprehension. Truly has the poet Bhavabhūti observed :

vajrād api kaṭhorāṇi mṛdūni kusumād api ।
lokottarāṇāṃ cetāṃsi ko nu vijñātum arhati ॥²

"Who can understand the heart of the great people which is at once harder than a thunderbolt and softer than a flower ?"

It is in this context that the authors of the Dharma-sūtras declare : "na devacaritaṃ caret".

After this we have in the Vāsiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa an interesting *Anyokti* where the sky is said to assume a number of forms and by so doing suggests a clever person whose ways are rather unpredictable. Even the wise will not be able to predict his movements. His mind will run in devious ways. He will adopt different postures in different

1. VI (ii) 116. 16. 2. Uttararāmacaritaṃ, II. 7.

places. What his real self is nobody will ever be able to find out. His character and conduct will always remain an enigma, however closely and minutely he may be watched. This fundamental truth is expressed in the Vāsiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa in the following verse :

ahni prakāśam asi raktavapur dinānte
yāmāsu kṛṣṇam atha cākhilavasturiktam ।
nityaṃ na kiñcid api sad vahasīti māyām
na vyoma veti viduṣo' pi viceṣṭitam te ॥

"You are resplendent by day, assume a red form in the evening, are dark and empty, (as it were) of all things at night. Although you are ever nothing, you always carry (the stars, the moon etc.) on you. O sky, even though you are wise nobody knows your clever movements¹."

Apart from the *Anyoktis* cited above there are many others which are no less interesting and charming. As a matter of fact, nearly the whole of the one hundred and sixteenth canto of the sixth book is replete with verses which approximate in character to the *Anyokti*. This very well helps bring out the author's love for *Anyoktis* in which he is seen to be in his top-form. The language and the style of the *Anyokti* verses is simply excellent and is a pattern for the later age when poets like Paṇḍitarāja Jagannātha enriched the Sanskrit literature with their *Anyoktis* some of which have passed into common use.

1. VI (ii) 116: 17:

CONCEPTION OF TIME IN POST-VEDIC SANSKRIT LITERATURE

It is very difficult to say anything definitely about abstract things. Time is one such thing. In the West, philosopher after philosopher and the physicist after physicist has worked on it to know it, yet it seems to be far too elusive.

According to Bergson time is made of a stuff which is called reality. Time is reality itself.

According to Alexander it is the soul of space and space-time is the soul of all reality.

As for Einstein's conception of time we may quote the words of Wildon Carr : "The principle of relativity declares that there is no absolute magnitude, that there exists whatever which can claim to be great or small in its own nature, also there is no absolute duration, nothing whatever which in its own nature is short or long. I co-ordinate my universe from my own standpoint of rest in a system of reference in relation to which all else is moving...Space and Time are not containers nor are they contents but variants¹".

Such is the line along which the philosophy of time has been developed in the West. Philosopher after philosopher there has studied the concepts of Time and Space. Kant, Alexander, Bergson, Whitehead, Bradley, Taylor, Spinoza—all have tried to analyse the time-concept in their own way. So much of energy has been expended on it and so much of thinking has gone in for its clear exposition that it is difficult to present it in a short compass. We, therefore, desist from it and devote ourselves to the exposition of the Time Philosophy in the religious and secular literature of Sanskrit only which is presented in the following pages.

1. The Principle of Relativity, p. 190.

THE SMRITIS

Of all the Smṛtis only the Manusmṛti gives us some idea of time and its various divisions. It reads :

kālam kālavibhaktīś ca

nakṣatrāṇi grahāṅs tathā. (Manusmṛti 1. 24.).

The singular in 'kālam' in the verse implies time as a principle while plural in 'kālavibhaktis' implies the empirical divisions of it.

It is interesting to note here that the above passage has been interpreted differently by different commentators. Medhātithi, Kullūka, Rāghavānanda and Nandana accept the aggregate of the motions of the sun, stars etc. as time. They, therefore, seem to accept the view of the astronomers on time (cf. sa eva grahatārādiparispandah kāla ity ucyate-Nyāyamañjarī 1. 1. 5.). Sarvajña Nārāyaṇa, however, differs from this view. He accepts time as *Puruṣa* (Spirit) who is sentient. The word *kālavibhaktiḥ* in the verse in the Manusmṛti refers, according to him, to the presiding deities (*abhimānidevatāḥ*) of moments, days, months, years, and epochs. The commentator Rāmacandra differs from both of these views. He accepts time as *Samvatsara* and the divisions of time as the six seasons, etc.¹ This is clearly the view of the Rgveda too. We see here as to how the commentators expound one and the same passage in the Manusmṛti according to their own set views and notions.

THE PURANAS

From Manusmṛti we pass on to the Purāṇas. These offer quite a variety of views on Time. Taking the Viṣṇu Purāṇa first of all, we find that Brahmā is described there as existing in the form of *Vyakta*, *Avyakta*, *Puruṣa* and *Kāla*.

tad eva sarvam evaitad vyaktāvyaktasvarūpavat ।

tathā puruṣarūpeṇa kālarūpeṇa ca sthitam ॥

(Viṣṇu Purāṇa, I. 2. 14.)

"All this, whether manifest or unmanifest, is nothing,

1. pūrvaṃ kālam kālātīnakasaṃvatsararūpaṃ Kālam asṛjat Kālasya vibhāgaś ca śatṛtūn ayanādīni ca.

—Rāmacandra.

but that (Intelligence), it appears as *Puruṣa* and as *Kāla*.” Śrīdhara explains the above passage as: *vyaktaṃ mahadādi, avyaktaṃ pradhānam*.

The Viṣṇu Purāṇa further declares—

kālasvarūpaṃ rūpaṃ tad Viṣṇor Maitreya vartate ||
(I. 2. 27.)

“O Maitreya ! Viṣṇu is of the form of *Kāla*.” Here the passage explicitly says that Viṣṇu is *Kāla*.

The Viṣṇu Purāṇa accepts time to be eternal. It existed even before creation came into being; and it will exist even after it is dissolved. As a matter of fact, all this creation and dissolution, etc. do not exist at all. The Purāṇa says:

anādir bhagavān kālo nānto'sya dvija vidyate |
avyucchinās tatas tv ete sṛṣṭisthityantasamyamāḥ ||
(I. 2. 26.)

“O Brāhmaṇa, the all-powerful *Kāla* is eternal (beginningless) and endless; hence creation, stasis and dissolution are all ever-recurrent.¹ It is because *Kāla* is equated here with Viṣṇu that He is spoken of as *Anādi* and *Ananta*. The idea of continuous flow that the passage above conveys, makes it also the basis of the theory of momentariness (*kṣaṇikavāda*) which we find so elaborated in the Yoga Sūtra and its Bhāṣya where it is said that a moment (*kṣaṇa*) is the ultimate minimum of time and cannot be further divided up... and the continuous flow of such moments is their ‘course’ (*krama*)... their uninterrupted course is what is called ‘time’.²

Now we come to the Bhāgavata Purāṇa. In the beginning (3. 8.) this Purāṇa describes the process of creation. A special power or *śakti* of the Lord, *Kāla* by name, remains in a dormant and latent state at the time of Dissolution. That *śakti* named *Kāla* impelled by God awakens when the

3 1. ‘avyucchināḥ’ in the above passage means flowing continuously (*pravāharūpenāvīratāḥ*—Śrīdharasvāmivyaḥkhyā).

2. Yoga Sūtra and Bhāṣya, 3. 57. The original quotation will be given under time in Yoga Philosophy

new creation is contemplated. This very idea is conveyed by the Bhāgavata Purāṇa in the following words: "He (Viṣṇu), withdrawing all beings into (making all beings recede into) his (all encompassing) Body, and bringing into play his *śakti* known as *Kāla* dwelt in his home of water, like fire latent in wood".¹ Śrīdharasvāmin, the commentator, very correctly interprets *Kālātmikāṃ śaktim udīrayāṇaḥ* in the verse quoted above as *kālaśakteḥ prerāṇaṃ punaḥ sṛṣṭyavasare prabodhanārtham* or 'to bring into play (to impel) *Kālaśakti* means to awaken it again at the beginning of the creation. Those who subscribe to the views of Madhva, however, interpret *udīrayāṇaḥ* in the sense of creating and thereby conclude that time according to the Bhāgavata Purāṇa is created by God and is hence *anitya*, not eternal. This view does not, however, appeal to reason, for it is doubtful if *√ir* ever means 'to create'. Be that as it may, there can be no doubt, at least on this point, that *Kālaśakti* is associated with Lord Viṣṇu whether it is identical with Him or is created by Him, we are not concerned with it at present. The association of *Kālaśakti* is very clearly brought out in the following verse of the Bhāgavata Purāṇa:

viśvaṃ vai Brahma tanmātraṃ samsthitaṃ Viṣṇumāyayā |
 Īśvareṇa paricchinnam Kālenāvyaḥkṛtamūrtinā ||
 (3.10.22.)

"The universe is verily *Brahma-tanmātra*, in essence Brahman, and is withdrawn by the *māyā* of Viṣṇu. It is put forward as something distinct by the Lord with the help of the formless *Kāla*".

The epithet *avyaktamūrti* in the verse above purports to mean that the Lord is by Himself unqualified. This is how the commentator Śrīdharasvāmin construes this verse. In our opinion the Lord is here identified with *Kāla*. *Kālena* is in apposition with *Īśvareṇa* and not the instrumental case signifying *nimitta*. The epithet *avyaktamūrtinā* is

5 1. *santaḥ śarīre'rpitabhūtasūkṣmaḥ Kālātmikāṃ śaktim udīrayāṇaḥ |
 uvāsa tasmin śalile pade sve yathānalo dāruṇi ruddhavīryaḥ ||*
 (Bhāgavatapurāṇa, 3. 8. 11.)

also in construction with *Kālena* and not with the intercepted *Īsvareṇa*.

The Bhāgavata accepts two kinds of time, gross and subtle, both knowable by inference only. It is time that determines all the actions that are termed manifest, *vyakta*. The Purāṇa reads :

evam kālo'py anumitah sauṣṣmye sthauḷye ca sattama |
saṁsthānabhuktyā bhagavān avyakto vyaktabhug viḥbhuh ||
(3. 11.3.)

"Thus time is inferred to be both gross and subtle. O best of men, the Lord, by reason of His pervasion of *paramānu*, though Himself unmanifest, enjoys (pervades, determines) the manifest."

Samsthāna in the verse, says the commentator, is in forms such as *paramānu* and *bhukti* is its pervasion.

Bhagavān means the *śakti* (for there is the identity of *śakti* and the possessor of *śakti*). This very idea is elaborated in the next verse which says that that much is termed the *Paramāṇukāla* which enjoys atomicity (*paramāṇuta*), by nature pervades everything, he is the great *Kāla*. On this the commentator Śrīdharasvāmin says :

sa kālaḥ paramāṇur vai
yo bhuṅkte paramānutām |
svato' viśeṣabhug yas tu
sa kālaḥ paramo mahān || (3. 11. 4.)

"*graharkṣatārācakra*stha" (Bhāgavata 3. 11. 13.) ityādinā yat sūryaparyāṭanam vakṣyate tatra sūryo yāvata paramāṇudeśam atikrāmati tāvān kālaḥ paramāṇuḥ, yāvata ca dvādaśarāśyātmakam bhuvanakoṣam atikrāmati sa paramamahān saṁvatsarātmakaḥ kālaḥ, tasyaivāvṛttyā yugamanvantarādikrameṇa dviparārdhamattattvam iti | tathā ca pañcame (Adhyāya 21.) sūryagatyaiva kālādivibhāgaṁ vakṣyati |

"The verse *graharkṣatārācakra*stha (Bhāgavata, 3.11.13.) speaks of the motion of the sun. That much is termed the *Paramāṇukāla*, which the sun takes to traverse an atom, and that which it takes to traverse all the twelve signs (the zodiac) in the year. By its rotation we have a

development beginning with *yuga* (cycle), *manvantara* (period) and ending with *parārdha*. Accordingly the author does well to treat of the division of time as effected by the motion of the Sun". The long and short of the whole discussion is that along with the *Kālaśakti* there is also recognised the empirical time which form the *Kālaśakti* assumes on account of the limiting condition, the motion of the Sun.

Of all the Purāṇas (with the full knowledge of the limitation of our study) we can say that it is only the Viṣṇu and the Bhāgavata which present time-concept with a philosophical and somewhat mystical tint. In other Purāṇas *Kāla* is explicitly recognized as a Deity, all-powerful, and all-pervasive. It is described there as follows :

anādir eṣa bhagavān
kalo' nanto' jaraḥ paraḥ |
sarvagatvāt svatantratvāt
sarvātmatvān maheśvaraḥ ||

Brahmāṇo bahavo Rudrā anye Nārāyaṇādayaḥ |
eko hi bhagavān īśaḥ kālāḥ kavir iti smṛtaḥ ||
Brahmanārāyṇeśānāṃ trayāṇāṃ prakaroti yaḥ |
procyate kālayogena punar eva ca sambhavaḥ ||
paraṃ Brahma ca bhūtāni Vāsudevo' pi Śaṅkaraḥ |
kālenaiva hi sṛjyante sa eva grasate punaḥ ||
tasmāt kālātmakaṃ viśvaṃ sa eva parameśvaraḥ |
(Kūrma Purāṇa quoted in Vācaspatyakoṣa, p. 1986.)

anādinidhanaḥ kālo Rudraḥ Śaṅkarṣaṇaḥ smṛtaḥ |
karṣaṇāt sarvabhūtānāṃ sa tu Śaṅkarṣaṇaḥ smṛtaḥ ||
sarvabhūtaśamitvāc ca sa Rudraḥ parikīrtitaḥ |
anādinidhanatvena sa mahān parameśvaraḥ ||

(Viṣṇudharmottarapurāṇa quoted in Vācaspatyakoṣa.
p. 1986.)

"The great is Lord beginningless and endless (*anādiḥ... anantaḥ*). He is said to have created even gods like Vāsudeva, Svayambhū and Śaṅkara. There are many gods like many Rudras and Nārāyaṇa etc. Of all these he is the great Lord. He is the great Lord as he is all-pervasive,

independent and the soul of all."

It is this conception of *Kāla* as a Deity, all-powerful and all-pervasive, that seems to find an echo in the work of the great grammarian Bhartṛhari when he, while mentioning the three different views on Time, picks up the concept of Time as a Deity as one among them. Says he—'Śaktyātmadevatāpakṣair bhinnam kālasya darśanam' (III. 9. 62.) About its *Devatāpakṣa* Helārāja's comment is significant—kecit tu mahāprabhāvāṃ devatām Kālatvenābhyupapannāḥ—"Some regard time to be an all-powerful Deity."

ĀGAMA LITERATURE :

Now, from the Purāṇas, we pass on to the Āgamas. There are different Āgamas from which we have traced here a lot of references to time. We shall take up these Āgamas one by one and deal with them briefly.

PRATYABHIJÑĀDARŚANA :

A school of Kāśmīra Śaivism, the Pratyabhijñādarśana recognizes *kāla*. We read :

sarvakaraḥ sarvajñaḥ pūrṇo nityo' saṅkucamś ca |
viparīta iva maheśo yābhis tā bhavanti pañca śaktayaḥ ||
(Mahārthamañjarī, Gāthā 18).

Out of the five *śaktis* referred to here, one is which the Parimala, the commentary, explains as *bhāvanām avabhāsanānavabhāsanātma kramah*.

According to this Darśana, the five *śaktis* are in no way different from *Īśvarecchā* or the will of God and this again is not different from *kriyā*. About *kāla* it is said that it has no existence outside the cognizer (experient). It comes to be related to the objects of cognition through the cognizer. This is what Ācārya Abhinavagupta says in the following words :

Kālaḥ kramam āsūtrayan pramātari vijṛmbhamāṇaḥ
'tadanūsāreṇa prameye' pi prasaratī |
(Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī, 3. 1. 9.)

MṚGENDRĀGAMA

According to the Mṛgendrāgama, *kāla* is perishable,

non-pervasive and manifold. It is non-sentient. The view of the Naiyāyikas that *kāla* is not *kriyā* is acceptable to this school. The nature of *kāla* is discussed in a beautiful passage in the *Mṛgendrāgamavṛttidīpikā* which bears reproduction :

astu tarhi Naiyāyikādyabhyupagata evātra kriyāvyatiriktaḥ kālaḥ | satyam | na tu nityo vyāpako vā | tasya vividhātvenānekatvāt acetanatvāc ca | ekarūpatve hi kālasya sarvadā padārthānām ekakālatā syāt, drśyante ca kecid vartamānāḥ kecid atītāḥ bhāvinaś ca kecid bhāvāḥ | tataḥ kālasyanekatvaṃ | kāla eva triprakāraḥ |

(*Mṛgendravṛttidīpikā*. 1. 10. 14.)

"Let us accept the view of the Naiyāyikas that *kāla* is something other than *kriyā* (action). But that cannot be eternal and ubiquitous, it being diverse and composite (manifold) and non-sentient. If time be a uniform entity, all things would be contemporaneous. But things are perceived to be either present or past or future. It, therefore, follows that *kāla* is manifold. Time is of three kinds."

ŚĀKTAS:

The Śāktas believe that this world is a product of reflection of *Citi* and is therefore unreal. They say :

...ekarūpāpi citiḥ svātantryahetutaḥ |

svāntar vibhāsayed bāhyam ādarśe gaganam yathā ||

nāsti cetyaṃ citer anyat

darpaṇe pratibimbavat |

(*Tripurārahasya*, Jñānakāṇḍa. 4. 99.)

Kāla is also an assumption, it has no existence in fact. The assumed *kāla* too is free from such variations as subtlety (*sūkṣmatva*) and elongation (*dirghatva*) it is only our thinking that differentiates one and the same thing. This is declared in so many words in the *Tripurārahasya* :

'deśaḥ kālo'thavā kiñcid yathā' nena vibhāvitam |

tathā tat tatra bhāseta dirghasūkṣmatvabhedataḥ. ||

(Jñānakāṇḍa, 14. 83.)

NAKULIŚAPĀŚUPATAS :

The *Nakuliśapāśupata* school, otherwise known as Pañ-

cārthaśāstra on account of the five categories in which it believes, does not seem to accept *kāla* as an independent entity. The five *Padārthas* that the followers of the school enumerate do not include *kāla*. Nor is *kāla* acceptable to another branch of this school which accepts only three *Padārthas*—*Tattva*, *Guṇa*, and *Bhāva*. The first branch of the *Nakulīśapāśupata* school believes that *Īśvara*, the one cause of all, is *Kāla*, the Destroyer.

DVAITAŚĀKTAS :

The *Dvaita-śāktas* postulate four categories. They are named in the *Pārānandasūtra* as :

‘anādyanantasādyanantānādisāntasādisāntāḥ’ (5. 7. 96.)

To them *Kāla* is beginningless and endless and is all-pervasive. Itself limited in the form of *kṣaṇa* (moment), *nimeṣa* (wink) it limits objects such as a jar.¹

PRAPAÑCASĀRA

According to the *Prapañcasāra*, attributed to Saṅkarācārya, three external Existences are admitted—matter, soul and time. The commentator Padmapādācārya explains:

“evam parakālasyāpi svarūpam abhidhāyāparam kālam prastauti-layeti |” (Prapañcasāravivaraṇam.)

Each one of these is twofold, being differentiated as *para* and *apara*. The *Prayogakramadīpikā*, however, explains that *Kāla* is unreal. It says :

‘devatātattvaṃ cidrūpam ekam eva, tasya svaśaktikalpita evāyaṃ prakṛtipuruṣakālātmakavikalpaḥ’ (1. 20—21.)

and adds :

‘atra ca prakṛtivyāyasarvajñānapreraṇākṣaṇacidrūpam kālasya svarūpam ityapi pratipāditam |’ giving us a definition of time, stating precisely the nature of its function.

The view of the *Prapañcasāra* briefly is: The Absolute Reality viewed as *Prakṛti* is Pure Consciousness and is the origin of all things. It remains always what it is and

1. Kālaḥ paricchēdakaḥ paricchinnāś ca.

—Pārānandasūtra, 5. . 6.

yet when the latent *karmas* of *jivas* are matured for fructification it becomes, in a part as it were, alienated from itself, externalized and relatively dense. This part is called *Prakṛtitattva*. When *kāla* acts on the lower *Prakṛti*, the latter is split up into three forms, viz. *Bindu*, *Nāda* and *Bija*. The cleavage of *Prakṛti* under the influence of Time is the occasion for the origin of what for lack of more appropriate term is called sound (*Śabda*) which is equivalent to what philosophers describe as *Avyakta* or *Śabda Brahman*. It is evident from the above that in this view *kāla* functions as the maturer of *karma*—seeds (*karma-fācaka*) and then as the energiser of *Prakṛti*.

TRIKA LITERATURE

In the *Trika* Literature *Kāla*, viewed in the Absolute *Parama Śiva*, represents His Supreme Freedom (*Svātantrya-śakti*) looked upon as *kriyāśakti* projecting the Universe till now unified with the Absolute and making it appear as external to it. The projection of the Universe is, therefore, only the apparent externalization of the Eternal Consciousness. The so-called creative process (*Viśvakalanā*) is only the outer aspect of the *kriyāśakti*, which inspite of its seeming externality retains itself always. The truth is that the Absolute Consciousness first appears as Life or *Prāṇa* (i. e. *Kriyāśakti*) on which as a base is built up the entire fabric of Time and Space.

TIME IN SECULAR LITERATURE

In all these pages we have been dealing with the concept of time in the *Smṛtis* and the *Purāṇas*. Now we propose to deal with it in the secular literature. When we study it, we find in it sometimes striking references to time in its philosophical aspect. The older texts like the *Mahābhāṣya* and the *Caraka Saṃhitā* very often present to us various views on time in a philosophical garb and therefore, indicate that phase of the development of the secular literature when the word *kāla* had not become restricted to the meaning of 'death' or the 'god of death,' the

meaning which it developed in later *kāya* literature. Under this heading of 'Time in Secular Literature' we propose to deal with six authors and commentators—Patañjali, Caraka, Dalhana, Vātsyāyana, Yaśodhara (commentator on the *Kāmasūtra* of Vātsyāyana) and Bhartṛhari, the author of the *Vākyapadiya*. We include the popular view and the views of the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* and the astronomers too under this very heading.

PATAÑJALI

Patañjali has not attributed eternity to the Vedas and *Śabda* (Sphoṭa) alone but has also included, the sky, heaven, space and time in the same category. According to the *Naiyāyikas*, the earth, light, water and air are external in so far as their ultimate atoms are concerned while the sky, time, mind, the quarters and the soul are regarded to be permanent in their entirety. Under the rule 4. 2. 3. Patañjali has expressly stated that both time and stars are permanent¹. He arrives at the final stage of his arguments that a thing wherein the ultimate essence is not destroyed is also to be considered to be permanent. (*tad api nityam yasmims tattvaṃ na vihanyate*)².

Time is said to be the ultimate substratum of the world (*Kālo hi jagadādharaḥ*), it is indivisible, permanent, one, and permeating the whole world. We can neither trace its origin, nor divide it into parts. Things grow and perish in time. Patañjali defines time as that whereby the growth and decay of material objects are perceived³. The division of time into day and night, months, years, cycles etc. is only an artificial process of calculation; it is by virtue of its conjunction with some action as the movement of the Sun (cf. *kayā kriyayā ? adityagatyā*)⁴ that we say it is day, it is night.

1. "nitye hi kālanakṣatre."—Mahābhāṣya, Kielhorn's Ed. Vol. II., p. 272.

2. *ibid.* Vol. I, p. 7.

3. *yena mūrtinām upacayās cūpacayās ca lakṣyante tanm kālam āhuḥ । tasyaiva kayācit kriyayā yuktasyāhar itī bhavati rātriḥ itī ca ।* *ibid.* Vol. I. p. 409.

4. *ibid.* Vol. I. p. 409.

In other words the movement of the Sun is the basis of our conception of the so-called divisions of time.

Patañjali also discusses whether there is present time or not. In this connection he says—

anāgatam atikrāntam vartamānam iti trayam ।
sarvatra ca gatiṃ nāsti gacchatīti kim ucyate ॥

—Mahābhāṣya, Kielhorn's Ed. Vol. II. p. 123.

He then discusses the pros and cons of the views of the non-existence of the present time and ultimately proves that the present time does exist. Altogether he quotes six beautiful verses which he frankly admits are taken from other works.

CARAKA

Caraka Saṃhitā, even though it shows special favour for Sāṃkhya views at other places, enumerates in Sūtrasthāna, (towards the beginning of the Saṃhitā) nine substances¹ which are accepted by the Vaiśeṣikas. The nine substances are—earth, water, fire, air, sky, time, space (*dik*), soul and mind. These nine substances of the Vaiśeṣikas include *Kāla* and, as Caraka accepts these very nine substances, he shows that time is according to him, a substance. Further, Caraka divides substances into sentient (*cetana*) and non-sentient (*acetana*)² of which the Soul only is sentient on account of its association with the sense-organs while all the rest of the substances including *Kāla*, are non-sentient.

While enumerating the nine substances Caraka says—'Kālo dīśaś ca dravyasaṃgrahaḥ'.³ The singular in *Kālaḥ* suggests that like the Vaiśeṣikas Caraka accepts *Kāla* as one. It seems, therefore, that so far as the concept of time is concerned Caraka subscribes to the Vaiśeṣika view.

DALHAṆA

Ācārya Dalhaṇa, the commentator of the Suśruta Saṃhitā, seems to subscribe to the view of the Sāṃkhyas. To him,

1. "khādīny ātmā manaḥ kālo dīśaś ca dravyasaṃgrahaḥ." (I. 48.)

2. sendriyaṃ cetanaṃ dravyaṃ nirindriyaṃ acetanaṃ.

3. *ibid.*

(Sūtrasthāna, 1. 48.)

as to the teachers of Sāṃkhya, *Kāla* is a modification of *rajoguṇa* and is not different from *Prakṛti* itself. Quotes Dalhaṇa—mahābhūtavaiśeṣāms tu śītoṣṇadvayabhedataḥ |

kāla ity adhyavasyanti Nyāyamārgānusārīṇaḥ ||
kriyātvena rajoguṇapariṇāmatvān mahābhūtapariṇāmaviśeṣātvāc ca na kālasya prakṛter anyatvam |

—(Sūśrutaṭīkā, Śarīrasthāna, Adhyāya I, under V. 11).

VĀTSYĀYANA AND YĀSODHARA

In the *Kāmasūtra* of Vātsyāyana, there is no reference to the nature of *Kāla*. Only this much is said that *Kāla* is the cause of good or bad, victory or defeat, happiness or sorrow¹. But in the commentary *Jayamaṅgalā* by Yāśodhara, time is said to be eternal and is called a substance². This view also seems to conform to the Vaiśeṣika standpoint.

ASTRONOMERS

The astronomers believe that *Kāla* is nothing but the movement of the planets, stars, etc. Jayantabhaṭṭa says in *Nyāyamañjarī*—

na Devadattādīparispandanibandhanāḥ kramākramādīpra-
tyayāḥ, kintu grahanakṣatrādīparispandanibandhanāḥ ;
sa eva grahatārādīparispandaḥ kāla ity ucyate | tatkrīta
evāyaṃ yāmāhorātramāsādivyavahārāḥ |...Kālavidaś ca jyo-
tirgaṇakās ta evainaṃ budhyante | (1. 1. 5.)

The same idea is expressed in *Mṛgendravṛttidīpikā* in words—"jyotiḥśāstradrīṣṭyā kriyāvaiśeṣātmaka evābhyupa-
gamyate" (10.15.). In Astronomy it (*kāla*) is accepted as a special movement (of the stars, planets, etc). Then the *Mṛgendravṛttidīpikā* (10. 15.) gives the following verse.

ādityagrahatārādīparispandam athāpare |
bhinnam āvṛttibhedena kālam kālavidō viduḥ ||

1. "kāla eva hi puruṣān 'arthānarthayor jayaparājayaṇor sukhadu-
ḥkhaṇyō ca sthāpayati."

—*Kāmasūtra*, Sādhārāṇādhikaraṇa, Adhyāya. 2.

2. "kālo nāma dravyapadārtho nityaḥ"

(*Jayamaṅgalā*, a commentary on the *Kāmasūtra*, Sādhārāṇādhikaraṇa, Adhyāya 2. under sūtra 'tatsarvam kālakāritam')

"Other knowers of time know *kāla* to be the movement of the Sun, the planets and the stars as differentiated by revolutions."

YOGAVĀSIṢṬHA

In the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* is given a detailed description of the emergence of the Creation. There it is said that 'immediately after the creation of *Jīva*, the *Kha* (sky, ether) emerges which is almost a void, the germ of properties such as sound, and which gives significance to future names. Later *Ahaṃkāra* follows along with Time¹. The *Vāsiṣṭhatātparyaprakāśa* explains the text thus :

'Now, with a view to discussing the creation of *Mahābhūtas* the writer begins with the creation of *Kha*. Immediately after the creation of *Jīva*, the *Kha* comes into being, itself almost a void, being the substratum of the remaining four elements. After the creation of the Sun etc., it gives significance to future names such as *Ākāśa* which literally means 'what shines all round'.....This creation of *Ākāśa*, *Ahaṃkāra* and *Kāla* is not from *Hiraṇyagarbha* but from the Supreme Being limited by its particular forms.²'

In the *Śukropākhyāna* of the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* while *Bṛghu* is about to pronounce a curse on *Kāla* who has taken away the life of his son, *Kāla* appears in human form and says: "Your curse would make no difference to me. For I am the manager of destiny (*vayaṃ niyatipalakāḥ*). Your curse would fail to burn me, for I am the eater and you are the food. I have consumed rows of universes, swallowed crores of *Rudras*.³"

The description of *kāla* as it is given in the *Śukropākhyāna* is interesting from two points of view. Firstly, *kāla* is here an allegorical description of the empirical time divi-

1. samūnāntaram evāsyāḥ kṣaṭtodeṭi śūnyatā ।
śabdādiguṇabijam sā bhaviṣyad-abhidhārthadā ॥
ahantodeṭi tadanu saba vai kūlasattayā ।"

—*Yogavāsiṣṭha*, III. 12. 9—10.

2. *Vāsiṣṭha-tātparyaprakāśa* under verse 11.

3. *Yogavāsiṣṭha*. IV. 10. 17—27.

ded into months and seasons. Secondly, it recognizes the all-powerful character of *kāla*. In other words it believes *kāla* to be a Supreme Force as it is recognized by many other schools of Indian philosophy.

The Yogavāsiṣṭha is remarkable in that it sets forth views that agree strikingly with the latest theories on time and space. Time and space are relative to the observer. This is the Theory of Relativity of Einstein about time and space, which has revolutionised all the thinking about time and space. A day may appear much shorter to a man who is gay and cheerful, while it may appear much longer to one who is pensive and tired. The same can be said about distance. A man high in spirits will not mind walking a distance of ten miles in a hill station where he has gone for enjoyment and fun, while the same distance may appear never-ending to a hilly labourer who toils hard the whole day, wearied and broken and leaves for his home in the evening. According to this view, all the motion that appears in the Creation is due to the conscious passage of time in an observer. This fact leads us to the well-known *dr̥ṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda*, the theory that there is no creation without an observer.

The theory that time and space are relative to the observer is propounded in the Yogavāsiṣṭha at a number of places. It is said that time and space are thoughts. It is upon thoughts that their existence depends.

Just as the appearance of the world is a thought-appearance, so also is the appearance of the moments and ages (III. 20.29.). A moment is doubtless experienced as a *Kalpa*, when consciousness of *Kalpa* is experienced in it; similarly a *Kalpa* is experienced as a moment if the consciousness of a moment is present in it (III.60.21.). The same period of a night is experienced as a *Kalpa* by the miserable, and a moment by the happy. In dream a moment is experienced as a *Kalpa* and a *Kalpa* is passed as a moment. Time-Space order is dependent on the mind. The mind can experience a moment as a *Kalpa* and vice-versa within itself (III. 103. 14.). What is a life-time to

Manu is an hour to Brahmā, what is a life-time to Viṣṇu is a day to Śiva. He, whose mind is lost in meditation, experiences neither day nor night (III. 60. 25, 26.). A day passes as a year for those who are separated from their beloveds (III. 20. 51.) The whole world-process occurs within a millionth part of a moment of the consciousness of the Self (3. 60. 171). The extent of the same world-process may be a moment for some and a long age for others. As a person experiencing a dream has the experience of stability, so has the person experiencing the world process.

According to Svāmī Mādhavātīrtha¹ the Yogavāsīṣṭha is the only philosophical work in India in which the concept of time is made sufficiently clear. This agrees remarkably with the latest discoveries of the modern science. The Svāmī quotes three stories from the Yogavāsīṣṭha and proves that these indicate the relative concept which is accepted to be the latest theory on time.

TIME IN POPULAR VIEW

Kāla in popular view has nothing to do with its philosophical abstruseness. As in old days so now the common man uses the word in the sense of time and fate. The senses of time and fate given to *Kāla* include the notion of death, primarily as being the fate from which no living being can escape. *Kāla* gradually becomes synonymous with death. The deity of time and a god of death form one heavenly being. *Kāla* is the same as *Yama*. Śiva is *Mahākāla*, the Great time and at the same time the Great Death. *Mahākālī* is a form of Durgā which she assumes to bring destruction. Though *Kālī* originally means 'the blue-black', the similarity of sound with *Kāla* must not be altogether neglected. Like Śiva Viṣṇu has been associated with *Kāla*, but time, the general destroyer and giver of life, seems on the whole, more appropriate to the character of Śiva.

1. cf. The Concept of Time in Indian Philosophy, p. 35.

BHARTṚHARI

Bhartṛhari has discussed time: What it is and how it functions, in section IX of Kāṇḍa III of his Vākyapadīya. This section, herein termed the *Kāla Samuddeśa* contains 114 *Kārikas*. Of these the first 79 *Kārikas* deal with the philosophical views held about time by the various schools of thought, and with the nature and function of time as understood by Bhartṛhari himself, and the rest offer well-reasoned justification for the various uses of the tenses in Pāṇini's Grammar, and serve to elucidate the pertinent passages in the Bhāṣya. Before we reproduce here and discuss the various other theories about time recorded by Bhartṛhari, we propose to put down what this great thinker has to say about time, what is his personal view of it, for that must have precedence over others.

One thing must strike a critical student of the Vākyapadīya, and that is that there is no perfect order in which Bhartṛhari presents the various views about *Kāla*. Usually a verse or two are read to enunciate a particular view. This is followed sometimes by some discussion on questions arising out of a clarification of it; sometimes it is left severely alone with a summary remark. Bhartṛhari glides along in his own masterly way apparently unmindful of setting in complete order what he says. No link is sought to be established between the various views; they are not presented in a string; they lie scattered here and there. Sometimes it is his view, sometimes another's. But whosoever it is, it is always supported and never refuted. Thus the *Kāla Samuddeśa* of his is a veritable repertory of the various theories and views that once held ground and still hold it. (cp. *Kārikas* 57, 58 and 68).

Bhartṛhari's Own View

In *Kārika* 62¹ of this section, Bhartṛhari sums up the three recognized views about time. Time is either a *Śakti*

1. Śaktyūtmadevatūpakṣair bhinnam Kālasya darsanam]

or an *Ātman* or a *Devatā*. Helārāja, the commentator tells us that 'time is *Śakti*' is the considered view of Bhartṛhari himself. While commenting on III.9.14, he refers to the above *Kārikā* with the words—*ihāpi siddhāntayīṣyati*. He assimilates the other two views to the first, since, to him they seem to conform to the first in the ultimate analysis. We however differ.

To us it appears that Bhartṛhari acknowledges the other two views as independent notions of time, and not as subordinate to his own. The connecting link placed at the head of the *Kārikā*: 'Now he sums up different views regarding the Reality, Time,' also supports our contention. Besides, we find the echo of the view that *Kāla* is a *devatā* (a deity) in the Purāṇas. The Kūrma Purāṇa, as quoted by the Vācaspatya (p. 1986) reads: *anādir eṣa bhagavān kālo nanto'jaraḥ paraḥ | sarvagatvāt svatantratvāt sarvātmatvān maheśvaraḥ ||* Helārāja, too notes—'anye tu vighrahavatīm mahāprabhāvaṃ devatām Kālatvena pratipannāḥ' Nīlakaṇṭha, commenting on M. Bh. XII. 320. 109, alludes to the view that *Kāla* is *jīva*.

True it is that to the author of the *Vākyapadīya*, *Kāla* is a *Śakti*, and a *Śakti* of *Brahman*. While discussing the nature of *Śabda-brahman* in Kāṇḍa 1, verse 3, he tells us what he thinks of time.

In his lucid gloss on the said *Kārikā*, he declares it unequivocally that all other generated, dependent subject-forces are pervaded by *kāla*, which alone is independent and follow the operation of this *Śakti* in their working.

How this *Śakti* of *Brahman* operates and with what results is, given in *Kārikās* 3-8 of this section. We are here told that *kāla* is the instrumental cause in the creation, persistence and destruction of all things that have an origin, etc.... *Kāla* seems to be itself diversified by the diversity of limiting adjuncts (*Upādhis*) and then diversifies the things in conjunction with it. Hence (being the instrumental cause), *Kāla* is the string-puller in the dumb show of this world. It is because of the powers of *pratibandha* and *abhyānujñā* that this

world comes to possess succession in action. What is the meaning of *pratibandha* and *abhyanuñña*? Bhartṛhari credits *Kāla* with these two effective powers. The first means the preventive power and the second, the permissive power. What leads him to imagine that these two powers must belong to *Kāla*? If there were no *pratibandha*, so argues he, there would be no order in this universe, no progression or regression; there would result perfect chaos, all action being simultaneous. Thus a seed, a sprout, a stem and a stalk—all would emerge and exist together. Therefore all objects having origination, though having peculiar causes, must have *Kāla* as an additional contributory cause for ordered progress.

These two powers namely, *pratibandha* and *abhyanuñña* correspond more or less to the two powers, *vikṣepa* and *āvaraṇa* ascribed to *avidyā* or *māyā* by the later writers on *Advaita*.

Earlier Interpretation Refuted :

Helārāja refers to some earlier commentators who take *Śakti* in *Kārikā* 62 referred to above to mean the generating cause which they say is itself time. Their case may be briefly stated as follows :

The power called seed, while it permits the appearance of the sprout, prevents the synchronous growth of the stalk. Similarly the power called sprout permits the production of the next effect, while restraining the production of the subsequent effects. Hence the generating cause is itself time.

This is a wrong interpretation and Helārāja convincingly refutes it. He points out that all this is tantamount to saying that particular effects proceed from particular causes, wherever these (causes) are present, and not otherwise. But since those effects take place at a particular time and not at any time, even when the generating causes are there, the additional regulating cause, namely time, must be acknowledged. The various phases of existence proceeding from a series of causes have a succession; and this succession

is a power of *Kāla*, the condition of all being.

To Bhartṛhari, *Kāla* is *one*, it is unitary. It is because of its relation to motions such as of the sun, that *Kāla* becomes many. The great thinker emphatically declares that things are in themselves neither diverse nor uniform. Time is one (indivisible), yet it appears to have so many divisions. How? The essential nature of a substance is, it has to be admitted, not the object of our parlance; it is inexpressible.¹ When we conceive unity to inhere in it, we say it is one, when we conceive the white or the dark colour to inhere in it, we say it is white or dark; and when we conceive the universal 'cowness' to inhere in it, we say it is a cow; similarly time comes to have the appellations such as the time of origination, the time of persistence, the time of destruction etc., on account of its conjunction with the action of origination etc. The movements of the sun, the planets and the stars which are in conjunction with time give it the appearance of divisibility; thus the time determined by the sunrise and the sunset is the day; so on and so forth.

If *Kāla* is one, how do we account for the various time-divisions such as the days, months, seasons and years? This question has been raised and discussed at a number of places in the *Vākyapadīya*. The author gives an answer to it in *Kārikā* III. 9. 32. The answer is that they are there on account of the diversity of action (*kriyā-bheda*), in external things. These divisions are superimposed upon time and are not integral to it. They do not affect it at all, they make no change to it. Just as a man becomes a carpenter for the time he is chiselling a piece of wood, and a smith when he is forging a piece of iron, but does not cease to be man or get divided into two men; similarly, time is called spring when there appear symptoms like flowers, a kind of humidity in the atmosphere and the charming cooing of the cuckoo. When there appear other symptoms like the falling off of the leaves of the trees, a kind of forbidding chillness in the atmosphere

1. *Vākyapadīya*, III. 11: 7.

a change in the direction of the sun, we say it is autumn. The spring and autumn are no part of the substance, time. It is a case of an *adhyāsa* (superimposition).¹

And, if time is eternal and unchangeable, how is it that we hear of such judgments as: It is good time. it is bad time, the *kṛtayuga* is good and auspicious, the *Kali* is bad and inauspicious? We cannot change time and import external goodness or badness into it. Both goodness and badness are extrinsic to time; they are transferred to it. They originally belong to actions. When good actions are performed, we say it is good time, when bad, we say it is bad time. Time knows no change?²

To Bhartrhari, time, though itself unchangeable is the cause of all change, motion and order. Every object is governed by the power of *Kāla*. Why the sun rises and sets at regular hours, why the moon shines for the night and not for the day; why the sun moves for six months along the southern path (*dakṣiṇāyana*) and for another six months along the northern path (*uttarāyana*), why the planets and stars move in a particular order—all these can only be explained as being due to the all-pervasive and all-powerful nature of *Kāla*. The coming into existence and passing out of existence, the appearance and disappearance of all objects is caused by time alone.

Other differentiations of time are also unreal, they are merely superimposed. A thing is *not* before it actually comes into being; *it is*, when it has been created. The mind, however, conceives it as *one* positive existence. When we set about putting together the competent means to the fulfilment of an act, we say it is Commencement time. when the means thus put together start operating, we say it is Performance time. And when a thing desired to be effected has been accomplished, we say it is Closing time.

1. *kriyābhedād yathaikasmins takṣādyākhyā pravartate |
kriyābhedāt tathaikasminn ṛtvādyākhyopapadyate ||*
2. *kartṛbhedāt tadartheṣu pracayāpacayau gataḥ |
samatvaṃ viśamatvaṃ vā tad ekaḥ pratipadyate || III. 9. 31.*

But time remains unaltered by these ideal divisions, says the great thinker; the Commencement-time, etc. in the case of a *dvyaṅka* (dvad) is exactly the same as that of the Himālayan range. The nature of a thing can neither be altered nor augmented.¹ The meaning is that objects are essentially indivisible (*svarūpeṇa nirāṁsā*) wholes, they would indeed be divisible if they were no more than a conglomeration of parts; hence the Commencement-time, etc. does not differ. The component parts are quite different from the whole they make. A jar is verily different from the sherds which go to form it. Even the magnitude, a property, is different from the whole. With the difference therefore in magnitude, things need not differ, suffer augmentation or reduction. Hence all produce substances, all wholes being non-distinguishable, it is not because of them that the Commencement-time etc. of objects of small magnitude or great, differs, but because of properties other than, or additional to, the whole.²

How does the Commencement-time etc. differ then? The question is answered by Bhartṛhari in the next *Kārikā* (III. 9.35).³ It is the parts (different from the wholes) which, if many, account for the greatness of the magnitude of the wholes; if a few, the smallness of the magnitude of them. Accordingly a whole made up of many parts is accomplished slowly, and one made up of lesser parts quickly. Hence in either case, the Commencement-time etc. is recognized as different. Since the parts lose their identity in the whole, the whole is designated after the properties of the parts, and not that the time of whole does differ, as a matter of fact.

It is further explained in *Kārikā* (III. 9.36).⁴ An object does not exist before origination as already observed. Hence,

1. Vākyapadīya, III. 9. 34.

2. All this is true only, if we share the view of the Vaiśeṣika that the wholes are distinct from their parts.

3. anyais tu bhāvair anyeṣāṃ pracayaḥ parikalpyate |
śūnair idam idam kṣipram iti tena pratīyate ||

4. asatāś ca kṛamo nāsti sa hi bhettum na śakyate |
sato'pi cātmātattvaṃ yat tat tathāivāvatiṣṭhato ||

previous to origination, it being non-existent, it could have no succession, there being no division into prior and posterior. And even when it has been produced and does exist, it cannot be differentiated, its nature persists; hence there is no succession. Succession, as explained by Helārāja, is based on difference, and difference cannot be there in each separate mode of an object which essentially consists of two modes, existent and non-existent while yet in the process of production. The two modes are pieced together by the intellect and differentiated as prior and posterior. There is first an idea of the non-existent and then of the existent, the succession is otherwise ideal. Hence even the sequence in the produced things is hypothetical; much more so the sequence in time, which is based upon that assumption.

Bhartṛhari repeats the idea at a number of places that *kāla* is *Svātantrya Śakti*, as for example in *Karikā* 14. He explains how *kāla* which is *vibhu* is significantly so called, since it urges all *kālas* (*Śaktis*) by its cycles such as the spring, which are comparable to the revolution of the water-wheel.

THE ADVAITIN'S VIEW AS GIVEN BY BHARTṚHARI

The question arises: Is this *Kāla Śakti* identical with *Brahman* or different from it? The answer is that to the Advaitin (as Hari undoubtedly is), the *Śakti* and the possessor of *Śakti* is one entity, not two. The difference is only apparent. The properties (*dharmas*) are held to be non-distinct from the substance (*dharmīn*). This Hari himself says in the *Brahma kāṇḍa*.¹ Abinavaḡupta also subscribes to this view. In his *Bodhapañcadaśikā*, he remarks that *Śakti* does not want to be differentiated from the *Śaktimat* (the possessor of *Śakti*). They are eternally one, like fire and its consuming power.² To be precise the *Kāla Śakti* can only be said to be *anirukta* (undefined).

“The conception of the one ultimate reality, be it *Śabda-*

1. aprthaktve'pi śaktibhyaḥ prthaktvenova vartate (1. 2)

2. saktiś ca śaktimadrūpād vyatirekaṃ na vāñchati |
tādātmyam anayor nityaṃ vahnidāhakaḥ iva || *Bodhapañcadaśikā* (8)

brahman, *Ātmabrahman*, *Sattā Brahman*, or *Vijñānabrahman* led the exponents of advaita philosophy to ascribe to it a power called *māyā*, *ajñāna*, *avidyā* or *Kāla Śakti*, which is unique in its nature and which is capable of projecting this phenomenal world, the *bāhyaprapañca*". Bhartṛhari calls this power by the term *Kāla Śakti* and *avidyā*. And like all other *Śaktis*, the *Kāla Śakti* too is *anirukta*. This is set forth by Hari himself in his inimitable way in his *Vṛtti* on 1.4. Says he: 'of the one *Brahman* that must be assumed to possess *Śaktis* which can neither be said to be identical with *Brahman* nor distinct from it, neither existent nor non-existent, which are free from mutual conflict (in so far as they subsist simultaneously in the one substratum)—of the *Brahman* which is only apparently partite; are the various unreal modifications such as the enjoyer, the thing enjoyed, the act of enjoyment—all of which do not exist externally like the person in a dreamvision'.¹

Does Time Really Exist ?

How do we know that there exists something that is called *kāla* (time)? There must be some evidence for it; mere belief in the tradition or scripture would not do. In *Kārika* III.9.46.² Hari observes: "That this universe which is really devoid of sequence (or succession) seems to have one is indeed due to the working of time". The all-pervasive time operating with its two powers *pratibandha* and *abhyānujñā* is responsible for this notion. But for *Kāla* all this *krama* would not be explainable. Then the notion of quickness and slowness too is explainable only on the admission that time exists. Just as this distance is long, this is short, is determined by the pace of the person walking and has nothing to do with the space walked over; for what is far for a

1. *ekasya hi Brahmanas tattvānyatvābhyām sattvāsattvābhyām cāniruktavirodhisaktyupagrāhyasyāsatvarūpapravibhāgasya svapnavijñāna-puruṣavad abahistattvāḥ paraspāravilakṣaṇā bhoktṛbhoktavyabhogagranthayo vivartante*".

2. *nirbhāso pagamo yo'yaṁ kramavūn iva lakṣyate |
akramasyāpi viśvasya tat kūlasya viceṣṭitam ||*

slow-moving person is near for another of nimble foot. Similarly though time never varies yet by virtue of an action which has a greater continuity, it comes to be called slow (*cira*) while another with a lesser continuity gives it the qualification (*kṣipra*) quick. The idea is that the notions *cira* and *kṣipra* must have an *adhikaraṇa* in which they could reside and that *adhikaraṇa* is *kāla*.

There is yet another evidence. The question how an action which is over (past) and therefore non-existent could give the appellation *bhūta* (past) to *Kāla* is beautifully answered by Hari in III. 9.39.¹ In plain English, the *Kārika* means: Things effected by action are called *atīta* (past), losing their identity (*svarūpa*). Whatever notion the mind forms of them in the present, they deposit in their stable receptacle, time, and they vanish, since after being perceived, they become objects of recollection, with their *Śaktis* transferred to the past stage (*vyavahāraṃ svāntam anupatanti*). The principle of time is cognizable only through the *upādhis* of the various objects, and they, when being recollected, transfer their own qualification (pastness) to time. Hence we say there was a jar. This indeed is the logical ground for the existence of *Kāla*, for if it did not exist, there would be no such usage.

Not only that. In the next *Kārika* (III. 9.40.) Hari seeks to clarify the use of *bhaviṣyat* (future) with regard to things. The external form (*dṛśyarūpa*) of things which are yet to be, viz., things whose 'becoming' is expected when the competent causes of them are present and the image of that external form formed in the mind (*vikalpyarūpa*) are brought together and unified in the stable receptacle of time whereon futurity is superimposed by the transference of *Śaktis*. It is because of this qualified time that things are called future or ensuing. But for time, it would not be possible to explain satisfactorily the use of future with regard to things. This is beautifully brought out by a simile: just as it is only after an image has been

1. *kāle nidhāya svaṃ rūpaṃ prajñāyā yaṃ nigṛhyato |
bhāvās tato nivartante tatra saṃkrāntasaktayaḥ ||*

seen in a spotless mirror, that one becomes sure of the form outside, similarly we see through *Kāla* the real form of things.¹

That time is an independent entity can also be inferred from the fact of dripping of water from a hole in a jar. This dripping is emphatically declared by Bhartṛhari (vide *Kārikā* III. 9. 70)² to be due to the working of time, and hence constitutes the logical ground for its existence. Helārāja's comments on this *Kārikā* are elucidating and bear reproduction. 'We observe that only a part of the quantity of water contained in a jar drips at a time from a hole in it and the remaining part does not drip simultaneously with it. What could this be due to?' It is certainly due to the preventive and permissive forces that time possesses; for if it were otherwise, the whole, here the water, which permeates all its component parts, must drip all at once, under its own weight. Since there is graduation in the act of dripping, time, a separate entity must be admitted to be at work here and that dripping itself is time must be ruled out. The dripping is only a determination of time. This dripping, itself determined by such acts as winking, movement of the vital airs, the continuous flow of the moments, serves to determine the time which is other than it. Winking, etc., too, is determined by *kāla* in its subtle form of succession; hence the power *Kāla*, known as *Krama* (succession) is to be found interwoven with all things in a subtle way and cannot be denied.

There is yet another equally cogent reason to believe that time is. How can two actions having a beginning and an end in common, and inhering in two different substrata be differentiated, the one as quick, the other as slow, unless there be an entity in relation to both the actions at the same time? Now all action is a collection of moments. Since the moments do not exist simultaneously all action is *sakrama*,

1. bhāvānām caiva yad rūpaṃ tasya ca pratibimbakam ।
sunirmṛṣṭa ivādarśe kā laevopapadyate ॥
2. pratibandhābhyanujñābhyaṃ nālikāvivarāśrito ।
yad ambhasi prakṣaraṇam tat kālasyaiva ceṣṭitam ।

possessed of succession, and this cannot but be due to the power of time. Succession is indeed a property of time. It is time that has a succession, and it is because of relation with time that actions appear to have it. Although action is one, yet it is here said to be two because of the two substrata. Hence the notion of *cira* (slow), *kṣipra* (quick) is not because of the unity of action. Because even when the substrata differ, we have the same notion of the one as of the other; for we say: "The jar is formed late, the cloth is fashioned late." It should not have been possible, for there were two actions inhering in two different substrata, the jar and the cloth. Nor can it be due to the produced things (jar and cloth), for they being different cannot be the cause of the common notion. Nor again can it be due to the agent, for that too differs with different things. Hence that something to which the notion is due is *Kāla*. This *Kāla* has to be *one*, in order that it may produce the common notion even when actions and things differ.

Granted that time being one, could well determine two different actions and give us the common notion: the jar is produced late, the cloth is produced late, but how could it, being one, give us two distinct notions such as: it is done soon, it is done late? To this Bhartṛhari's reply is recorded in *Kārikā* III.9.28.¹ This he explains on the analogy of a balance, which though one, determines the varying weights of gold, silver, etc., similarly time, though one, comes to have manifoldness by virtue of the powers inherent in it and determines uninterrupted action diversified by such distinct operations as winking. Or time, the absolute time, determines action as soon or late, quick or slow, just as the hand of the practised adepts determines a particular weight. As the hand is competent to weigh by reason of the skill born of practice, time is capable of measuring the difference in actions by virtue of its own inherent power.

The Vaiśeṣika has his own way of inferring the existence

1. anityasya yathotpāde pāratantryam tathā sthitau |
vināśayaiva tat sṛṣṭam asvādhīnasthitim viduḥ ||

of time. This is set forth in a number of *Kārikās* (III. 9, 16-22). The *Kārikā* 22 says that as objects depend upon causes, material, instrumental and others for their production, so do they depend upon a cause for their existence. The meaning is that an object which is produced, is artificial, is from its very nature perishable and would perish as soon as it is produced, if it is not sustained by a cause. And that sustaining cause is time. This argument of the *Vaiśeṣika* becomes clearly understandable when we keep in view the fact that to the *Vaiśeṣika* the whole is different from the parts of which it is composed. So it cannot be urged that a piece of cloth (the whole) is sustained by the hundreds of threads of which it is made.

The Bhāṣyakāra's View as given by Bhartṛhari :

The *Bhāṣyakāra's* view is embodied in *Kārikā* 13¹ of the *Kāla Samuddeśa*. It says that it is time which causes the quantitative changes in all objects. It is because of time that there is orderly development or decay noticed in youth or old age. It also tells us that time is one, though it comes to be differentiated by external objects in relation to it. By limiting the function of time to finite objects, *Bhartṛhari* wants to say that eternal objects are not affected by time. The *Bhāṣyakāra* has expressed himself similarly. Says he: 'That which causes development and decay in finite objects, is, they say, *kāla* (*Mahābhāṣya* II. 2. 5.).² On this *Kaiyaṭa* says: 'Now we see development, now decay in things such as grass, creepers, trees; other causes remaining the same. What this change (*pariṇāma*) is due to, is time.'³ If time is one, how are we to account for the use of such terms as day, night. etc. ? To this the *Bhāṣyakāra's* answer is that it is due

1. mūrtinām tena bhinnānām ācayāpacayāḥ prthak ।
lakṣyante pariṇāmena sarvāsāṃ bhedayoninā ॥
2. yena mūrtinām upacayās cāpacayās ca lakṣyante tam kalam
āhuḥ.
3. tarutṛṇalatāprabhṛtīnām kadūcid upacayo' nyadā tv apacayaḥ, sa
pratyayāntaraviśeṣo'pi yatkṛtāḥ sa kālāḥ.

to the motion of the sun.¹ Elsewhere,² the Bhāṣyakāra declares that time is eternal.

It is interesting to observe here that Nāgeśabhaṭṭa, the grammarian-philosopher does not accept the view of the Bhāṣyakāra. To him, time is neither one, nor eternal and all-pervading. If time is one, argues he, it would not be possible to account for the diversity of effects produced; hence time must be held to be a stream of moments. Nor can time be maintained to be eternal, all-pervasive, etc., for time is said to be the cause of various objects in so far as it forms their substratum, but unless it is qualified, it cannot be the substratum of such notion as 'now there is jar,' and if a qualification of it is to be assumed, then we shall have to assume another determination for that qualification, and still another for this second; and so on ad infinitum.³

The Sāṃkhya View as given by Bhartṛhari.

In the section on the Buddhist's view, we will observe that the Sāṃkhyas and the Buddhists deny that time has an objective reality. But Bhartṛhari records a view recognizing the existence of time, which the commentator ascribes to the Sāṃkhya thinkers, and explains it accordingly. According to this view, three *guṇas*—*sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* are assumed to possess the three powers—past, future and present. These powers do not function at one and the same time. When they do function respectively, they give rise to such usage as 'a thing was,' 'a thing will be,' 'a thing is.' These powers are inseparable and non-distinct from the three *guṇas*. They are present everywhere and are ultimately of the form of succession. The past and future powers remove things away from our consciousness and make them invisible, while the power called present brings things into our consciousness.

1. *tayaiva kayācit kriyayā yuktasyāhar iti ca bhavati rātrir iti ca kayā kriyayā ? Ādityagatyā !*

2. *ekatvenāsya karyavaicitryaniyamakatvarūpāpattir iti Bhāṣya-lakṣaṇanupapattya kṣaṇādhārarūpakāla iti yuktam—Uddyota under II. 2. 5.*

3. *Laghumañjūsā*, p. 848 (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series).

Things disappear because of the working of the past and future powers and never return. What reappears is a semblance of them; similar things recur but never the same. Yet what we conceive as non-existent has only disappeared and has never ceased to exist. Hence ultimately there is no difference between 'being' and 'non-being', although the modes of existence may differ. All this has been summed up beautifully by Bhartṛhari in his *Kārikās* (III. 9. 59-61.).

The Astronomers' View as given by Bhartṛhari

Others who claim to know what time is, understand by the term *kāla*, the movement of the sun, the planets and the stars, diversified by diverse revolution.¹ That means the movement of the sun from dawn to dusk makes a day, from dusk to dawn makes a night, fifteen cycles of the day and night make a fortnight, thirty such cycles make a month and so on. Similarly when the moon has traversed all the 27 planets, it makes a month, and when Bṛhaspati completes its revolution round a single *Rāśi* (asterism), it makes a year. Since it is the movement of the planets that leads to the division of time, this movement itself is looked upon as time by some of the thinkers, the astronomers, whom Helārāja rightly dubs as having a short-range vision.² Though not falling in with this view, Bhartṛhari does not refute it. On the contrary, he seeks to answer some of the objections raised against it, as we shall presently see.

According to these thinkers, action that measures another action is also *kāla*, so far as that particular action is concerned. The movement of the sun, etc., called the day and the like, and the milking of the cow, etc., having a well-defined duration is a measure for another action of unknown duration, such as sitting. It is therefore *kāla*.³ An example

1. Vākyapadīya, III. 9. 76.

2. ity arvāgdarsanāḥ kecin manyante | ibid (avataraṇikā)

3. kriyāntaraparicchede pravṛttā yā kriyām prati |

nirjñātaparimāṇā sū kāla ityabhidhīyate ||

Vākyapadīya, III. 9. 77.

will make it clear. We say : *godoham āste*, which means : 'he sits as long as the cows are milked.' Now, the milking of the cows limits the period of sitting. It does the function of time and is therefore recognized as time.

Now if time is nothing but the movement of the sun, the planets, etc. we are faced with the question : How is it that a meditating Yogi shut up in his cell, with his senses drawn in, as the tortoise draws in its limbs, is aware of time ? Certainly he does not perceive the movements of the sun, etc., or the dripping of water from a jar. How does he know then on leaving his *samādhi* or meditation that he had been meditating long ? When shortly after he has begun meditating, some one approaches and disturbs him, the Yogi exclaims rather sadly : "It is soon that my *samādhi* has been interrupted." How does he measure time ? How can he use the terms *ciram* (late) and *kṣipram* (soon), which are meaningless without the awareness of time.

To this, Bhartṛhari's answer reads as follows : Action is reflected in the mind, and then the reflected (and uninterrupted) moments of action are fused into one concept. This fusing itself is the measure of the movement of breath, hence it is *kāla*, as it gives the notion of time that has elapsed even in the absence of external motion as that of the sun.

The Buddhists' View as given by Bhartṛhari

Now there are certain schools of thought which do not recognize *kāla* as an independent entity. Such are the Buddhists, the Sāṃkhyas, and the Vendāntins. They argue that since the indivisible, unitary time is never the object of our parlance, and since actions, etc., which go to qualify time and diversify it, are really instrumental in human conduct there is little use in assuming the abstract invisible time which lacks all proof. If it be urged that because without the assumed *kāla*, *vyavahāra* (all human activity) is not possible, then they say : Let us accept it as an intellectual construction or a conceptual fusion of the various acts which would account

for the use of the language such as slow, quick, etc. This view is recorded by Bhartṛhari in III. 9. 87. The plain meaning is that time is purely subjective.¹ It is an intellectual fiction. The human mind pieces together the series of actions and the result is such notions as moment, day, month, etc. and the corresponding conventional language. The Tattvasaṅgraha by Śāntarakṣita repudiates time in a couple of *Kārikās* (629-630). According to the commentator, Kamalaśīla, they purport to mean that a particular impression (*ābhoga saṁskāra-viśeṣa*) is created in the mind of the hearers when they are addressed with the suggestive words: this is prior, this is posterior with reference to things or events emerging in a sequence. This impression leads to the knowledge that the things thus referred to are prior or posterior. Thus temporal as well as positional priority and posteriority being otherwise conceivable, both *kāla* and *dik* (space) are rejected by the Buddhists. Moreover, both time and space being originally (fundamentally) indivisible neither of them could be prior or posterior. If this priority or posteriority primarily belongs to other objects such as a flame, a body, etc. and only secondarily it is there in time and space by transference, then too they are dispensable.

Bhartṛhari simply takes note of this view and does not refute it, as indeed he does elsewhere. He accommodates a variety of philosophical views. In *Kārikā* III. 9. 58. he says: whether time is merely *jñānānugataśakti* viz. *buddhyanusaṁhāra*, a conceptual fusion or something positive, the truth is that we cannot do without time. All our activities are simply impossible without reference to time; they take place in time.

The Reality of the Present Time according to Bhartṛhari.

Following closely the Bhāṣyakāra, Bhartṛhari recognizes the three-fold division of time into the present, the past and the future. This division, he affirms, is empirical, yet he declares emphatically that there is no escape from it.²

¹ Yogavāsiṣṭha V. 49, 4; III. 60, 21; III. 60, 26.

² Vākyapadīya. III. 9. 48.

All action is cast in the form of one or another of these time-divisions. Time as conditioned by action which began but which is finished is 'past'; when the means of production of an action are ready and the action is expected, we say it is future. When however an action has begun but has not concluded, we say it is present time. According to Kaiyaṭa,¹ the past, the present and the future are merely particular moods of existence. Hence the future changes into the present and the present changes into the past. By existence Kaiyaṭa means not only real existence, but also ideal. It is the tree conceived by the mind and existing in it that is affirmed, denied or produced. Things absolutely non-existent such as the hare's horn are conceived by the mind, and are referred to by their names. This ideal or conceptual existence appears externally as material existence. If words such as 'tree' were to express only external existence, then it would do to say 'a tree' and it would be redundant to say, 'a tree is'. Again it would be a contradiction to say 'a tree is not'. And it would not be reasonable to speak as we do, 'a sprout has sprung up', for what is, cannot be said to be becoming. But once we accept the view of Kaiyaṭa, the use of *asti*, and *nāsti*, etc., has a purpose; it is there to denote the existence, etc., of the thing outside the mind.

But here Kaiyaṭa raises an interesting question: Can we qualify existence (*Sattā*) as future existence or past existence, or as existence of the future time, etc.? *Sattā*, which is derived from the present participle of $\sqrt{\text{as}}$ 'to be' necessarily implies the present. The existent is necessarily the present in an absolute sense; hence it would be inconsistent to talk of future or past existence. But if it be urged that the futurity or pastness of the substrata in which existence resides could justify the use of such expressions as future existence, we say, even then existence (*Sattā*) would not be present. Hence expressions like 'he had cows', 'he will have cows' are incapable of replacement by *gomān*, wherein the possessive

1. *avasthāviśeṣasyaivātītādīśāñjñā*.—Pradīpa on *Mahābhāṣya*. 5. 2, 49.

suffix is enjoined in the sense of the present.¹

The Bhāṣyakāra gives a very beautiful answer to all this. He explains the use of the future, past and present with regard to one and the same existent thing on the basis of its conjunction with the senses or absence of it. 'There are two different actions, one of the senses, the other of the mind. The action of the senses is approach, conjunction or contact. The action of the mind is conceiving. A person anxious to go to Pāṭaliputra says: "On the way to Pāṭaliputra which I am to traverse, there will be a well". When he has reached the well, he says: "The well is", when he leaves it behind and proceeds further, he says: "The well was". In all this, when we have this action of the senses (conjunction), we have the past and the future tenses (with their varieties): when, however, there is the action of the mind, we have the present tense."²

All this is summed up by Bhartṛhari in a couple of *Kārikās* (III. 9. 112, 113), and lucidly explained by Helārāja. The plain meaning of the first *Kārikā* is that existence is qualified by conjunction with the senses; for all linguistic usage is governed by the relation which a thing has with another in conjunction with it. As explained by Helārāja, a thing (*Satta*) becomes predicable only when we perceive it, for so long as it is not perceived, it is in no way different from non-existent. And, perception is possible only when there is conjunction with a sense. Hence when this conjunction is yet to be, in other words, when on the way, the well is yet to have conjunction with the sense of vision, we say: "a well will be". When this conjunction has already been there, we say: "The well was". When the conjunction takes place presently, we say: "The well is".

Now as the future and past times do not encroach upon the sphere of the present, the present too should not encroach upon theirs, and when the conjunction with a sense has already been effected or has yet to be effected, it should not be pos-

1. Pradīpa on Bhāṣya on 5. 2. 49.

2. Bhāṣya on 3. 3. 133.

sible to say : "The well is." To this, Bhartṛhari gives a reply in the next *Kārikā*. The mind conceives things as merely existent, and therefore there could be no bar to the use of the Present Tense, even when a conjunction has been or is yet to be, the proper spheres of the past and future tenses.

Now the objector says that we cannot speak of the present with respect to things that have been ever-existing, for there is no division of time in their case.¹ For instance, we should not say : "The mountains stand." But against this, it may be urged that the present which is *nowness* is an antithesis of the past and the future. Since things which have been ever-existing have neither the past nor the future time, the present is there by its very nature and in its own right, and needs no support from any quarter. To this the critic's reply is that these appellations, the past, the future and the present, apply only to things which are influenced by time ; and these are the things that have an origin. These appellations are explainable only on the basis of origination having a definite limit. Thus things or events are called future, when the means are present and production is expected; they are present, when after origination they persist; and they are past, when after origination they have perished. The appellation present therefore stands between the past and the future. Where there are no past and future, there is no present either ; for the present is antithetical to the past and the future, as declared by the Bhāṣyakāra.² Since things which are constant have no past and future, there is no present, so far as they are concerned. Not only that. Since there is no time-division in their case, there is no action, conditioning time. Action is a process, which determines time.

To this the Bhāṣyakāra's reply is : Yes, there are time-divisions even in their case.³ How? The actions of the kings (the motions of the sun, etc.) past, future and present, are the substratum of the standing of the mountains. This

1. nityapravṛtte ca kālavibhāgāt.—Var. on 3. 2. 123.

2. bhūtabhaviṣyatpratidvandvo vartamānaḥ—on 3. 2. 123.

3. santi ca kālavibhāgāḥ—Var. on 3. 2. 123.

explains such expressions as the mountains will stand, the mountains stand, the mountains stood.

Bhartṛhari elucidates this reply in a couple of *Kārikās* (III. 9. 80, 81). Things come to be differentiated by relation with other kings, not by themselves. Hence the standing of the mountains, the flowing of the rivers, etc. is qualified by the existence of other things related to them. The actions of the kings, etc. are said to be the substratum of the standing of the mountains, etc. ; for they qualify them. As the actions of the kings, etc. belong to three different periods, they possess succession and are of the nature of a process; the actions such as the standing of the mountains, by their relation with them, are assumed to possess the same characteristics ; hence the secondary use of the three tenses stands justified and therefore there could be no objection to the use of the present tense.¹

Bhartṛhari offers an alternative explanation in *Kārikā* 81. Actions such as cooking, splitting, etc. are known to have distinct parts—actions within them—and therefore have a sequence in time. Placing the pot on the hearth and the like are the distinct parts of cooking, lifting (the implement etc.) of the action of splitting. But the actions of standing of the mountains and the like, which do have parts but which being similar (non-distinct) are difficult to cognize, are shown to have succession and therefore different periods by the actions of the kings, etc. which consist of distinct parts and are known to belong to different periods. Hence the actions of the kings, etc. being determinations of the standing of the mountains, etc. are said to be their substrata and define their time. How the *Parvata-sthiti* is action, is explained by Bhartṛhari himself in III. 8. 26. The fact of even constant things being sustained by their substratum every moment, even when there is no sequence, is nothing different from origination (*janma*) which is doubtless action (*kriyā*).

Again the objector points out that there is little justifica-

1. III. 9. 80.

tion for the use of the Present Tense when an action goes on because of the non-achievement of the principal purpose, but which comes to an end and becomes a thing of the past, as the agent begins some other action or actions. It should not be reasonable to say 'we are living here', 'we are here performing a sacrifice for Puṣyamitra'. The priest, even when he is busy otherwise and is not performing the sacrifice, speaks thus, as he is still intent on performing the sacrifice, for he has not achieved the purpose, viz. the sacrificial fee. The Bhāṣyakāra replies that action is understood to be present, so long as the principal object is not achieved, it does not cease because some other actions which have their own distinct purpose, intervene. Hence the use of the Present Time is perfectly justified. But if it be insisted on that there is interruption by the intervening actions hence, the action is no longer present, but is past, the Bhāṣyakāra says that even if intervention is interruption, the action is present, not past. When we speak of Devadatta as: 'Devadatta eats' we know that while he is eating, he now smiles, now talks and now drinks water. Yet no denying the fact that the action of eating belongs to the present. If interruption does not affect the continuity of action in this case, why should it do in other cases?

This view of the present is explained by Bhartṛhari in a couple of *Kārikās* (III. 9. 82, 83). As explained by Helārāja, eating etc. is not a single action, it consists of a number of parts which follow one another in succession. This action seems to break off because of the intervening actions such as smiling, talking, etc.; yet it does not, for, unless there is satisfaction, the continuity of eating has to be recognized. As a matter of fact, the whole is not interrupted but the moments, past and future. And, they alone do not make action. The interruption is only apparent, for, there could be no cessation unless the fruit was achieved. A collection (series) of moments ending with its fruit such as seeing, is action. Even when physical action has ceased, mental action such as the desire to see continues till the former bears fruit; hence there

is, in fact, no cessation. The use of the Present Tense therefore has its justification.

There is yet another way of showing how other actions coming in between, do not interfere with the continuity of the (principal) action such as eating which therefore goes on in the present. The various intervening actions, such as smiling are no more than parts of the same action, such as eating, since they are secondary and helpful like sipping, etc. And parts do not intercept the whole. Surely Devadatta is not intercepted by his own limbs.¹

Now the objector turns a thorough sceptic and challenges the very existence of the present. He asserts that there is no such thing as the present time. He argues: Action that is finished is past, and that not yet finished (or undertaken) is future, but we cannot conceive of anything that is neither finished nor unfinished, there being no intermediate stage. Besides the past and the future, therefore, there is nothing else in between.² In other words, action is the state of being effected. In the course of this process, the moment that is past, existed and action for that moment was accordingly past; the moment that does not exist, is yet to come and be effected, the action qualified by that moment is future. And there is no such moment as may be both existent and non-existent, for that would be self-contradictory.

Again all action being imperceptible and only inferrable from its outcome is necessarily past and could be denoted only by the past tense. Rightly an intelligent young thinker addresses a crow the question: 'How are we to define your flight? Surely *patasi* (flies) cannot be said of your flight in the past, for that is over, nor can it be spoken of your flight in the future, for that too does not exist. The use of *patasi* would be justified only if the flight lay in the present. Were it so, we shall have to say that the whole world moves like-

1. III. 9. 84.

2. III. 9. 85.

wise and that the Himālayas too move.¹ That would be indeed absurd.

Then there is a view of the ancients (which you should also honour) that there is no movement in the world ; hence no time including the present. The ancients declare :

The wheel does not move, the arrow is not thrown, the rivers do not flow to the sea, the whole world is motionless and there is no active agent : he who views the state of thing thus is also not blind. The idea is repeated in a slightly different way : In all the three divisions of time, there is no motion ; how then do we say : "He goes."² If it be urged, says the objector, that action is present because it is there as it (action) is a state of being effected, a process, he would say that this too was untenable ; for a single thing by itself incapable of differentiation is not possessed of succession, which is action. A thing is or is not. What is, is not to be effected and therefore does not possess succession. What is not, could not in that condition of non-being, be capable of being effected and therefore possessed of succession. Surely a non-existent thing, devoid as it is of all properties, could not have any succession. There being no third category of things, there is *no one thing* that may be characterized as a state of being effected and therefore possessed of succession. How could it be then present³ ?

Again, if it be assumed that moments possessed of sequence, some prior, others posterior, constitute action and that this action continuing till fruition must be admitted to be in

1. Mīmāṃsako manyamāno yuvā medhāvisammataḥ ।

kakam smehānuprehati kim re patitalakṣaṇam ॥

anāgate na patasi atikrānte ca kaka na ।

yadi samprati patasi sarvo lokah pataty ayam ॥

Himavān api calati...Mahābhāṣya on 3. 2. 123.

2. na vartate cakram iṣur na pātyate na syandante saritaḥ sāgarāya ।

kūṭastho' yaṃ loko na vicesṭitāsti yo hy evaṃ paśyati so' py anandhaḥ ॥

anāgatam atikrāntam vartamānam iti trayam

sarvatra ca gatiḥ nāsti gacchatīti kim ucyate ॥

3. III. 9. 86.

the present, even this assumption would be wrong, points out the objector. For, the parts arising in succession are mutually unrelated ; they therefore are not at all simultaneous. It is only one single moment that is perceived to be present, and that being by itself undifferentiated has no succession. Nor can it be urged that many such successive moments are remembered simultaneously, for that is not possible ; because we remember as we perceive and not contrariwise ; and the one moment has not been perceived to possess succession, how could then remembrance give you a notion of succession¹ ?

Remembrance apart, the various moments could not constitute one single action ; for then everything would be both existent and non-existent, but that is not possible. Existence and non-existence are contradictory and exclusive of each other. To obviate this difficulty, we shall have to assume a common attribute of the different moments and this is that we assume that each one of the moments is able to effect action. But this would mean that there are a number of actions, not one. For what is assumed is that many moments have the common attribute, *kriyādharmā*, and not that all of them make one action. Hence the question, how action is present remains still unanswered.²

To all this Bhartṛhari gives the answer in *kārikā* III. 9. 89. Action consisting of a series of moments is assumed to be one. Moments having a definite succession and arising in pursuit of one definite object are termed action, which is one so long as the object is one. Although the moments are not simultaneous, when one is existent, another is non-existent, still they are present. For by 'present' we do not mean existent, but 'begun and not (yet) finished.' And that is true of that series of moments which continue to arise (and disappear) till fruition and which are unified conceptually. This series of moments alone is capable of producing action. And this is inferrable from its outcome. When an

1. III. 9. 87.

2. III. 9. 88.

aggregate of moments possessed of its characteristic succession is comprehended as existent, then this existence of it, is its presentness. The upshot of all this is : An aggregate of moments possesses succession. Though it is both existent and non-existent; each one of the moments conceived as mutually related by sequence and therefore existent, is present. True every moment by itself is not possessed of succession and is therefore not action, yet the sequence given rise to by other moments following it, is surely an object of our consciousness; hence there is nothing wrong with it.

The Bhāṣyakāra sums up the case for the present in the following words : The present does exist. It is not perceived like the motion of the sun. Yet it is there. The five lotus-fibres in the inside of a lotus-stalk, when being burnt are not noticed as being burnt, similarly subtle things are knowable only by inference. We use *gacchati* (he goes), for there is action which is present. How ? First, there is mental action, the desire to achieve something. This mental action leads to physical action. Both these actions, mental and physical, prior and posterior, ending with the production of the fruit are unified by the mind which has the power of piecing things together and presented as one action. The use of the Present Tense in *gacchati* is therefore perfectly justified.¹

That an aggregate of moments held together by the one common purpose is one action in the present has already been shown. Now, Bhartṛhari proceeds to show that an aggregate of moments does make one action otherwise also. This oneness is possible, for the mind is by virtue of the permanence of the impression created by perception, capable of piecing together even such things as are perceived in succes-

1. *asti vartamānaḥ kālaḥ । ādityagatīvan nopalabhyate ।
viśasya jvālā iva dahyamānā na lakṣyate vikṛtiḥ sannipāte ।
astitī taṃ vedayante tṛbhāvāḥ sūkṣmo hi bhavo' numatena gamyah ॥
kriyāpravṛttau yo hetus tadartham yad viceṣṭitam ।
tatsamīkṣya prayuñjīta gacchatīty avicārayan ॥*
—Mahābhāṣya on 8. 2. 128.

sion. Hence when an aggregate of actions with loose-hung parts is transferred to the mind and made into one concept, it is understood as present and one, being identified with the one concept.¹ If this is not conceded, absence of knowledge of the parts constituting the whole would result. It is true that remembrance is invariably based upon perception; but it is not true that things perceived in succession cannot be remembered simultaneously; for if it be so, we should have no notion of a hundred, etc. The reflex in the mind being looked upon as a concept leads us to say that there is one present time outside the mind. Once the present time is established, the past and the future also exist beyond doubt, as they are relative to the present.

ORTHODOX PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOL

Barring the Vaiśeṣika system, and the now extinct school of *Kālavāda*, the concept of time has not been discussed in great details in any other system of Indian Philosophy. Not that it is barren in this respect; as a matter of fact, it is a blooming orchard wherein blossom forth many a problem of Metaphysics. Any scholar, therefore, who undertakes the study of the different schools of philosophy even with a narrow and limited perspective is sure to find himself amply rewarded provided he takes care not to get embroiled in a quagmire of endless discussion. We have studied a number of works belonging to these schools and traced a number of references to the concept of time. On these we have based certain conclusions. They are given hereunder:

SĀṂKHYAS

According to the God-disbelieving Sāṃkhyas *kala* does not exist. This we learn from Ratnaprabhā, a commentary on the Śārirākabhāṣya² by Śaṅkarācārya which towards the end

1. III. 9. 90.

2. There are two schools of the Sāṃkhyas—God-believing and God-disbelieving vide Śāstradīpikā: "Dvividhaṃ ca Sāṃkhyam seśvaraṃ nirśvaraṃ ca 1. 1. 5). 3. 2. 2. I.

of the first *Sūtra* explicitly says—'Sāṃkhyaiḥ kālasyānāṅgikārāt'. Vācaspati Miśra fully explains why the Sāṃkhyas do not accept *Kāla*. Says he :—

Kālaś ca Vaiśeṣikābhimata eko nānāgatādibhedavyavahāraṃ pravartayitum arhati | tasmād ayaṃ yair upādhibhedair anāgatādivyavahārabhedam pratipadyate, santu ta evopādhayo' nāgatādivyavahārahetavaḥ, kṛtam antargadunā kāleneti Sāṃkhyācāryaḥ | tasmān na kālarūpatattvāntarābhyupagama iti !¹

"*Kāla* as conceived by the Vaiśeṣikas cannot be the cause of such usage as *anāgata* (not come, i. e. future). Therefore, let those limiting adjuncts by virtue of which *Kāla* leads to the variety of usage such as *anāgata* be themselves regarded as the cause. There is, therefore, no use in assuming the superfluous *Kāla*, say the teachers of Sāṃkhyā. Hence another substance *Kāla* is not to be accepted."

There are several other views or theories about *Kāla* in the God-disbelieving (*nirīśvara*) Sāṃkhyā. One of these is that *Kāla* is not altogether non-existent, and is an evolution of *Prakṛti*. The Mrgendravṛttidīpikā says—

pariṇāmaḥ pṛthagbhāvo vyavasthākramataḥ sadā |

bhūtaiśyadvartamānātmā kālarūpo vibhāvyaṭe ||²

That this view did not appeal to other Sāṃkhyā teachers is clear from the statement of the Mrgendravṛttidīpikā itself when it repudiates this. Says it—

Sāṃkhyābhyupagatas tāvat kālo na yuktaḥ | yato bhoṭkur bhogaḍhikaraṇatvena sthitāyās tanor vṛddhitaruṇādyavasthaya' numīyate pariṇativyatiriktaḥ kālaḥ |³

"Time as accepted by the Sāṃkhyas cannot be maintained since one is to infer from the stages of growth, youth etc. of the body which is the substratum of the experiences of the experiencing self, that *Kāla* is the thing other than the modification of *Prakṛti*."

1. Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī, under Kārikā 33.

2. 10. 14.

3. 10. 14.

There is another view about *Kāla*, viz., *Kāla* is nothing but *Prakṛti*, otherwise known as *Pradhāna*. Thus says Ma-dhvācārya, "Since the *Pradhāna* theory recognizes only twenty five principles, which do not cover the principle of *Kāla*, the *Pradhāna* itself has to be called *Kāla*" :

pradhānavāde pañcaviṃsatitattvebhyo bahirbhūtasya kālatattvasyābhāvāt pradhānam eva kālasābdena vyavahriyatām |¹

Another view accepts *Kāla* as merely action. The *Yuktidīpikā* expressly says—"There is no such thing as *Kāla*: it is only the actions that get the designation of *Kāla*²."

There is a *Sāṃkhya Sūtra*—'Dikkālāv ākāśādibhyaḥ' (2.12.). The *Bhāṣyakāra Vijñānabhikṣu* interprets this *Sūtra* and the way he does it, shows that he accepts *Kāla* as both *nitya* and *anitya*, eternal and non-eternal. Says he:

dikkālāv ākāśādibhyaḥ (Sāṃkhyasūtra 2. 12.) | nityau yau dikkālau tāv ākāśaprakṛtibhūtau prakṛter guṇaviśeṣāv eva | ato dikkālayor vibhūtvopapattiḥ | yau tu khaṇḍadikkālau tau tattadupādhisamyogād ākāśād utpadyete ityarthah | ādisābdenopādhipgrahaṇād iti | yady api tattadupādhi-viśiṣṭākāśam eva khaṇḍadikkālau tathāpi viśiṣṭasyātiritatābhyupagamavādena Vaiśeṣikanaye śrotrasya kāryatāvat tatkāryatvam atroktam |³

The space and time which are eternal are the *Prakṛti* (the primary cause) and ether (*Ākāśa*) and are no more than the *guṇas* of *Prakṛti*. Hence space and time are justifiably *vibhu* (all-pervasive). The space and time which are parts, proceed, however, from *Ākāśa* on coming into contact with manifold limiting adjuncts. Although *Ākāśa* as conditioned by the various limiting adjuncts is the space and time in parts, still what is conditioned is looked upon as something distinct. They (*Khaṇḍadikkālau*) are, therefore, here said to

1. Parāśarasamhitābhāṣya 1. 20.

2. na kūlo nāma kaścit padārtho' sti, kin tarhi kriyāsu kālasamjñā | (50).

3. Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya Ed. Kashi (Chowkhamba) Sanskrit Series, Vol. 67, 1928, p. 82

have been created as the ear is held as a creation by the Vaiśeṣikas.

Aniruddhabhaṭṭa, however, does not accept twofold *Kāla*. Says he :—

tattadupādhibhedād ākāśam eva dikkāśābdavācyaṃ |
tasmād ākāśe'ntarbhūtau¹ |

Because of the various limiting adjuncts *Ākāśa* itself is expressed by the words *dik* and *kāla*, hence both time and space are contained in the *Ākāśa*. The great Vedāntin Mahādeva, too, agrees with Aniruddhabhaṭṭa.²

There is another view expounded in the *Vṛttānta* which will close the list of various views in the *Nirīśvara Sāṃkhya*. It is :

'kāśaś ca bhūtam, bhavad, bhaviṣyad iti vyavahriyamānapadārtha-vyatirekeṇa na svatanthro' stī'³

kāla is nothing besides, and independent of, objects spoken of as past, present and future. So an object like a jar spoken of as past is the past time, the object spoken of as present is the present time and so on.

YOGA

The followers of Patañjali who belong to the God-believing Sāṃkhya school accept only *kṣaṇa* or moment as time while saying that all times like the *muhūrta*, *yāma*, day and night are mental constructions. Vijñānabhikṣu says in his *Yoga Vārttika*—“Now there is no time besides *kṣaṇa*. Divisions of time beginning with *muhūrta* and ending with *Mahākāla* simply do not exist. This is what he incidentally establishes as the settled proposition of his own *Śāstra*. He further says :—

idāṇīm kṣaṇātiriktaḥ kālo nāsti muhūrttādirūpo mahākāla-
paryyanta itī prasaṅgāt svaśāstrasiddhāntam avadhārayati |
muhūrttāhorātrādayo buddhikalpitasamāhārā eva | Comment

1. Aniruddhavṛtti on Sāṃkhyasūtra. 2. 12.

2. yadyapy upādhiśiṣṭākāśa eva dikkālau |
(Vedāntimahādevavyākhyā on Sāṃkhya sūtra. 2. 12.)

3. Vṛttānta, Māṇsollāsa on Stotra-verse 41.

on Vyāsabhāṣya on Sūtra 'kṣaṇatatkramayoḥ samyamād vivekajaṃ jñānam.' (Pātañjala Yogasūtra, 3.52.)

"The *muhūrttas*, the days, the nights, etc. are only mental accumulation of *kṣaṇas*". The Vyāsabhāṣya here explains the Sūtra *kṣaṇatatkramayoḥ*, etc. (3.52.) in a lucid way. Says it: "The *kṣaṇa* and its succession are not comprehended cumulatively in the object. Therefore, the *muhūrttas*, the days, the nights, etc. are comprehended in the mind. Indeed *kāla* has no factual existence, but is only a mental construction. It is only a *vikalpa* which appears to the common man in abstract meditation. The *kṣaṇa* is a reality".¹

Here we have further comment of Vyāsa :—*apakarṣa-paryantaṃ dravyaṃ paramāṇuḥ | . . . tatpravāhāvicchedas tu kramaḥ, kṣaṇatatkramayoḥ nāsti vastusamāhāra iti... tenaikena kṣaṇena kṛtsno lokaḥ pariṇāmam anubhavati* !²

"A moment (*kṣaṇa*) is the ultimate minimum of time. It cannot be further divided up and the continuous flow of such moments is their course (*krama*)... Their uninterrupted course is what is called time... The whole world passes through a mutation in only one moment, so all the external qualities of the world are relative to this present moment."

MIMĀṂSĀ

In Mīmāṃsā the concept of *kāla* is treated according to its two schools of the Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras. We first deal with the Bhāṭṭa school.

The Bhāṭṭas

The Bhāṭṭa school recognizes *kāla* as a substance. It is eternal and all-pervasive. Though one, it gets appellations of *kṣaṇa* (moment), *māsa* (month), etc. on account of the

1. *kṣaṇatatkramayoḥ nāsti vastusamāhāra iti buddhisamāhāro muhūrttāhorātrādayaḥ | sa khalv ayaṃ kālo vastuśūnyo'pi buddhinirmāṇaḥ śabdajñānānupūti laukikānāṃ vyutthitadarśanānāṃ vastusvarūpa ivāva-bhāsate | kṣaṇas tu vastupatitaḥ kramāvalambī—Pātañjalayogasūtra, Ānandāśrama Series Vol. 47, 1932, p. 170-171.*

2. Ibid.

limiting adjuncts. Again, in spite of its all-pervading character *kāla* appears to be limited on account of the limiting adjuncts. Thus fifteen winks (*nimeṣas*) make one *kāṣṭha*, thirty of them make one *muhūrta*, thirty of these make one day, thirty days make a month and twelve months make a year and so on.¹

Further, the Bhāṭṭas believe that *kāla* is perceptible by all the six senses. Thus says the Mānameyodaya—"sa ca kālaḥ ṣaṁdriyagrāhyaḥ" ⁽²⁾ *kāla* is perceptible by the six senses. Śāstradīpikā, however, differs slightly from this view. It says—"kālo na svāntantryeṇendriyair grhyate, atha ca viśayeṣu sveṣu grhyamāṇeṣu tadviśeṣaṇatayā sarvair apīndriyair grhyate!"³

'*Kāla* is not perceived independently by the senses. But along with the perception of various objects *kāla* is also perceived as their qualification by all the senses'.

That according to this school *kāla* is perceptible, is also to be gathered from the statement of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. Says he :—

*kālasya ca rūpādihīnasya mīmāṃsakādibhiḥ sarvendriyagrāhyatvābhyupagamāt*⁴ !

"The Mīmāṃsakas etc. accept *kāla* as colourless and perceptible by all the senses."

Prābhākaras

In the Prābhākara school *kāla* is regarded as one, eternal and all-pervading as in the Vaiśeṣika school. In the Tantrarahasya of Rāmānujācārya it is expressly stated:—

tatra cābhyupagamasiddhāntanyāyena Kaṇādatantrasiddha eva prameyavargo'ṅgikriyate, tasya tatpratipādanārtham

1. *kālasyaṁpi vibhūtvē py aupādihiko bhedavyavahāro'sti |*
sa yathā-pañcadaśa nimeṣāḥ kāṣṭhā | tābhis triṁśatā muhūrtaḥ |
te triṁśad ahorātraḥ | taiḥ tāvadbhir māsaḥ | tair dvādaśabhiḥ |
saṁvatsaraḥ | taiḥ ca krameṇa yugādāya iti" |

Mānameyodaya, Theosophical Publishing House, Adyar, 1933. p. 191

2. Ibid p. 190

3. 1. 1. 5.

4. Advaitasiddhi, Nirṇaya Sagar Press Edition, 1917, p. 819.

pravṛttatvāt; na tu prthag atra vyutpādyate | tatrāpyanabhi-
matāṁśo nirākriyate; viśeṣāṁśas tu vyutpādyate ①

"We adopt here the cognizable categories recognised by Kaṇāda in the Vaiśeṣika Darśana. mainly devoted to their treatment. Whatever therein does not accord with our view is discarded, the rest is accepted."

After this have been enumerated the very nine substances which the Vaiśeṣikas accept. Among these one is *kāla*. Beyond this no mention of *kāla* is made in any of the texts of this school. We, therefore, presume, keeping in mind the statement of Rāmānujācārya, that the Prābhākaras accept the Vaiśeṣika concept of time in toto.

VEDĀNTA

Now taking up the Vedānta, we find that the Brahma-sūtra or the Śāṅkarabhāṣya thereon nowhere deal with *kāla*, though in works of Vedānta such as the Vedānta Paribhāṣā we do have a treatment of the empirical objects such as *Ākāśa*. Hence the Siddhāntabindu declares—Time and Space have not been noticed, for there is no evidence of their existence. ② Yet the Vedānta Paribhāṣā seems to recognize the empirical time. In order to show that the definition of *Pramā* (correct knowledge) as 'anadhigatābādhitārchaviṣayañānatvam' ③ does not suffer from the defect of being too narrow, leading to the exclusion of *dhārāvāhika pratyakṣa*, it reads—"nīrūpasyāpi kālasyendriyavedyatvābhyupagamena dhārāvāhikabuddher api pūrvapūrvajñānaviṣayatattatkaṣaṇaviśeṣa-viśiṣṭaviṣayakatvena na tatrāvyāptiḥ." ④ This means that the author believes in the existence of *kāla* and holds it as directly perceptible.

According to the Vedāntins *kāla* is merely *avidyā* (nescience). Thus says Madhusūdana Sarasvatī while com-

1. Gaekwad Oriental Series, No. XXIV, Baroda, 1956, p. 17. Prameya-pariccheda.

2. Dikṣālaṅkāra tv aprāmāṇikatvān noktau under verse 8.

3. Adyar Library Series 84, Adyar, 1942, p. 3.

4. ibid, p. 4.

menting on the eighth verse in the Siddhāntabindu, "kāla is merely *avidyā* for that is the substratum of all¹."

NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA

Time is conceived in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system as a unique, all-pervading and eternal substance. It is the static background against which events happen and from which they derive their chronological order. It possesses no specific physical quality like colour and thus cannot be an object of external perception. Neither is it perceived internally, for the mind has no jurisdiction over external or non-psychical objects independently of a physical sense-organ. The question naturally arises: What is the source of our knowledge that time exists? The Vaiśeṣika answers that the knowledge of time is arrived at by a series of inferences. The notions of priority (*aparatva*) and posteriority (*paratva*), of simultaneity (*yaugapadya*) and succession (*ayaugapadya*) and of quickness (*kṣipratva*) and slowness (*ciratva*) constitute the grounds (*linga*) of the inference of the existence of time². The Nyāya Vaiśeṣika gives a comprehensive treatment of *kāla*. Here we have merely touched on it in its barest outlines. We propose to take it up in fuller details later³.

SAMPRADAYAS

There have been, and still are, many sects in India whose founders have expounded, according to their light many a new view on several metaphysical and mystical problems. These have been further elaborated by their followers with the result that there has grown a mass of literature dealing with sectional doctrinaires. After wading through it we have found a number of references to the philosophy of time which are highly interesting in the variety and richness of their

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1. "kālas tv avidyaiva, tasyā ova sarvādhāratvāt" I
 2. kālaḥ parāparavyatikarvyaugapadyacirakṣipratyayalingam I
 (3) —Prāśastapādabhāṣya, Ed. Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series p. 332.
 3. The author proposes to publish shortly an independent study of the 'Time-concept in Indian thought'.

content. Below we present a brief study of the time-concept as we found it in these *Sampradāyas*.

RĀMĀNUJA

We take first the *Rāmānuja Sampradāya*. Here we have three Realities, namely, *Cit*, *Acit*, and *Īśvara*. The *Acit* is further divided into three parts—pure *sattva*, mixed *sattva* and void *sattva* (*śuddha sattvam*, *miśrasattvam*, *sattvaśūnyam ceti*). Out of these *kāla* is *sattvaśūnya*. It is the cause of the modification of *Prakṛti* and its evolutes and is itself modified as *kāla*, *kāṣṭha*, etc. It is eternal. It is Lord's field of activity and His body¹.

In another work of this *Sampradāya*, the following definition of *kāla* is given :—

atītādivyavahārahetuḥ kālaḥ | kālikena sarvādhārat-
vaṃ tallakṣaṇam |²

"*Kāla* is the basis for such parlance as past. *Kāla* is so called because it is the substratum of everything in so far as everything is comprehended by it."

Here *Prakṛti*, *Puruṣa* and *Kāla* are regarded as the playthings of the Lord (*Paramēśituḥ kṛīḍāparikaraḥ*). *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa* become means with which the Lord effects His purpose, viz., the creation and the dissolution of the Universe. *Kāla* does merely an assisting job. It is a mere *aide* as says the *Yatīndramatadīpikā* :—

evambhūtaḥ kāla Īśvarasya kṛīḍāparikaro bhavati |
līlāvibhūtāv Īśvaraḥ kālādhīna eva kāryam karoti |³

"Thus defined *kāla* is the Lord's field of activity. In display of His (painless) activity the Lord effects His purpose with the help of *kāla*." The implication of the above statement of the *Dīpikā* evidently is that it is only in Lord's playful activity (*Līlāvibhūti*) that *kāla* is of any

132 1. "sattvaśūnyam kālaḥ | ayam ca prakṛtiprakṛtānām pariṇāmahe-
tuḥ kalākāṣṭhādirūpeṇa pariṇato nitya Īśvarasya kṛīḍāparikaraḥ śarīram ca |"
Tattvatraṇya, Chowkhamba Series Nos. 22 & 26, p. 62.

2. Anantārya, Siddhāntasiddhāntjāna. (Jadāpariccheda) 1899, p. 49

3. Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series, Vol. 50, 1906, p. 50

use, in eternal divine glory (*Nityavibhūti*), *kāla* is superfluous.¹

Time is one indivisible entity. As it is so, it is deemed to have undergone modifications such as *kṣaṇa*, *lava* and it is possible to carry on with the all-pervading (time). The modifications such as *kṣaṇa* are also all-pervading for relation with each and every *kṣaṇa* is perceived in all objects. On this it has been said—

kālasyaikasyaiva kṣaṇalavādirūpeṇa pariṇāmāṅgīkārad
vibhinnavyavahāropapattiḥ | ... kṣaṇādayaḥ pariṇāmā api
sarvagatā eva, ekaikakṣaṇādisambandhasya sarvapadārtheṣu
pratīteḥ |

ekenaiva kṣaṇenāśya viśvasyāpi viśeṣaṇāt |

kālavat tat kṣaṇānāñ ca vyāpitvam avasiṣyate ||

ity ukteḥ |²

‘kecit tu śaḍindriyavedyaḥ kāla ity apy āhuḥ’.³

“As all this is qualified by the one moment (*kṣaṇa*) the moments of time are, like time itself, held to be pervasive.”

Some, however, affirm that *kāla* (time) is comprehensible by the six senses. A pot is, for it is an object of ocular perception, as admitted by all. Being is here no more than being related to time.

A few teachers of this school accept *Kāla* as one and eternal in both the *Vibhūtis*—*Līlavibhūti* and *Nityavibhūti*—of the Lord and believe that one, eternal, and all-pervading time gets appellations of moment (*kṣaṇa*) etc. on account of the limiting adjuncts, of solar motion, etc. They say :—

ayaṃ ca kālaḥ śaḍindriyavedyaḥ | ghaṭaḥ sann iti
cākṣuṣādipratīteḥ sarvasiddhatvāt, tatra sattvasya kāla-
sambandhitvamātrarūpatvāt |

ayaṃ ca kālo nityo vibhur eka eva | kṣaṇādivyavahāras
tu ekasyāpy upādhibhedād upapadyate |⁴

135 1. “Nityavibhūtau tu kālasya vidyamānatve’pi tasya na svātantryam |
kecit tu tatra kālo nāstīti vadanti” | Yatīndramatadīpikā, p. 50.

2. Anantārya, Siddhāntasiddhāñjana, (Jaḍapariccheda), 1899. p. 49.

3. Yatīndramatadīpikā, Ed. as noted earlier, p. 51.

4. Siddhāntasiddhāñjana p. 49 and 50.

In essentials this view seems to be influenced by the Vaiśeṣika system.

VALLABHA

The Ācāryas of the Vallabha Sampradāya do not accept *Kāla* as a separate entity. According to them *Kāla* is non-distinct from *Brahman*. It is *Brahman* itself. As the Vidvanmaṇḍana says—

“yadi kālasyāpi Brahmatvam eva manuṣe tadā om iti brūmaḥ | ata eva “kālosmī” ti (Śrīmadbhagavadgītā, II. 32.)—bhagavadvākyam “kālarūp’o vatirṇa” ityādy api |”

‘If you think *Kāla* too is nothing but *Brahman*, then we say : “We agree”. Hence the Lord says—“I am time”. (Gītā II. 32) and also that “I have manifested myself as *Kāla*,” etc.,

Just as the Vaiśeṣikas accept *Kāla* as one eternal and independent substance and believe that the empirical divisions of it into moments, hours, days, etc. are caused by the limiting adjunct of solar motion, etc. so do the teachers of this school accept *Brahman* as the one entity with which they equate *Kāla* and believe that the divisions of it into moments, etc. are likewise, limitations (*upādhibhedas*) caused by solar motion.

MADHVA

In the Madhvasampradāya *Kāla* is believed to be a substance. The Padārthasaṅgraha of Padmanābha enumerates ten substances (*Dravyas*)² of which one is *Kāla*. The function of *Kāla* is to limit the living period of beings, (*āyurvayavasthāpakāḥ kālāḥ*). That is why God (*Paramātmā*) and (*muktas*) have no limited period of existence (*āyurmaryyādā*) for, their connection with time is non-existent (*kālasambandhābhāvāt*). Time, the Ācāryas of this school say, is not one but many, assuming different forms like *kṣaṇa* (moment), *lava*, etc. (*kṣaṇa-lavādyanekarūpaḥ*). According to a section

1. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series p. 12.

2. “tatna dravyaguṇakarmasāmānyaviśiṣṭānśiṣṭisāktisādrśyābhāvā daśa padārthāḥ” |

of this school *kāla* is an entity created and destroyed and hence non-eternal. They say : *Kālopādānaṃ prakṛtir eva*. Some others among them contradict them and affirm—*Kālopādānaṃ na prakṛtiḥ | pūrva-pūrvakāla evottarottarakālopādānaṃ |*

This view is repudiated in the *Mādhvasiddhāntasāra*¹ with clear and forceful arguments. Not only is *Kāla* not destroyed, it is believed to be existent even at the time of the dissolution of the creation. The *Bhāgavata* says :—

sontaḥśarīre' rpitabhūtasūkṣmaḥ

kālātmikāṃ śaktim udīrayāṇaḥ |

Kāla in this school is believed to be its own substratum and the proof for this is the notions like 'now it is morning, (*idāṇiṃ prātaḥ*). It is also the substratum of all and the proof for this is the notions like 'now there is a pitcher' (*idāṇiṃ ghaṭaḥ*). Although *kāla* is believed to be created by God (vide *Bhāgavata* passage quoted above) it is eternal and ever-recurrent (continuum).

In the *Mādhva* school all *Padārthas* are believed to be perceivable. Soul, Mind and Time are directly perceived while Sound (*Śabda*) etc. are perceived with the help of the sense-organs.² *Kāla*, therefore, according to the *Mādhvas*, is a perceptual datum.

NIMBĀRKA

The *Ācāryas* of the *Nimbārka* school accept three categories of *Cit*, *Acit* and *Māyā*. Of these *Acit* is divided into *Prākṛta*, *Aprākṛta* and *Kāla*. *Kāla* is, therefore, defined as a nonsentient substance, different from *Prākṛta* and *Aprākṛta*. It is further described as eternal, all-pervasive and cause for such usage as past, present and future.

We do not find any detailed references to time in this school which may deserve notice. We, therefore, leave it

1. Vide chapter on *Kāla* (*Kālaprakaraṇa*) in *Mādhvasiddhāntasāra*.

2. Cf. *ātmanamanahkālādayaḥ sākṣād eva sākṣiṇo viṣayāḥ, śabdādayas tu bahir indriyadvārā—*

—*Padārthasaṅgraha, Indriyaprakaraṇa*.

and pass on to our next topic of discussion—the concept of time in unorthodox philosophical schools.

UNORTHODOX SCHOOLS.

After having studied the concept of time in the orthodox Brahmanical systems of thought, we now turn our attention to how it is conceived in the unorthodox systems. Under this head we propose to study the concept of time in three systems—

Jainism, Buddhism and Cārvāka.

JAINISM

In the Jaina philosophy *Kāla* is as much a real substance as the five others, viz. *Jīva*, *Dharma*, *Adharma*, *Pudgala* and *Ākāśa*.¹ It is described as the accompanying cause or condition (*sahakārikāraṇa*) or *asamavāyikāraṇa*, as the Vaiśeṣikas call it, of the modification of substances.

There was, however, a school among the Jainas which did not believe in the independent existence of time. Thus, for example, Kundakundācārya, the great Jain thinker in his twenty-fifth Gāthā defines empirical time and then does not say whether time is included in the *Pudgala Dravya* or not.

In the Tattvatraya too this view is presented as the first proposition which is sought to be rejected². Although later on this is repudiated, yet it serves its purpose to show that there existed a school among the older Jainas which subscribed to the view that time as a substance does not exist. That some Jaina teachers do not accept time as a substance is also shown by Guṇaratna when he says—
ye kecanācāryāḥ kālaṃ dravyaṃ nābhyupayanti kintu

1. The Jaina philosophers divide a substance into two categories; *Jīva* and *Ajīva*. Then the *Ajīva* substance is described as five-fold: “Pudgaladharmādharmākāśakālabhedena pañcadhā !” cf. *Dravya Saṃgraha* by Nemi Candra, First Chapter and Tattvārthasūtra by Umā Svāmin, Fifth Chapter.

2. “kecit kālo nāstīty āhuḥ” !

—Tattvatraya Ed. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, p. 66. Nos. 22 & 26.

dharmādidravyāṇām paryāyam eva, tanmate dharmādharmākāśapudgalajīvākhyapañcāstikāyātmako lokah. | ye tu kalam dravyam icchanti tanmate śaḍdravyātmako lokah. | pañcānām dharmādidravyāṇām kāladravyasya ca tatra sadbhāvāt ¹

“Those of the teachers who do not recognize the substance *kāla*, but regard it as a *dharma-like* substance view this world as constituted of five *āstikāyas* of *dharma*, *adharma*, *pudgala*, *jīva* and *ajīva*. Those who hold *kāla* as a substance look upon this world as made up of six substances.”

The two sects among the Jains seem to be at variance on the acceptability of time. The Digambaras among them seem to accept it as they read the Sūtra as ‘*kālaś ca*’ (Tattvārthasūtra 5.38) ‘time is’, the Śvetāmbaras among them do not seem to agree with this for they read the Sūtra with a variant ‘*kālaś cety eke*’, ‘some say time is’.

BUDDHISM

The Buddhists do not accept *kāla*. Varavaramuni clearly says—“The Buddhists and others believe that there is no *kāla*.” The same idea is expressed in Brahmavidyābhāṣa in the following words :

Bauddhānām mate kṣaṇapadena ghaṭādir eva padārtho vyavahriyate, na tu tadatiriktaḥ kaścit kṣaṇo nāma kālosti... kṣaṇikaḥ padārtha iti vyavahāras tu bhedakalpanayā ²

The Buddhists assert that *kṣaṇa* is no other than objects such as a jar. There is no time such as a *kṣaṇa*. ‘A thing is momentary’, is an expression based on the assumed differentiation. Śivārkamaṇidīpikā too does not accept time :

Bauddhānām mate vastutaḥ kālo nāsti | udyann eva svarasabhaṅguro ghaṭādiḥ kṣaṇaparikalpanāmātranimittaṃ bhavati | sa ca ghaṭādiḥ svodayavināśaparikalpitakṣaṇavattvāt kṣaṇiko’pi bhavati, vapuṣmāñcchilāputraka itivat | vastutaḥ svavyatiriktakṣaṇābhāvāt svayam eva kṣaṇo’pi bhavati teṣāṃ prakriyā ³

1. Tarkarāhasyadīpikā, a commentary on Śaḍdārśanasamuccaya ed. by Luigi Sualì, Ed. Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1905 p. 162-163.

2. 2. 2. 20.

3. 2. 2. 19.

"In the opinion of the Buddhists *kāla* does not exist. A jar etc. which is perishable by nature in the very act of emerging becomes the basis for the assumption of *kṣaṇa*.

"The Buddhists believe in the *kṣaṇabhāṅgavāda*; that is, an object exists only for a moment after which it perishes and then in the next moment it becomes another object. That is why in Buddhist texts the brevity of life is emphasised most. 'Brief is the life of human beings,' says *Samyutta Nikāya*... 'none to whom death cometh not.'¹ Even of *Brahmā*, whose day is of a thousand years, it is said that 'his life is little'², not for long.³ This is how the Buddhist mind speculates on time.

CĀRVĀKA OR LOKĀYATA

Now, taking up the *Cārvāka* or *Lokāyata* system we may say that it accepts only four 'Bhūtas', viz; earth, water, air, and fire.⁴ The *Cārvākas* do not include *kāla* in them. In their system, therefore, the existence of *kāla* will have to be established by such usage as 'here is a jar' (*idāṇiṃ ghaṭaḥ*) which is based on direct perception, for, without the assumption of *kāla* such usage is not possible.

1. 1. 188.

2-3. 1. 143. For a detailed analysis of the time-conception in Buddhist philosophy see A. K. Coomaraswami, *Time and Eternity*, Berne.

4. 'Atha catvāri bhūtāni bhūmivāryanalālāḥ'

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CONCEPTION OF SPACE (*Dik*) IN THE VĀKYAPADĪYA

Bhartṛhari holds space to be a Power or a Force (*Śakti*) along with time. Says he :

dik sādhanam kriyā kāla iti vastvabhidhāyinaḥ |
śaktirūpe padārthānām atyantam anavasthitāḥ ||

III 6. 1.

By *Śakti* he means something dependent i. e. something which abides in its substratum and has no existence independently of it. Space cannot be a substance, as held by the Vaiśeṣika, for it is a *Śakti* which is to be inferred from its effect of helping things hold together. Such a *Śakti* cannot be expressed by a single word or phrase and has to be defined. The required definition of space Bhartṛhari gives us in *Kārikās* 2 and 3 of the *Dik Samuddeśa* :

vyatirekasya yo hetur avadhipratipādyayoḥ |
ṛjv ityeva yato' nyena vinā buddhiḥ pravartate ||
karmano jātibhedānām abhivyaktir yadāśrayā |
sā svair upādhibhir bhinnā śaktir dig iti kathyate ||

III. 6. 2-3.

Dik is a *Śakti* which is the cause of differentiation (*vyatireka*) between a limit and an object sought to be limited by it, which again is the cause of the notion of straightness without reference to any other thing and which presents the lower species of motions such as rotatory, horizontal etc. This *Śakti*, though one, is diversified by its limiting adjuncts. As explained by Helārāja, the relation between two things, one being prior and another posterior to it, is an adventitious quality produced in them, which certainly is no part of their nature; for that is incapable of producing it. It must, therefore, have another cause, and that cause is *Dik* (space). If it be urged that this (new) relation may be the effect of a

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universal, etc., we say no, for we are not conscious of our notion of it being coloured by a universal, etc. By the process of elimination, therefore, it is *Dik* that is the cause of it and nothing else. Hence the Vaiśeṣikas say : 'The characteristic of *Dik* is that it is from or on account of it that there arises the fact that this thing is here or there from this other thing.' Says Kaṇāda :

ita idam iti yatas tad diśo liṅgaṃ—Vai. Sūtra, II. 2. 10.

Since *Dik* is knowable only by inference and is understood as a qualification of things, it cannot be an independent substance. *Dik* is not perceptible like substances such as earth. Though *Dik* is one, yet by virtue of its limiting adjuncts, it appears as many and is spoken of as ten. It is the conjunction of the sun with a particular part of the horizon that is the cause of our notion of the east, the west, etc.

Now if an accessory cause such as conjunction with the sun is to be accepted to explain our notion of the east or the west, etc., why not dispense with *Dik* altogether, asks the objector? The reply is that the conjunction is not by itself either prior or posterior, which relation is admittedly a product of *Dik*. Nor can it be advanced that time can be that effective cause in place of *Dik*; for it is also equally the cause of the notion of the relation of mutual priority and posteriority. Because, these notions produced by time and space belong to two different spheres, this necessitates the assumption of these two distinct entities. The relation of priority and posteriority between finite bodies (corporeal things) is caused by space and that between the parts of an action, or between two actions having two different substrata, in the form of succession, is caused by time. This is set forth in *Kārikā* III. 6. 4 as follows :

parāparatve mūrtānāṃ deśabhedanibandhane |

tata eva prakalpyete kramarūpe tu kālataḥ ||

It may be noted that the Text of the Vākyapadīya and of the Helārājīya (the Commentary thereon) is generally corrupt but at places so horribly spoilt by the unintelligent scribe that it is a challenge to the most learned among

scholars. Even the most ingenious fail to hit upon the correct reading. The confusion is indeed baffling. In the above *Kārikā*, we have changed the original reading '*kramarūpe na kalpataḥ*' to '*kramarūpe tu. kālataḥ*', for that alone makes sense, and has, besides, the support of Helārāja who remarks : 'pūrvam abhūd bhaviṣyati param iti tu kriyāpaurvāparyam kālāśaktikṛtapratibandhābhyānujñāvaśād vyavatiṣṭhata iti.'

As explained by Helārāja, our notions of prior and posterior in respect of finite things arise from their conjunction with a place which is prior or posterior, but a place owes this priority or posteriority to space (*Dik*).

Not only that. *Dik* (space) is also the cause of the hypothetical relation of priority and posteriority between infinite things on the one hand, and finite things on the other. Hence there is no escape from it. Now *ākāśa* is one, but this one *ākāśa* comes to be differentiated by objects in association with it. Thus conditioned, it has various conjunctions and disjunctions with the parts of finite substances. It is space itself qualified as prior or posterior, east or west that functions to relate the assumed parts of the *ākāśa*. Thus a group of stars conjoined with prior *ākāśa* is termed prior, and another conjoined with posterior *ākāśa* is termed posterior. All this is beautifully expressed in *Kārikā* III. 6. 5.¹

Now an objector makes an attempt. He urges that the assumption that space possesses *pūrvatva* and *paratva* as parts of its nature, involves the fault technically called *anavasthā* and asks if space can have such parts as intrinsic or integral to it. He also asks—what is wrong with the places that they are incapable of having such parts? This is answered in *Kārikā* III. 6. 6.² That a place is a container or a receptacle is its own nature, it is not dependent upon the power of something else; but priority or posteriority is no part of its

1. *ākāśasya pradeśena bhūgaiś cānyaiḥ prthak prthak* |
sā samyogavibhāgānām upādhitvāya kalpato ||

2. *diśo vyavasthā deśānām digvyavasthā na vidyate* |
śaktayaḥ khalu bhāvānām upakūraprabhāvitāḥ ||

nature. When a place comes to have this adventitious quality, it must be due to a cause outside it and that cause is space. But in the case of space, priority or posteriority is not dependent upon anything else, it is a part of its nature. And space, being infinite, cannot assume the character of a receptacle in addition to its quality *pūrvāparatva*, for which it would require a cause. But space must be a principle such as is inferable from its effect, priority or posteriority, viz. it must be of the nature of priority and posteriority. This is cryptically put down in the first half of the *Kārikā* 'diśo vyavasthā deśānām digvyavasthā na vidyate'. Every thing has its own unique nature; hence space cannot be both a receptacle and have the nature of priority and posteriority. Things come to have varied or complex nature only under the influence of other things in relation with them. And, if a substance were assumed to possess a variety of *Śaktis*, it would work independently of accessory causes and might produce all sorts of effects.

Bhartrhari once again emphasizes that *Dik* is a Power (*Śakti*) and that priority and posteriority form its very nature. It is the condition of the priority and posteriority in places, but priority and posteriority are its own inherent qualities which are not due to any other external object. The *Dik* which gives the notion of priority is prior. If it were otherwise, *Dik* would be an empty name, not signifying any real thing.¹

To Bhartrhari, as to the Vaiśeṣika, *Dik* is *vibhu*, all-pervading; for it operates everywhere : the quality of priority or posteriority is produced by it in all things without exception. This is what is meant by *vibhutva*, all-pervasiveness, declares Bhartrhari²

.How do we know that space exists ?

1. pratyastarūpā bhāveṣu dik pūrvetyabhidhīyato |
pūrvabuddhir yato dik sū samākhyāmātram anyathā || III. 6. 7.
2. sarvatra tasya kāryasya darśanād vibhur iṣyato |
vibhutvam etad evāhur anyathā kāryavatām vidhiḥ || III. 6. 17.

The definition of space (*Dik*) given above implies that we derive our knowledge of it from inference. Now what is the basis of this inference? In other words, what constitutes the logical ground (*linga*) for this inference? A summit of a mountain is aglow with sunshine, while another is covered by thick shade. This division of the mountain into parts, characterized by sunshine and shade, would not be possible, if there were no space. For, in the absence of space, there would be no prior or posterior limit which alone is the cause of the notion of the plurality of parts. The division into parts (that seems to have been due to relation with *Dik*) is surely the evidence of the existence of *Dik*.¹

It might perhaps be urged that so far as corporeal bodies are concerned there is little necessity of postulating an independent entity like *Dik* to account for the notion of the diversity of parts, because that diversity can become the object of our consciousness by virtue of the conjunction of those bodies, say, with shade, sunshine, etc. To this we reply 'No'. It is wrongly assumed here that corporeal bodies are directly in conjunction with shade or sunshine. The fact is that it is their component parts that are directly conjoined with sunshine or shade. For instance, the rays of the sun that fall on one side of a jar are in contact only with the potsherds of that particular side; and on the other side, the potsherds alone are in conjunction with the shade. This means that the jar is neither in conjunction with the shade nor with the sunshine. If, however, it be said that the whole, the substance, having the same locus with, and thus present in, the parts is in contact with the shade, etc., we point out that in that event the whole, being in contact with the shade, etc., will cease to have the same locus with its parts—a contingency highly undesirable. Moreover, it is an indirect admission that it is parts only that are directly in conjunction with the shade, etc. Hence *Dik* has to be assumed

1. chāyābhūbhīyām nagādīnām bhāgabhedat prakalpate |
ataddharmasvabhāveṣu bhāgabhedo na kalpate || III. 6. 12.

to account for the notions of priority, posteriority, lowness, highness, etc., in all corporeal things.

There is also another logical necessity for the assumption of *Dik*. All produced things are ultimately the product of atoms. The atoms are believed to be without parts. Production of various things means combination of atoms. But how do they combine and how does the minimal gross magnitude (visible to the naked eye) arise from the combination of atoms which are the limits of minuteness? As a rule a magnitude is capable of giving rise only to a superior magnitude of the same order. Thus the gross magnitude of two bodies is invariably found to be the cause of a grosser magnitude in the body which they produce by their combination. Hence the magnitude of a *dvad* (*dvyanuka*) should be minuter than that of either of the constituent atoms. The Vaiśeṣika, however, denies causal efficiency to atomic magnitude and hence rules out a minuter magnitude resulting in the effect. Bhartṛhari has his own answer. He affirms that atoms, though themselves without parts, come to have four sides and the lower and upper surfaces by virtue of association with *Dik* (space). Thus when six atoms combine, they have each a side for conjunction. This explains the resultant gross magnitude. Yet, however, unless *Dik* is assumed, it would not be possible to account for the development of a gross magnitude from the atomic magnitude of the constituents. *Dik* has, therefore, to be assumed as the very first cause of the ascription of parts to the primary material cause of production, viz. the atoms.¹

The necessity of the assumption of *Dik* has been challenged on yet another ground. It is urged that things emerge (come into existence) possessed of a particular structural arrangement of parts, how then does *Dik* help to give them a form? To this Bhartṛhari gives a reply in *Kārikā* III. 6. 14. Says he : Things are in their nature devoid of locus

1. paramāṇor abhāgasya diśa bhāgo vidhīyate |

bhāga prakalpanāsaktiṃ prathamam tūṃ pracakṣate || III. 6. 13.

(*deśa*), parts (*bhāga*), succession (*krama*) and the colouring by conditions (*upāśraya*); it is only on account of their association with other things that they vary. Infinite things such as *ākāśa* have no locus (or locality), for they are all-pervading. Similarly with finite things, for how could such an external thing as a place or room form part of their nature? Both these categories of things are only assumed to be in conjunction with places or to inhere in them. Things are in their nature devoid of parts which are distinct from them, and which are assumed to be related to them. And if things have no real parts, they are free from succession, for that is grounded on difference. Again, in their own nature, they are not subject to the colouring by limiting adjuncts. But it is association with other things that seems to change their nature, which really remains unaffected. Thus of a number of things lying in the same direction, say, the west, one particular thing may be positionally lower. Now this notion is entirely due to *Dik*. Again, the parts of a whole stand undistinguished on account of the quality of inherence. But we have a notion of its parts. This notion, too, is produced by *Dik*.

If, indeed, things are really without parts, how is it that an object like a jar presents itself to us as a whole apparently made up of parts and possessing sensible magnitude? To this Bhartṛhari's reply is that, as a matter of fact, the whole being quite distinct from its component parts, a jar as well as an atom is devoid of parts. It is under the influence of the power called *Dik* that the component parts develop positional relation of priority and posteriority and become non-distinguishable from the whole by virtue of the quality of inherence. If a whole were in its very nature possessed of parts, it would not be one, but many. And we are here not concerned with secondary divisibility, for that could well be predicated even of an atom. As for magnitude itself, which is minute in the case of an atom and gross (sensible) in the case of a jar, it is also different from the thing produced.

Dimension is a specific Force which is the cause of our notions of the gross and atomic magnitudes. Hence what differentiates a jar from an atom is the difference in dimension.¹

Again, if wholes are really different from their component parts, and if a qualification supplied by a limiting adjunct is no inherent part of their nature, all things would become undefinable and indistinguishable. They would, like *Brahman*, be internally non-differentiable (*svagatabhedaśūnya*). To this Bhartṛhari says : We agree. This is the real nature of things. All this difference is apparent, it is empirical, a product of *avidyā*. It has become, as it were, a part of the nature of things and cannot be denied. Yet it cannot be maintained that it is real. As already observed, the wholes are different from their parts. But the parts must be different from their parts, and these other again from their parts, so on and so forth, till we come to the atom. To the atom too, space imparts parts or sides, for how else is the undifferentiated atom to produce diversity ? Space, too, is differentiated by conjunction with the sun. The conjunctions of the sun are also differentiated by the different parts of the Meru mountain ; and these parts by their own, and these again by their parts, till we come back to space. This difference is like a movement in a circle and stops nowhere. There is *anavasthā*. All this difference therefore lacks proof and must be held to be apparent only. Not only are things not differentiated in themselves, but they are not differentiated even by the limiting adjuncts, for they must themselves be differentiated by other limiting adjuncts and those others by still others, and so on and so forth, the differentiation stopping nowhere. The limiting adjuncts, too, therefore are quite incapable of differentiating the nature of things.²

Now Bhartṛhari declares emphatically that he would be

1. nirbhāgātmakatā tulyā paramāṇor ghaṭasya ca |
bhāgāḥ śaktyantaraṃ tatra parimāṇaṃ ca yat tayoḥ || III. 6. 15.

2. yataḥ prakalpyate bhedo' bhedas tatrāpi dṛśyate |
adṛṣṭoparatim bhedam ato' yuktataraṃ viduḥ || III. 6. 16.

a bold man indeed who would deny the empirical existence of both time and space. All our experience is determined by priority or posteriority. The notion of priority and posteriority has become so inextricably woven with our consciousness of things that it has become vital to our very being. We are as much convinced that time and space exist as our own consciousness (Intelligence) which is no other than the self; and the self is recognized by all controversialists. Since both time and space are objects of experience, there is little sense in discarding them.¹

And if time and space are discarded, what will be there to regulate our conduct, secular and religious? Śāstraic injunctions, with a seen or unseen purpose, such as 'one should face the east when dining', 'one should perform the *śrāddha* ceremony in the afternoon', could not be faithfully carried out in the absence of both time and space. For, in their absence, there would be nothing to cause the notion of priority and posteriority in things and actions. Although this world is devoid of succession, there being nothing prior or posterior positionally or chronologically, yet the enlightened person to whom the falsity of this world of phenomena has become manifest, accepts this world and while he rejects time and space on the basis of reason, does accept them both in practice; for there is no escape from the notion of priority and posteriority generated by them.²

THE ADVAITIN'S VIEW

As is usual with Bhartrhari, he concludes his treatise on space with the statement of the Advaitin's view of it. According to this view, *Dik* (space) does not exist externally. It is the externalization of the Inner Consciousness under the influence of *Avidyā* without a beginning, an outward manifestation of that one Principle in various forms which have

1. caitanyavat sthitā loko dikkālaparikalpanā |
prakṛtiṃ prāṇināṃ tām hi ko'nyathā sthāpayisyati || III. 6. 18.
2. saṅkaro vyavahārāṇāṃ prakṛteḥ syād viparyayo |
tasmāt tyajann imān bhāvān punar evāvalambato || III. 6. 19.

no real existence.¹ Bhartṛhari repeats the idea when he says: The heaven, the earth, the wind, the sun, the oceans, the rivers and the quarters are all parts of the internal organ, which have manifested them in so many external forms.² This appearance is, therefore, independent of any real external existence. Priority and posteriority too are the products of Nescience. Things are said to be internal and external, but as a matter of fact, there is no such difference. The so-called difference does not go beyond words, it does not touch the nature of things.

Proceeding further, Bhartṛhari discusses the question whether space is one or many. He says that neither assumption brings us any the nearer to the truth. The assumption that space is fundamentally one, being only diversified by the various limiting conditions, is as false as the one that space is primarily many as inferred from its effects. Anyway human activity goes on unhampered. Things are not in their essence as they are represented to us by various thinkers; surely they could not have the conflicting characteristics attributed to them by the different schools of thought. Their true nature transcends the various views held of them.³

Now Bhartṛhari argues why oneness or manyness cannot be true of space, and, for the matter of that, of any thing. There is the dictum that of two interdependent things, if the one cannot be proved, the other too becomes automatically unproved; hence the oneness or manyness of space is incapable of proof. We in this world go by our experience, take things as they appear to us. In the ultimate analysis, even such contraries as difference and non-difference do not exist. The one without a second is the only truth. Moreover,

1. antaḥkaraṇadharmo vū bahir evaṃ prakāśate |
asyām tv antar bahir bhāvaḥ prakriyāyām na vidyate || III. 6. 23.
2. dyauḥ kṣamā vāyur ādityaḥ sūgarāḥ sarito dīśaḥ |
antaḥkaraṇatattvasya bhūgā bahir avasthitāḥ || III. 7. 41.
3. ekatvaṃ āsāṃ śaktīnāṃ nānātvaṃ ceti kalpane |
avastupatite jñātvā satyato na parāmr̥śet || III. 6. 24

space has been defined here as a power, which is the condition of other things. And a power cannot be said to be one or many.¹ Manyness is doubtless predicable of things possessed of power; but a power cannot be differentiated, dependent as it is on a substratum, even when they, the substrata, are many. Nor the oneness such as experienced in a jar is part of the nature of a power.²

And there is further reason why oneness or manyness in respect of a power like space is unprovable. The concept of oneness must necessarily involve the concept of its opposite, viz. manyness. It cannot stand alone. It is unthinkable without its counterpart. Similarly manyness, dependent upon its opposite oneness, is unthinkable, independently of the latter. Hence neither oneness nor manyness can be exclusively predicated of space. It is therefore neither one nor many.

1. naikatvam asti nānātvaṃ vinaikatvena notart |
paramārthe tayoṛ eṣa bhedo' tyantaṃ na vidyate ||
2. na śaktināṃ tathā bhedo yathā śaktimatāṃ sthitiḥ |
na ca laukikam ekatvaṃ tāsāṃ ātmasu vidyate ||

III. 6. 26.

III. 6. 27.

CONCEPTION OF DAIVA AND PURUṢAKARA IN THE VALMĪKI AND THE VASIṢṬHA RĀMAYĀNAS

VĀLMĪKI RĀMĀYAṆA

Fate and Destiny—these are the two terms that are so often heard in everyday life. Though mysterious themselves they help to clear up many a mystery of the human life. Reason and fate do not go together. When reason fails, fate steps in.

But what is this fate after all ? This question has rocked people's minds since ages. Fate is a power the existence of which is inferred from the chance-occurrences which are not infrequent in life. When something unaccountable happens it is attributed to fate. What fate actually is nobody knows, for nobody has seen it. Yet it is believed to exist for it cannot be imagined that a particular incident or event happens all by itself. There must be supposed to be an invisible hand that creates a particular set of circumstances which by no stretch of imagination can be foreseen. The events and occurrences that cannot be explained away are supposed to be due to some unseen power which always has something up its sleeves and which brings it out only occasionally and spasmodically. This is what is popularly known as chance. This chance element plays an important part in human life. It is only this chance which is given the exalted name of fate.

But this form of arbitrary fate has not appealed much to the Indian mind. It has accepted the *kṛtānta* form of it. All along the Indian tradition fate has been believed to be the accumulated effect of the actions done in previous births. Thus it would seem that fate is intimately connected with the theory of *karma*. When anything unaccountable takes place in a man's life he feels agitated about it. Why should

this happen like that ? But the next moment the agitation disappears and in a mood of resignation he says, 'fate had ordained it so'. Fate is the cause he has found of the effect he has seen. After all, cause must precede an effect. And it is not always necessary that the cause may be visible. Fate or the effect of the actions in the previous births is such an invisible cause. When a man is born blind or loses his eyesight afterwards, or when a child loses his parents after two years of its birth and suffers all sorts of privations and miseries, it is explained away as due to the working of fate which actually means that the unfortunate things are due to some bad actions performed by a man in his previous births.

For as long back as one can see the human mind has ungrudgingly accepted an independent entity called fate to which all the chance-events and chance-occurrences have been attributed. But as and as man has advanced in knowledge the field for fate's playful activity has gone on shrinking. Man has now learnt to establish the relationship of cause and effect with regard to things which were once supposed to be due to *daiva* or fate. There was a time when drought or flood or storms were also supposed to be due to the working of fate. But as and as man has advanced towards knowledge, these have got out of the purview of fate. To-day science explains many things which were hitherto considered mysterious. With the advancement of scientific knowledge, therefore, fate has lost much of its importance. But be that as it may, the basic concept of fate or chance clings to man all the world over. Where science fails to establish a definite cause and effect relationship, *adr̥ṣṭa* or fate is thought to be in operation. As in the primitive races so in the most civilized societies of the present day the basic concept of fate still persists. This is interesting inasmuch as it explains the working of the human mind. It is human psychology to find in the mysterious things the working of some unseen power, *adr̥ṣṭa*, over which one has no control.

There are broadly two categories into which fatalists are divided. The first are those who are primarily influenced by the chance-element in life. They think everything to be preordained. They resign themselves to their fate and as such have no interest left in the events and happenings of their lives. They prefer to accept life as it is. There are others whose concept of fate is more influenced by the theory of *karma*. Whatever good or evil they get in this world is, according to them, the result of the good or bad actions performed by them in their previous births. The good things of life do not overenthuse them nor do the bad dishearten them. Believing as they do in the theory of *karma* they prefer to devote themselves to performing good actions in their present birth in the hope of getting good things in their next birth. They do not resign themselves to their fate, for they think it within their power to change it or shape it by their actions. They have intense faith in *puruṣakāra*.

Since ages the Indian mind has sought to decide the superiority of *adr̥ṣṭa* and *puruṣakāra* over each other. There are numerous instances where the one is spoken of as superior to the other. Yet this problem has never been solved. *Daiva* and *puruṣakāra* have gone on side by side according to the individual training and make-up. A lesser man would give way when faced with unforeseen calamities. But a higher man would rise to the occasion. He would not throw up his hands in despair and sit idle. When things take place beyond his control or when events occur beyond his calculations what should a man do? Must he act as the mighty power of fate makes him act? Is he just a plaything in the hands of the invisible power? A higher man would never think of doing so. He will measure up with the difficulties, the trials and tribulations of life and would emerge cheerfully out of them. He would redouble his efforts to perform good deeds. He is the maker of his own destiny.

Both these viewpoints are to be met with in the *Rāmāyaṇa*. *Valmiki* has used six words to denote fate. They

are : *vidhi*, *kāla*, *niyati*, *bhavitavyatā*, *daiva* and *kṛtānta*.

The word *vidhi* has been explained by Vālmiki himself. *Vidhi*, according to him, is that power which makes a man act in consonance with the predetermined order.¹ In fact, the irresistibility of a power beyond making a man act is contained in a greater or smaller degree in all the words that are used to denote fate in Sanskrit.

As for the exact denotation of the word *kāla* in the Rāmāyaṇa nothing definite can be said. In ordinary language it means either time or death. It seems in the Rāmāyaṇa it is used as a synonym of *daiva* and is said to be the most powerful of all the forces operating in the universe. The inexorable nature of it is emphasised in a passage where Rāma, the son of a king, is described as having slept on the bare earth.²

The words *niyati* and *bhavitavyatā*³ which etymologically mean the 'definiteness' and 'wouldbeness' (*ni*+ $\sqrt{\text{yam}}$ +*ti* and $\sqrt{\text{bhū}}$ +*tavya*+*tā*) point to the inexorableness of fate. Events in life must take place according to their predetermined order.

Next we come to the word *daiva* which has been used most frequently in the Rāmāyaṇa to denote fate and destiny. It means the power of *adṛṣṭa* or the desire of the unseen power. Everything in this world moves and acts as it is made to do by the mighty hand of the invisible power.⁴ That is the controlling authority. Man is but a plaything in its hands.

Finally we come to the word *kṛtānta* which approaches nearest to the Indian concept of fate. It means the fruit of the actions done in previous births. This word, therefore,

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| 1. vidhiḥ kila naraṃ loke vidhānenānuvartate | IV. 56. 4. |
| 2. na nūnaṃ daivatam kiñcit kālena balavattaram
yatra dāsarathī Rāmo bhūmāv evam aśeta saḥ | II. 88. 11. |
| 3. niyatiḥ kāraṇam loke niyatiḥ karmasādhanaṃ
niyatiḥ sarvabhūtānāṃ niyogeṣv iha kāraṇam
bhavitavyatayā nūnam idaṃ vā vyasanam mahat | IV. 25. 4. |
| kulasyāsya vināśāya prāptam sūta yadṛcchayā | I. 59. 20. |
| 4. sumahānty api bhūtāni devās ca puruṣarṣabha
na daivasya pramuñcanti sarvabhūtāni dehinaḥ | III. 66. 11. |

eloquently explains the close connection between the theory of *karma* and *daiva*. It is very important inasmuch as it points to the time when *daiva* was no longer considered a force which operates arbitrarily. There is a definite relationship, according to this view, between the chance-occurrences and the actions in the previous births to which they can be traced. The combination of the theory of *karma* with *daiva* takes away the edge from the many unhappy events and occurrences in life. Next to *daiva* Vālmiki uses the word *kṛtānta* most frequently in his Rāmāyaṇa.¹

One thing that must strike a student of the Rāmāyaṇa is that almost all the Rākṣasa characters are silent with regard to fate. It seems they did not believe in it. And this is very natural too. In a culture where the self stands above everything else there is no place for fate which actually means the superiority of an unseen power over everything else in this world. However, there is no total absence of reference to *daiva* in the passages dealing with the Rākṣasas. After the battle in Laṅkā is over some women characters blame *daiva* for all the killing and destruction.²

The concept of fate or destiny seems to be very popular among the Āryans and the non-Āryans who had come under the influence of the Āryans in the time of the Rāmāyaṇa. Although theoretically the happy moments and the pleasant events also come under fate it is remembered only at places where something wrong happens. This is not peculiar to the Rāmāyaṇa only. In the Rāmāyaṇa it is seen in everyday-life too. Triśaṅku, Sumantra, Daśaratha, Kausalyā, Bharata, Lakṣmaṇa, Sitā, Sampāti, Tārā and Vālin—all unhappy characters are firm believers in fate. Above all, the hero of the epic, Rāma, has intense faith in the power of fate. Though *Maryāda-puruṣottama* he, strangely enough, gives himself

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- I. aiśvārye vā suvistīrṇe vyāsane vā sudāruṇe |
 rajjiveva puruṣaṃ baddhvā kṛtāntaḥ parikarṣati || V. 37-8.
2. na kāmākāraḥ kāmaṃ vā tava rākṣasapuṅgava |
 daivaṃ ceṣṭayate sarvaṃ hataṃ daivona hanyate || VI. 110. 23.

over to the power of *adṛṣṭa*. This may be due to his having been called upon to bear the greatest hardships in life which all but overwhelmed him. These seem to have made him a fatalist through and through. His faith in *niyati* borders on tragic fatalism. That is why he is so indifferent to life. That in spite of all this indifference he went on doing his duty sincerely and devotedly speaks volumes for his strength of character. It is this which has made him the idol of millions of people of India.

In all the Aryan characters of the Rāmāyaṇa the idea of fate and destiny is deeply rooted. They seem to be in no doubt about the existence of a power called fate. There is however only one character Lakṣmaṇa whose views on fate undergo many changes as events and occurrences unfold themselves. In the beginning when Rāma decides to go to the forest at the bidding of his father, who is bound by a promise to Kaikeyī, Lakṣmaṇa has no faith in fate. He feels hurt and in anger readily blurts out—

yathā hy evaṃ aśauṇḍiraṃ śauṇḍiraḥ Bharatarṣabhaḥ |
kiṃ nāma kṛpaṇaṃ daivaṃ aśaktam abhiśaṃsasi ||¹

But he has no objection to accepting the power of fate in consoling Rāma at the time of Sītā's abduction—

āśvasiḥi naraśreṣṭha prāṇinaḥ kasya nāpadaḥ ||
sumahānty api bhūtāni devāś ca puruṣarṣabha |
na daivasya pramuñcanti sarvabhūtāni dehinaḥ ||²

Lakṣmaṇa's faith in fate is further strengthened when he has to leave Sītā in the forest at the bidding of Rāma. Here he seems to have resigned himself to the all-powerful fate. He feels that it is inexorable—

vyaktaṃ daivād ahaṃ manye Rāghavasya vinābhavam |
Vaidehyā sārathe nityaṃ daivaṃ hi duratikramam ||³

Next Lakṣmaṇa comes back to Ayodhyā after leaving pregnant Sītā in the forest. He notices the grief of Rāma

1. II. 23. 7.

2. III. 66. 6 & 11.

3. VII. 50. 4.

and utters these words of consolation—

sarve kṣayāntā nicayāḥ patanāntāḥ samucchrayāḥ |
saṃyogā viprayogāntā maraṇāntaṃ ca jīvitam ||¹

And finally when he has to go at the call of death he consoles his brother in these words :

na snatāpaṃ mahabāho madarthiṃ kartum arhaṣi |
pūrvanirmāṇabaddhā hi kālasya gatir īdrṣī ||²

Here the climax is reached. Lakṣmaṇa who had a robust faith in *puruṣakāra* lies prostrate at the feet of the cruel fate. Throughout the many unhappy events of his life he has learnt to believe in the all-embracing power of fate. This, though inevitable, is unfortunate in the extreme.

Thus it would seem that Vālmīki had an intense faith in fate. However, it was only the more hopeful aspect of it which was acceptable to him. Although at times he had to say *pauruṣaṃ tu nīrarthakam* (man's own effort is of no use) he has not attached, as it would appear from the study of the Rāmāyaṇa, an undue importance to this view. The behaviour of his characters has throughout been based on that concept of fate according to which fate or destiny is nothing but the effect of the actions done in previous births. On that account alone they could endure many difficulties and hardships with a cheer that is remarkable. Statements like *pauruṣaṃ tu nīrarthakam* have a different meaning. The inner sense of these seems to be that man when faced with difficulties and hardships should not run about and feel overwhelmed. *Pauruṣa* is this running about ; going from place to place in a frantic search for anything to hold on. Such a man is advised by Vālmīki not to lose his mental balance and do all sorts of useless things when he is overpowered by difficulties. Nor should he make a fuss of them. He should endure them calmly and quietly and go on doing his duty undisturbed by many unhappy events and occurrences in his life.

1. VII. 52. 11.

2. VII. 106. 2.

VĀSIṢṬHA RĀMĀYAṆA

There are frequent references to *daiva* and *puruṣakāra* in the Vāsiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa. In the very beginning of the work from canto V to canto X of the Mumukṣuprakaraṇa there is a fervent praise of *puruṣakāra* or human efforts. The idea of fate is presented there from a different angle. *Daiva* is *pauruṣa* itself, *pauruṣa* of earlier births. In the present life, therefore, a constant struggle is going on between the *pauruṣa* of the earlier births and the *pauruṣa* of this birth. The author of the Vāsiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa compares the struggle between the two *pauruṣas* to a close neck-to-neck fight between rams. Says he :

dvau huḍāv iva yudhyete puruṣārthau samāsamau !¹

He repeats the ram-simile at least thrice in these six cantos. The author is definitely of the opinion that there is no fate. If there exists anything it is *pauruṣa* only. Just as any wrong done the other day can be rectified the following day similarly the effect of the deeds done in previous births can be offset by the good deeds done in the present birth. Out of the two *pauruṣas*, the earlier and the present, the present *pauruṣa* is more powerful and can easily conquer the earlier just as a young man can overpower a child. The author is very forthright when he says. "Fie upon those fools who believe in destiny, although it is a matter of their experience that it is their own efforts that accomplish things for them". We see virtues are acquired by us if we put in efforts to read the scriptures and keep company with the good. It is pointed out further that unlike fate, *pauruṣa* is a matter of our direct experience. *Daiva* or fate is merely a figment, a product of the imagination of the unwise. There is no such thing as fate. Whenever some one desires a thing and puts in adequate efforts for its realization he does obtain it, provided he does not stop half way because of exhaustion.² The Vāsiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa very

1. II. 5. 5; II. 6. 0.

2. so, vāṣyaṃ tad avāpnōti na cec cchṛānto nivartate !

lucidly puts forth its view about *daiva* and *puruṣakāra*. It compares *daiva* with the sky,¹ which is nothing, a mere void, but still is given the name *ākāśa*. *Daiva* is merely a name given to a phenomenon which really does not exist. The author of the Vāsiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa does not mince matters when he declares unequivocally that fate is something substantial and active only to the unenlightened and that to the enlightened it verily does not exist.² It is a fact or facts, a thought, a resolution about doing an act or an act itself done in a previous birth which offers the much-needed explanation as to why an act accomplished in this life yields good or bad results. Or fate is nothing but a word of consolation said when one is faced with the good or bad results of a present-day act and is told that they are all due to the influence of some act done in a previous birth.³ In these definitions and the other pronouncements of the Vāsiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa there appears an apparent contradiction. *Daiva* or fate is the good or the bad effect of the earlier actions. If it be so, how can fate be said to be nothing or non-existing. The Vāsiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa itself notices this contradiction and tries to resolve it. *Daiva*, according to it, is merely a synonym of the action done in previous births with intense resolve.⁴ Behind each activity there lies the *vāsanā*, the impressions of the earlier births. *Vāsanā* is nothing but the mind and the mind is nothing but person. So when it is said that *daiva* is action, it actually means the mind. Now the mind is non-distinct from the person. Hence the conclusion that *daiva* does not exist. The person in the form of the

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| 3 1. daivam ākāśarūpaṃ hi..... | II. 9. 7. |
| 4 2. nanu Rāghava lokasya kasyacit kiñcid eva hi
daivam ākāśarūpaṃ hi karoti na karoti ca | II. 9. 7. |
| 5 3. puruṣārthasya siddhasya śubhāśubhaphalodaye
idam itthaṃ sthitam iti yuktis tad daivam ucyate
iṣṭāniṣṭaphalaprapṛptāḥ idam ityasya vācakam
āśvāsanāmātravaco daivam ity eva kathyate | II. 9. 8 & 10. |
| 6 4. yad eva tīvrasanprvegād dṛḍhaṃ karma kṛtaṃ purā
tad eva daivāśabdena paryāyepcha kathyate | II. 9. 16. |

mind tries for this or that thing and comes to obtain it on account of his own efforts which are said to be *daiva*. And so it is the definite mental resolve of a person which is at the back of all activity. The advice of the Vāsiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa, therefore, is that one should engage oneself in good activities, for that will surely off-set the evil effect of bad deeds done in previous births. But here it must be remembered that the individual effort in the present must be powerful enough to contend adequately with the effort put forth in earlier births. Otherwise it is possible that the present effort may be thwarted and may just remain devoid of any fruit. Just as food is crushed by the teeth when it is put under them, similarly if one of the two, the *daiva* and the *puruṣakāra* is more powerful than the other, it can destroy the other. *Daiva* or destiny is nothing else than one's own actions in previous births, the view enunciated by the Vāsiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa in a number of places. The Vāsiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa clearly propounds the principle that of the two *puruṣārthas*, the one of this birth and the other of previous births, whichever is more powerful wins and overpowers the other : *jayaty atibalas tayoḥ*.¹⁷ The Vāsiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa further advises that if, one's efforts directed to the achievement of a desired object come to naught, one should console oneself by this feeling alone that the efforts were too feeble to lead to the desired results. It may also be possible that occasionally proper efforts too may not yield proper results. But that should not dissuade a person from putting in more and more strenuous efforts. In any case whether one's efforts succeed or not one should not feel aggrieved. All the objects of the world thrive on such factors as time, space, action and substances. If in one set of circumstances one's efforts do not succeed, it is just possible that in another, they may. Under these conditions it will be simply unwise to feel sorry for one's wasted efforts. What is required is that one should have recourse to *pauruṣa*,

7 1. II. 5. 7.

join the company of the good, read the *śāstras* and cross the ocean of this *samsāra* by purging one's mind of all impurities by conscious and sustained efforts. As and as one's efforts would go on multiplying the results would begin to appear quicker and quicker. In the ultimate analysis it is an individual effort alone that is real. It is that alone which is termed fate. Just as a person stricken with sorrow cries out *hā kaṣṭam*, how sad, similarly does he exclaim, *hā daivam*, oh fate.¹ The expression *hā kaṣṭam*, and *hā daivam* are synonyms. By *hā kaṣṭam*, one means the painful results of one's actions. This is precisely the meaning of *hā daivam*, too. From this it will be clear, as has been remarked earlier, that fate or *daiva* is nothing else than one's own previous actions. It is nothing different from them. It has no independent existence, no separate entity which the ignorant alone assume for it. If one's efforts go waste, it may be due to the comparatively increased forcefulness or effectiveness of *daiva*, viz. one's own actions performed earlier. But then there is all the more reason that the present effort should be intensified so as to become more forceful than the actions performed earlier. Those who assume fate or destiny as an independent force at work to frustrate one's present efforts do not grasp its reality and consequently do not put forth effort to conquer it. They must be pronounced as wretched fools deserving of pity. They think that whatever is seen by them, heard by them, experienced by them or done by them, is all due to fate. They are really perverted minds. By ascribing things directly seen or experienced by them to an outside agency called destiny they land themselves nowhere. What is required is that one may give oneself over to efforts with a singleness of purpose. Such efforts alone, when regulated by *śāstraic* injunctions, can deliver the goods. The *Vāsiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa* clearly declares :

arthaprāpakakāryaikaprayatnaparatā budhaiḥ |
proktā pauraśābdena.....||²

1. II. 6. 3.

2. II. 7. 24.

What is *pauruṣa* according to the Vāsiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa ? The definition as given above is *arthaprāpakākāryaika-prayatnaparatā*.¹ But the efforts should not be absolute, but should be put forward, the Vāsiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa clearly points out, within the framework of the śāstraic injunctions, the checks and balances put down by the śāstras (*śāstrayantrita*), lest the consequences be disastrous. It is necessary that efforts made are noble, are for good and not for evil. That is the refrain in the Vāsiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa. Its author is never tired of enjoining proper efforts which should yield good results. His entire approach is characterized by the ideal of Dharma. The good efforts would yield good results which would banish sorrow and suffering which are necessarily the result of misdeeds done previously, and that is precisely the aim which the author has in view.

Not only is it in the beginning of the work, but elsewhere also that we find that the individual effort is extolled while what goes by the name of fate or destiny is denounced to the point of its being called non-existent and its equation with *pauruṣa* itself. So in the balance what remains is *pauruṣa* only. Elsewhere, too, in the Vāsiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa we meet with many passages which echo the same idea. Thus in IV. 32 we come across the verse :

paramaṃ pauruṣaṃ yatnam āsthāyādāya sudyamam |
yathāśāstram anudvegam ācaran ko na siddhibhāk ||² ||
which clearly says "who is there who cannot achieve his ultimate goal by putting in supreme efforts according to the śāstras without any feeling of fear" ? Further in IV. 62 the author comes out very forcefully in support of *pauruṣa*. Among the many verses found there one deserves quotation here for it spells out the author's belief which in all probability is born of inner conviction. The verse in question reads :
na tad asti pṛthivyām vā divi deveṣu vā kvacit |
pauruṣeṇa prayatnena yan nāpnoti guṇānvitah ||³ ||²

1. II. 7. 24 ; II. 6. 32.

2. IV. 62 18-19.

3. IV. 32. 48-49.

"There is no such thing on the earth, in the heaven, and among the gods and elsewhere which a person endowed with qualities cannot attain by individual efforts." There can be no more forthright enunciation of the importance of *puruṣa* and its implied superiority over *daiva*. In V. 13. 8. too, the fatalists are denounced in no uncertain terms while *puruṣakāra* is praised. The verse reads :

na daivaṃ na ca karmāṇi na dhanāni na bāndhavāḥ ।

śaraṇaṃ bhavabhītānāṃ svaprayatnād ṛte nr̥ṇām ॥¹

"Apart from one's own efforts nothing can save the people who are afraid of this world; not even fate, actions (mere physical movements), wealth or relations."

In V. 24 too, a lengthy discussion about *daiva* and *puruṣakāra* is introduced in the Vāsiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa. There too, the superiority of *puruṣakāra* over *daiva* is enunciated in clearest possible terms. The reason for so much of emphasis that the Yogavāsiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa puts on *puruṣakāra* can be traced to its philosophy. The central theme of the Vāsiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa philosophy is *cittanāśa*. The entire world, according to it, is the *sankalpakalanā* of the *citta*. The moment the *citta*, is deadened (rendered absolutely inactive) by various methods (*yuktis*) which are detailed in different parts of the work and constant practice (*abhyāsa*), the world outside ceases to exist. There is no happiness or sorrow then. And that is the state of salvation (*mokṣa*) which is the ultimate goal. The work in V. 92 (verses 27—33) describes the various stages in the conquest of the *citta*. First, the stopping of breath (*prāṇarodhana*) by means of *prāṇāyama*, continued practice (*cirābhyāsa*), the way shown by the guru (*yuktyā ca gurudattayā*) and the control exercised on sitting and eating (*aśanāsanayogena*) and then the appearance of the true knowledge (*jñāna*) by which one comes to know the real form of a thing as it obtained in the beginning and as it stood at the end, which results in the disappearance of the *vāsanā* and ultimately leads to that state when the

¹ 1. V. 13. 8.

citta becomes extinct, just as the dust remains still in the sky when there is no movement in the air. What is actually the movement of the breath is the movement of the *citta*. A wise man should try his utmost to achieve a conquest of *prāṇaspanda*, the movement of the breath, by concentration. Or one may directly put the *citta* under control and not follow the above-mentioned sequence of various practices. It requires constant practice spread over a long period. However, whichever way the conquest of the mind is sought to be achieved, one thing that can definitely be said about it is that the mind can never be conquered without the proper devices (*yuktis*) and these devices may be listed as :

adhyātmavidyādhigamaḥ sādhusaṅgama eva ca |
 vāsanāsamparityāgaḥ prāṇaspandanirodhanam ||
 etās tā yuktayaḥ puṣṭāḥ santi cittajaye kila |
 yābhis taj jīyate kṣipram.....¹

“Attainment of spiritual knowledge, association with the good people, giving up of the *vāsanā*, the stopping of the movement of breath—these are said to be the devices effective for the conquest of the *citta*. The disappearance of the *vāsanā* (*vāsanākṣaya*) leads to the extinction of the *citta* (*cittanāśa*) and vice versa. These two again lead to *tattvajñāna* which may again be said to be the cause of these two. These three, the *tattvajñāna*, the attainment of true knowledge, the *manonāśa*, the extinction of the mind and the *vāsanākṣaya*, the disappearance of the *vāsanā* are, therefore, each the cause and the effect of the other and are difficult of accomplishment as the Vāsiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa says :

tattvajñānaṃ manonāśo vāsanākṣaya eva ca |
 mithaḥ kāraṇatām gatvā duḥsādhyaṇi sthitāny atah ||²

What is required therefore is conscious effort (*tasmād Rāghava yatnena pauruṣeṇa vivekinā...trayam etat samāśrayet*).³
 As a matter of fact, the achievement of *vāsanā-samparityāga*,

1. V. 92. 35-37.

2. V. 92. 14.

3. V. 92. 15.

the giving up of the *vāsanā*, which is at once the cause and the effect of the *manonāśa*, the extinction of the mind, is very difficult, more difficult perhaps than even the uprooting of the Mount Meru (*duḥśādhyo vāsanātyāgaḥ sumerūnmulanād api*)¹ but there is no reason why it should not be attempted. By constant *abhyāsa*, practice, and the various devices detailed above, conscious efforts are to be put forth to achieve the disappearance of the *vāsanā* (*vāsanākṣaya*), the extinction of the mind (*manonāśa*) and the ultimate knowledge (*tattvajñāna*). Here then comes the need for *puruṣakāra*, the conscious effort. Hence there is so much of emphasis on it in the *Vāsiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa* whose author is never tired of repeating the value of *puruṣakāra* and bringing out its importance even at the risk of being repetitive. For his pet theory is 'just as you think and do so will it take shape.' So in the ultimate analysis what remains of this world is one's own *saṅkalpa*, one's own *puruṣārtha*—

puruṣārthād rte putra na kiñcid iha vidyate ²

If that *puruṣārtha* is directed properly and with discrimination, it may well lead to the disappearance of the *vāsanā* (*vāsanākṣaya*), the extinction of the mind (*manonāśa*) and the dawn of the true knowledge (*tattvajñāna*). Now, if one more entity, the *daiva* is postulated here it will directly come in the way of the *puruṣakāra* and will then be a clear reversal of the philosophy preached by the *Vāsiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa*. For the author of the *Vāsiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa* there is no *daiva*. In one of his many forthright utterances he says that one should put in one's efforts and leave the fate far behind:

*pauruṣaṃ yatnaṃ āśritya daivaṃ kṛtvā sudūrataḥ |
bhogān vigarhayet prājñāḥ.....* ³

There is talk of *daiva* (fate) among the ordinary folk but it (fate) is nothing concrete, nothing corporeal.

daivam ity ucyate loke na daivaṃ dehavat kvacit ⁴

¹ 1. V. 92. 10.

² 2. V. 24. 36.

³ 3. V. 24. 60.

⁴ 4. V. 24. 26.

In V. 24. the Vāsiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa mentions a number of words for fate like *daiva*, *bhavitavyatā* (*avaśyambhavitavya*) and *niyati* and attempts an interesting interpretation of them to fit in well with its philosophy. The Vāsiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa's interpretation of *niyati*, for example, is :

kartā no mana ēveha yet kalpayati tat tathā ||
 niyatim yādṛśim etat saṅkalpayti tat tathā |
 niyatāniyatān kāṅścid arthān aniyatān api ||
 karoti cittaṁ tenaitac cittaṁ niyatiyojakam |
 niyatyām niyatim kurvan kadācit svārthanāmikām ||
 sphuraty asmin jagatkoṣe jivo vyomnīva mārutaḥ |
 niyatyā vihitam kurvan kadācin niyatimcaraḥ ||
 saṃjñārthaṁ rūḍhaniyatiśabdaḥ sphurati sānuvat |
 tasmād yāvan manas tāvan na daivam niyatir na ca ||^{1 2 1}

"For us it is here the mind which is an agent. Just as it conceives things, so do they take shape. The way it thinks of the *niyati* so does it become. It is the mind which creates things of our experience (the empirical world) which ordinarily yield fruit but in exceptional circumstances may not, and things which are illusory only and have no invariability of effects. Hence it is the mind that is responsible for the *niyati*. In this way when an object is real it must have fruit invariably and hence no variability of fruit which we have in the case of *daiva* or *karma*. Sometimes the individual soul (*jīva*) called the *citta* (mind) in a birth fit for emancipation has its *niyati*, the *nirvikalpasamādhi*,^{2 2} or *niyati*, the supreme self which is ever immutable. In that state like the air in the sky it continues to exist in its real state free from all association and attachment. But when on leaving *samādhi* it becomes active, then, according to *niyati*, the *śāstraic* injunctions, it occupies itself with activities suitable for various stages of life for the purpose of instructing the

1. V. 24. 30-34.

2. The exclusive concentration without the consciousness of the knower or the known or even without self-consciousness and where there is perfect equilibrium.

ignorant. Then the word *niyati* comes to be popularly used for it. It begins to behave like the peak of a mountain which appears to be moving when the leaves on the trees growing on it are shaken by the wind, and appears still when the wind does not blow. Hence the conclusion that so long as there is the mind there is no *daiva* or *niyati* or fate or destiny. The reason for this is that it is the individual self which assumes the form of a human being and whatever it conceives, it becomes. Fate or destiny or *daiva* or *niyati*, as the two words are understood popularly, simply does not exist. From the above dissertation it follows that *saṃkalpa* being *Jīva's* (or *Citta's*) own doing independent of outside help, one ought to acquire by self-effort such means as *vairāgya* to conceive oneness with Brahman and not conceive oneself as *saṃsārin*.

The above discussion helps us grasp properly the various senses in which the word *niyati* has been used in the *Vāsiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa*. In the text quoted above at one place it means the supreme self (*paramātman*), at another it means the *nirvikalpasamādhi* (the exclusive concentration) where all forms of consciousness of the known etc. disappear, and at still another it means the *śāstraic* injunctions. The etymology of the word *niyati* is probably at the back of all these different meanings in which it has been used in the text. Etymologically *niyati* means control (*ni+yam+ti*) or the invariableness. *Niyati* is called the supreme self because it is invariable, it is always found in its one state of sameness. *Nirvikalpakasamādhi* is called *niyati*, for here too there is the sameness, all cognition having vanished.¹ The *śāstraic* injunctions are called *niyati* for they control (regulate) the life of an individual. To attempt a connection between these seemingly different meanings of the word *niyati*, we may say that it is the *citta* or the individual self which when in a state of *nirvikalpakasamādhi*, as when it is emancipated is identical with, and has its existence in

23 1. Yet not a trance or a stupor or senselessness.

the supreme soul (*paramātman*) who is changeless or *niyati* or is *niyati* changelessness itself. It engages itself in different activities enjoined by the *śāstras* when it bestirs itself. It is the activized state of the mind or the individual soul only which is called *niyati* popularly. *Niyati* actually is *phala-niyati*, the regularity about the effect.¹ The various *saṃkalpas* have the various effects invariably. It is therefore the *saṃkalpas* which control the effects. Now these *saṃkalpas* arise in the mind. So it is the mind which really controls the effects of the *saṃkalpas* or the *niyati* or the invariable nature of the effects. When no *saṃkalpas* arise in the mind, there is no *niyati* which is in the form of the direct perception of the internal reality (*pratyak-paramārthagocara-sākṣātkārarūpa*), the state of equilibrium called the 'nirvikalpakasamādhi', but this *niyati* is different from the 'phalan-*niyati*' which has its appearance only when the mind bestirs itself (*vyutthānakāle*). When the mind or the *citta* becomes active it begins to weave different patterns and draw different images. It is these images, good or bad, which yield good or bad effects. As these images are the creations of the mind, it is the mind which is real and not these images which owe their existence to it (mind). When the mind is brought under control, the various *saṃkalpas* of the mind which give rise to 'phalan-*niyati*' too are brought under control. So it is that the Vāsiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa enjoins supreme efforts for the control of the mind or the *citta*. Hence the value of *puruṣakāra* in its philosophy.

It is perfectly in accord with this philosophy of *puruṣakāra* that at another place, too, the Vāsiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa points out that all aims and objects which ordinarily appear impossible of attainment are obtained by means of *adhyavasāya*, conscious effort : '*sarvam adhyavasāyena duṣprāpam api labhyate*.'² In V. 57 the verses 37-38 extol *puruṣakāra* and present it as essential for the achievement of even the most

21. 1. since a given cause must produce an effect.

25. 2. V. 47. 38.

difficult things.

In V. 61, however, the word *niyati* is used in an altogether different sense, viz., the desire of the Supreme Lord. We have the verse there :

tathaitāsv atidīrghāsu daśāsv anyatvam āgatāḥ ।

bhūyo vayam api śliṣṭās citro hi niyater vidhiḥ ॥¹ 26

"So having separated from each other for all these long periods we have come together. The way of *niyati* (*īśvaracchā*) is strange indeed". That the use of *niyati* is here in the sense of *īśvaracchā*, the desire of *Īśvara*, may be seen from another verse occurring in that very canto wherein *niyati* is qualified by the word *daivikī* thereby meaning the *daivikī niyati* or the desire of the *deva* or *īśvara*. The verse in question reads :

bhagavan niyater asyāḥ gatiṃ sarpagater iva ।

daivikyāḥ ko hi jānāti gambhīrāṃ vismayapradām ॥² 27

"My Lord who knows the way of *niyati*, the playful desire of the Supreme Being (*deva*) which is mysterious as the movement of a serpent and which is wonderful." It is the *īśvaracchārupavidhi* or *niyati* which is of course conditioned by one's actions, good or bad, which is spoken of here as well as elsewhere in the *Vāsiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa* as very powerful, as for example, in 'kim asādhyam aho vidheḥ.' Now, it may be observed that here *īśvara* does not signify God as we use the word in ordinary parlance. The word means the internal self (*pratyakcetana ātman*). The words *vidhi*, *daiva* and *niyati* too which ordinarily mean destiny or fate mean here the internal self only. In support of it, we may quote the following verse from the *Vāsiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa* :

vidhir daivaṃ vidhir dhātā sarveṣaḥ śiva īśvaraḥ ।

iti nāma bhir ātmā naḥ pratyakcetana ucyate ॥³ 28

"Our internal self is called by various names like *vidhi*,

26 1. V. 61. 42.

27 2. V. 61. 43.

28 3. V. 75. 95.

daiva, dhātr, sarveśa, śiva and īśvara." *Vidhi* or *niyati* in other words, therefore, would mean the internal self or the *jīvātman*, not in its absolute state but in its state of activity (*vyutthāna*) when it performs good or bad actions and can have any *saṃkalpa* and in this way is capable of achieving the most impossible things. It is for this *vidhi* or *niyati* in its state of *vyutthāna* that it is said in the Vāsiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa that it is such a thing for which there is nothing difficult of achievement. That is why the *niyati*, the set course, (here the word *niyati* has been used not in the sense noted above, viz., *pratyakcetana ātman*, the internal self, but in a different sense of fixed, set) of *vidhi*, the internal self is said to be strange and is said to be slow-moving on account of its endless exertions.

As this *pratyakcetana ātman*, or the internal self is capable of endless *saṃkalpass* (*anantārambha*) so it is that conscious-efforts are enjoined in the Vāsiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa to keep it under control. These efforts are the *pauruṣa*, which is very much essential for achieving any thing. Without it nothing can be achieved or as the Vāsiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa says :

pauruṣeṇa na yat prāptaṃ na tat kvacana labhyate ¹ 29
Under the circumstances, the advice of the Vāsiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa is :

daivaikaparatāṃ tyaktvā bālabodhopakalpitāṃ ||

nijaṃ prayatnam āśritya cittam ādau nirodhayet ² 30

"One should give up one's sole dependence on fate which is an entity assumed for the purpose of instructing the ignorant. One should have recourse to one's own efforts and first control the mind." More explicit is the following statement :

prāktanī vāsanādyāpi pauruṣeṇāvajīyate |

hyaḥ kukarmādyā yatnena prayāti hi sukarmatām || ³ 31

"Even to-day the earlier *vāsanās*, the impressions left on the mind by earlier actions, good or bad, which are responsible

1. VI (i). 29. 9.

2. VI (i). 29. 9-10.

3. VI (i). 51. 47.

for all feelings of pleasure or pain can be conquered by present efforts. A bad deed done yesterday can be converted into a good one by *pauruṣa* or *yatna*, the present effort.

Further in VI(i). 104 it is said that this is the decision of *niyati* : *niyater eṣa niścayaḥ* and further, *durlaṅghya eṣa niyato niyater vilāsaḥ*, "that the way of *niyati* is pre-determined and cannot be transgressed." *Niyati* here is the pre-determined course of events conditioned by good or bad actions performed by an individual in earlier births.

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